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Abstract
As both the scope and scale of data collection increases, an increasingly large amount of sen-
sitive personal information is being analyzed. In this thesis, we study the feasibility of effectively
carrying out such analyses while respecting the privacy concerns of all parties involved. In partic-
ular, we consider algorithms that satisfy differential privacy [30], a stringent notion of privacy that
guarantees no individual’s data has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the information released about the
database. Over the past decade, there has been tremendous progress in understanding when accu-
rate data analysis is compatible with differential privacy, with both elegant algorithms and striking
impossibility results. However, if we ask further when accurate and computationally efﬁcient data
analysis is compatible with differential privacy then our understanding lags far behind. In this the-
sis, we make several contributions to understanding the complexity of differentially private data
analysis:
 We show a sharp upper bound on the number of linear queries that can be accurately an-
swered while satisfying differential privacy by an efﬁcient algorithm, assuming the existence
of cryptographic traitor-tracing schemes.
 We show even stronger computational barriers for algorithms that generate private synthetic
data—a new database that consists of “fake” records but preserves certain statistical prop-
erties of the original database. Under cryptographic assumptions, any efﬁcient differentially
private algorithm that generates synthetic data cannot preserve even extremely simple prop-
erties of the database, even the pairwise correlations between the attributes.
 On the positive side, we design new algorithms for the widely-used class of marginal queries
that are faster and require less data.
Computational inefﬁciency is not the only barrier to effective privacy-preserving data analysis.
Another potential obstacle is that many of the existing differentially private algorithms do not
iiiguarantee privacy for the data analyst, which would lead researchers with sensitive or proprietary
queries to seek other means of access to the database. We also contribute to our understanding of
privacy for the analyst:
 We design new algorithms for answering large sets of queries that guarantee differential
privacy for the database and ensure differential privacy for the analysts, even if all other
analysts collude.
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Introduction
Widercollectionofdataispredictedtohaveatransformativeeffectinareasasdiverseashealth-
care, education, government, and online commerce (see [48, 63, 56] for a few examples of such
claims), and research in statistics, machine learning, and the social sciences is rapidly generating
more powerful data analysis techniques to harness the commercial and social value of this data.
However, many of the richest and most important data sets are comprised of sensitive, private in-
formation. The result is a dilemma: allowing unrestricted access to and sharing of this data might
be unethical, illegal, or reputationally damaging for the data collectors, holders, and analysts, and
this harm cuts against the social beneﬁt of analyzing the data. On the other hand, access to the
data can be partially or completely restricted, which gives up on some or all of the opportunities
for social beneﬁts altogether. The ﬁeld of privacy-preserving data analysis seeks to create a third
option by designing methods for analyzing sensitive data that enable researchers to realize the so-
cial beneﬁts of the data without compromising individual privacy. However, combining these two
goals is a delicate task. Indeed, there have been several high proﬁle “re-identiﬁcations” of suppos-
edly anonymous data sets that have lead to tighter control of sensitive data—the re-identiﬁcation
of former Governor of Massachusetts William Weld’s medical records [85], re-identiﬁcation of
certain users’ movie rental history in the Netﬂix dataset [69], and the re-identiﬁcation of users
from AOL search records [11] being just a few examples. There are also academic papers suggest-
ing that many more datasets may be re-identiﬁable, such as databases of genetic information for
genome-wide association studies [49], anonymized social network graphs [68], and databases of
anonymized writing samples [67].
1In this thesis we study privacy-preserving data analysis under differential privacy. Differen-
tial privacy, introduced by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [30] (building on [26, 34, 15])
is a stringent notion of privacy that guarantees no individual’s data has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the information released about the database. More precisely, a differentially private algorithm is
randomized, and comes with the guarantee that the distribution of the algorithm’s outputs remains
nearly unchanged, in a precise technical sense, if a single individual’s record in the database is
added or removed from the dataset. Intuitively, since no individual’s data has a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the output of the algorithm, then it is impossible for the algorithm to reveal a signiﬁcant
amount of information speciﬁc to any one individual.1 We encourage the reader to look at the
excellent surveys by Cynthia Dwork [28, 29] for more interpretation of and the motivation behind
the deﬁnition of differential privacy.
For its strong guarantees, differential privacy comes at a price. Indeed, there has been a great
deal of attention on understanding to what extent differential privacy is compatible with useful data
analysis. In this thesiswe willfocus on aparticular data analysis task—answering counting queries
on a sensitive database. Counting queries are of the form “What fraction of individual records in
the database D satisfy some property q?” In addition to being a natural framework for studying
the feasibility of differentially private data analysis, counting queries are a very general primitive
that enable a wide variety of computational tasks in statistics, machine learning, and computational
learning theory. The line of work on answering counting queries under the constraints of differen-
tial privacy has produced some beautiful and striking results, suggesting that a great deal of useful
data analysis is possible. These results roughly fall into three categories:
1) Some of the earliest results in differential privacy [26, 15, 30] gave a simple, efﬁcient algo-
rithm capable of privately accurately answering nearly n2 counting queries, by perturbing
the answers to the queries independently with random noise. Here and in the sequel n = jDj
denotes the number of individual records in the database.
2) A beautiful and surprising result of Blum, Ligett, and Roth [16] showed how to approxi-
mately answer exponentially many counting queries on a sensitive database. There have been
several exciting developments [32, 46, 78, 35, 44, 42, 43, 50, 70] showing how to achieve
1This statement was only intended to provide intuition for why the guarantee of differential privacy has an intuitive
relationship to individual privacy. We caution the reader against taking it literally, as it requires care to correctly
interpret the guarantees made by differential privacy.
2even stronger utility guarantees. All of these algorithms work by perturbing the answers to
the queries with carefully correlated noise, and as a result are computationally inefﬁcient.
3) A parallel line of work, beginning with the seminal results of Dinur and Nissim [26] shows
that these algorithms achieve nearly optimal utility among all differentially private algo-
rithms in terms of the number of counting queries answered and the desired level of accu-
racy.
Together, these results give a clear and nearly-complete picture of when accurate data analysis
is consistent with differential privacy, at least when we consider counting queries. However, as
we’ve alluded to, some of the most powerful algorithms for differentially private data analysis
(those in item 2 above) are not computationally efﬁcient. In many settings, the time to privately
answer the queries is exponential in the time to answer the queries without a guarantee of privacy.
Asaresult, thefeasibilityofdifferentiallyprivatedataanalysisisfarlessclearifwesimultaneously
require differential privacy, accuracy for counting queries, and computational efﬁciency. The issue
of computational efﬁciency is not purely theoretical, as running time considerations have been an
important part of several of the empirical papers on answering counting queries under differential
privacy [60, 61, 43]. If we cannot achieve all three of these goals simultaneously, at least in
practice, then differential privacy cannot resolve the dilemma of analyzing sensitive data.
In addition to computational inefﬁciency, there are several other issues that threaten to prevent
the adoption of differentially private data analysis. One such issue is privacy for the data analysts,
which is ignored in the above discussion where we had assumed that the database itself is the only
sensitive information we wish to protect. However, the increased value of data also increases the
value of proprietary methods for analyzing that data. Unfortunately, due to the need to correlate the
answers to different queries in complex ways, answers to queries asked by one analyst of a data set
may leak information about the queries asked by another analyst. For example, suppose we have a
database consisting of sensitive information about the online activities and purchasing behavior of
different consumers. An online retailer may want to query this database in order to train a classiﬁer
that will identify products new customers are likely to buy, and in particular this retailer’s com-
petitive advantage may be in knowing the best attributes to focus on when training the classiﬁer.
If their competitor can also query the database, and the algorithm does not satisfy analyst privacy,
then the competing retailer may be able to learn which attributes have been considered by queries
most frequently, and thus steal the trade secrets of the ﬁrst retailer. Revealing this information may
3be quite costly for the data analysts. Even if we are not concerned about the economic costs to the
online retailer, there is a risk that if we cannot prevent their queries from being leaked, then they
may seek other ways to access the data that are less safe for the individuals in the database. In
addition to possible economic harms to the analysts, such as in the preceding example, the queries
asked to the database may be embarrassing or stigmatizing, for instance if an analyst is trying to
determine how many participants in the database would support a political position that is believed
to be signiﬁcantly out of the mainstream. Designing ways to access the database that satisfy dif-
ferential privacy not only for the data subjects, but also for the data analysts is a potential way to
address all of these concerns and ease the path to adoption for privacy-preserving data analysis.
1.1 Contributions of this Thesis
In this thesis we present several new results on the complexity of differentially private data
release, and on the possibility of satisfying differential privacy for the analyst. We now give a
high-level summary of these results.
1.1.1 The Complexity of Natural Private Data Analysis Tasks
In Chapters 3 and 4 we show that computational complexity is a barrier for effective differen-
tially private data analysis, even for natural data analysis tasks.
Our ﬁrst contribution to this area is to demonstrate that, under standard cryptographic assump-
tions (namely, the existence of one-way functions), there is no efﬁcient differentially private algo-
rithm capable of accurately answering even n2+o(1) arbitrary counting queries. Here an efﬁcient
algorithm would be one whose running time is polynomial in the size of the database and the time
required to evaluate the queries without a guarantee of privacy. This result is essentially optimal
with respect to the number of queries, as the simplest differentially private algorithm—the Laplace
mechanism—accurately answers e 
(n2) counting queries. One way to summarize this result is that
if unless we restrict the types of queries we want to answer, or allow exponential running time,
then the Laplace mechanism is essentially the best possible differentially private algorithm. We
prove this result by reﬁning and extending the connection between differential privacy and crypto-
graphic traitor-tracing schemes discovered by Dwork et al. [32]. This work is forthcoming in the
Symposium on Theory of Computation (STOC 2013) [88].
4Although the previous result is essentially tight with respect to the number of queries, it is
not tight with respect to the type of queries. Indeed, the “hard queries” for the previous result
will be rather complex, and unlikely to reﬂect the type of queries a real data analyst would ask
about the database. Thus, a logical question to ask is whether or not it is possible to answer many
more than n2 “simple” queries. Our second contribution is to show even stronger computational
barriers that apply even to very simple queries and rule out a particular type of differentially private
algorithm. In particular, we show strong hardness results for algorithms that generate synthetic
databases—roughly, a new database with “fake” records that preserves certain properties of the
original database. We show that, assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is no efﬁcient
algorithm that generates a private synthetic database even if we only want to preserve the answers
to 2-way marginal queries (roughly the means of and pairwise correlations between attributes).
Our proof builds on the technique of Dwork et al. [32], who showed a similar result but for a small
but seemingly unrealistic family of queries. This work is joint with Salil Vadhan, and appeared in
the Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC 2011) [89].
1.1.2 Faster Algorithms for Privately Answering Marginal Queries
A natural approach to circumventing the computational hardness results of Chapters 3 and 4 is
to ﬁnd algorithms capable of answering large numbers of simple, natural counting queries, without
generating synthetic data. Arguably the simplest, natural family of queries are k-way marginal
queries. A k-way marginal query is asked on a database D whose records are strings of d bits,
specifying each individual’s value for d binary attributes. The query is speciﬁed by a set S  [d],
jSj  k, and a pattern t 2 f0;1gjSj. The query asks, “What fraction of the individual records in
D has each of the attributes j 2 S set to tj?” The set of k-way marginal queries, also known as
the “k-way contingency table” of the database, is a workhorse for statistical data analysis at orga-
nizations such as the US Census Bureau, and are a natural test-case for the power and feasibility
of differentially private data analysis. The number of k-way marginal queries is roughly d(k),
thus we could answer all such queries in time d(k) on a database of size d(k) using the Laplace
mechanism.
A previous series of results [41, 22, 45, 38] have used techniques from computational learning
theory to circumvent the computational barriers and give more efﬁcient algorithms for privately
releasing marginal queries. However, these results leave several open questions that we partially
5address. One weakness of these algorithms is that they do not yield accurate answers to every
marginal query, but rather give answers that have small average error over various distributions on
marginal queries. In Chapter 5, we give a differentially private algorithm that releases a summary
of the database from which an analyst can compute an accurate answer to every k-way marginal
query. The running time of the algorithm and the summary is dO(
p
k) and the answers will be
accurate as long as n  dO(
p
k). This work is joint with Justin Thaler and Salil Vadhan, and
appeared in the International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
2012) [87].
In order to give accurate answers, the algorithm in Chapter 5 and all prior algorithms for this
problem require a database that is much larger than what would be needed for an exponential time
algorithm. Recent experimental results by Hardt et al. [43] suggest that an exponential-time algo-
rithm based on the private multiplicative weights mechanism [44] is not far from being practical
and provides much better accuracy than other techniques when the database is relatively small.
Motivated by their experiments, we consider the possibility of designing algorithms for answering
k-way marginal queries on “small” databases with subexponential running time. In Chapter 6,
we give a differentially private algorithms that approximately answers all k-way marginal queries
on a database of size (kd:51) in time exp(d1 
(1=
p
k)). The minimum database size required by
our algorithm nearly matches the best-known information theoretic upper bound of e O(k
p
d) [44]
and matches the best-known information theoretic lower bound of e 
(maxfk;
p
dg) when k is
small [76, 90].
The algorithms of Chapter 5 and 6 are all based on the idea of encoding the answers to the
k-way marginal queries in a function (depending on the sensitive database) and privately learning
that function, which was introduced by Gupta et al. [41].2 Our private learning algorithms are
based on approximations to that function by low-degree polynomials, and in Chapter 6, we prove
various new upper and lower bounds on the degree of such approximating polynomials that may
have applications outside of differential privacy. The results of Chapter 6 are joint with Karthik
Chandrasekaran, Justin Thaler, and Andrew Wan [21].
2Here, the notion of private learning is deﬁned with respect to the database deﬁning the function being learned,
in contrast to previous works on “private learning” (e.g. [51]) where privacy is deﬁned with respect to the examples
given to the learning algorithm.
61.1.3 Differential Privacy for the Analyst
Computational complexity is not the only barrier to effective differentially private data anal-
ysis. Another barrier is that differentially private algorithms may not be entirely “safe” for an
analyst to use, as essentially any algorithm capable of answering large number of queries must
correlate its answers to the queries, and thus leak information about the sequence of queries that
were asked [33]. While this leakage seems harmless if we assume the queries are issued by a single
data analyst, in practice there will be multiple parties interested in analyzing sensitive data sets,
and the queries they ask may themselves be sensitive or proprietary. Motivated by these concerns,
Dwork, Naor, and Vadhan [33] introduced the notion of analyst differential privacy, and showed
the existence of an algorithm that answers exponentially many queries on a sensitive database and
ensures differential privacy not only for the database but for the queries made on the database.
The algorithm of Dwork et al. [33] suffers a few shortcomings: Their algorithm does not
achieve an optimal rate of error compared with algorithms that do not guarantee analyst privacy.
Also, their algorithm does not ensure differential privacy for the analyst if the other analysts col-
ludeormakequeriesundermultipleidentities. Finally, theiralgorithmisonlycapableofanswering
counting queries, and not arbitrary low-sensitivity queries.
In Chapter 7 we present a suite of new analyst-private algorithms. Some of our algorithms
answer linear queries with error poly(d;jQj)=
p
n, and thus has the optimal dependence on n, even
among algorithms that do not guarantee analyst privacy [26]. Another algorithm is capable of an-
swering exponentially many counting queries while guaranteeing differential privacy for the entire
set of queries asked by a single analyst, even if all other analysts collude. Yet another algorithm
is capable of answering arbitrary low-sensitivity queries. All of our algorithms are inspired by
a novel view of the private counting query release problem as privately computing equilibrium
strategies for a two-player zero-sum game. This viewpoint uniﬁes and generalizes several previous
approaches, in addition to enabling new results on analyst privacy.
7Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we will introduce the notation and standard results about differential privacy
that we rely on throughout this thesis.
2.1 Databases
We deﬁne a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n to be a collection of n rows (x(1);:::;x(n)) 2 f0;1gd.
We will always assume that n is public information (and thus not subject to privacy considerations)
and that the order of rows in D is irrelevant. We sometimes refer to f0;1gd as the data universe.
Two databases D;D0 2 (f0;1gd)n are adjacent if they differ only on a single row, and we denote
this relationship by D  D0. An alternative way to represent the database is not as a collection of
rows from f0;1gd, but rather as a probability distribution over f0;1gd. In this representation, we
view the database as a probability mass function D: f0;1gd ! [0;1] where D(x) is the fraction of
rows in D equal to the universe element x. For any two adjacent databases D  D0, the resulting
probability distributions will satisfy
1
2
X
x2f0;1gd
jD(x)   D(x
0)j =
1
n
:
2.2 Differential Privacy
The notion of differential privacy was formalized in the work of Dwork, McSherry, Nissim,
and Smith [30].
8Deﬁnition 2.1 (Differential Privacy). Let M: (f0;1gd)n ! R be a randomized algorithm that
takes a database as input (where n and d are varying parameters). M is (";)-differentially private
if for every two adjacent databases D  D0 and every S  R,
Pr[M(D) 2 S]  e
"Pr[M(D
0) 2 S] + :
If M is (";)-differentially private for some functions " = "(n) = O(1),  = (n) = negl(n), we
will drop the parameters " and  and say that M is differentially private.
Informally, differential privacy ensures that the contents of a single row of the database do not
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the output distribution of the algorithm. As a consequence, an adversary
who knows all the rows of the database but one, “cannot learn much” from seeing the output of a
differentially private algorithm applied to that database.
Differential privacy is easy to achieve on its own; simply ignore the database and output ?.
Thus, the goal is to ﬁnd useful algorithms that satisfy this deﬁnition. For example, it is possible to
approximately compute the value of a function on the database while satisfying differential privacy
by evaluating that function, and then adding noise whose standard deviation is somewhat larger
than the maximum inﬂuence a single row of the database can have on the output of the function.
By doing so, the contents of that row do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the output. This approach is
typically known as the Laplace mechanism, and is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.1.
In this thesis, we will assume that the range R is discrete. Doing so has a number of ad-
vantages: it avoids subtleties in the deﬁnition of differential privacy that arise when the range is
continuous and it also avoids certain security vulnerabilities that arise in the implementation of
real-valued differentially private algorithms using ﬂoating-point arithmetic, discovered in a clever
attack by Mironov [65]. Nonetheless, many differentially private algorithms, such as the Laplace
mechanism, are mathematically cleaner to deﬁne and analyze using a continuous range of outputs.
In Section 2.4.1 we discuss how to implement the continuous Laplace mechanism using a discrete
range without signiﬁcantly degrading its guarantees. For the other algorithms we discuss, we will
suppress this issue and use a continuous range when appropriate, with the understanding that these
algorithms can be modiﬁed to have a discrete range without affecting the results substantively.
We conclude this section with a useful lemma that gives a sufﬁcient condition for an algorithm
to be differentially private. In some cases it is easier to establish this condition than it is to establish
differential privacy directly.
9Lemma 2.2 ([35]). Let M: (f0;1gd)n ! R be an algorithm. For any "; > 0, if it holds that for
every pair of adjacent databases D  D0,
Pr
r RM(D)
   ln

Pr[M(D) = r]
Pr[M(D0) = r]
     "

 1   ;
then M satisﬁes (";)-differential privacy.
Note that, since we have assumed R is discrete, we are justiﬁed in writing Pr[M(D) = r].
2.2.1 Composition of Differentially Private Algorithms
An important property of differential privacy is that it is well-behaved under composition.
The simplest composition theorem for differential private states that if M1 and M2 are (";)-
differentially private algorithms then the algorithm M(D) = (M1(D);M2(D)) is a (2";2)-
differentially private algorithm. By induction, this property implies that if we apply T (";)-
differentially private algorithms to D, then the result is (T";T)-differentially private. For our
results, we will use an even stronger composition property, due to Dwork, Roth, and Vadhan [35].
First, they showed that the rate at which differential privacy decays under T-fold composition can
actually be shown to be approximately
p
T, rather than linear in T. They also showed that these
bounds on the deterioration of privacy under composition hold even if the sequence of algorithms
M1;:::;MT is chosen adaptively. We model adaptive composition via a game with a (computa-
tionally unbounded) privacy adversary A, described in Figure 1.
Let D 2 (f0;1gd)n be a database, A be an adversary, and T 2 N be a parameter.
For t = 1;:::;T:
A(y1;:::;yt 1) chooses an ("0;0)-differentially private algorithm Mt: (f0;1gd)n ! R.
yt  R Mt(D).
End For
Output: y1;:::;yT
Figure 1: A framework for adaptive composition.
We can now formally state the composition properties of differential privacy as follows:
10Theorem 2.3 (Composition of Differential Privacy [30, 35]). Fix any 1=2  "0;0 > 0. For
every adversary A, database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, and y1;:::;yT 2 R, let MA(D) be the algorithm
obtained by performing the experiment of Figure 1 and outputting y1;:::;yT. Then we have
1) MA is (T"0;T0)-differentially private, and
2) for any  > 0, MA is (";T0 + )-differentially private for
" =
p
2T log(1=)"0 + 2T"
2
0:
In particular, if an algorithm M can be expressed as the T-fold adaptive composition of ("0;0)-
differentially private algorithms for "0  "=T, then M is (";0)-differentially private. Further, if
M can be expressed as the T-fold adaptive composition of ("0;0)-differentially private algorithms
for "0  "=
p
8T log(1=), then M is (";)-differentially private.
2.3 Sanitizers and Counting Queries
For our study, we must deﬁne a data analysis task that we would like to accomplish while sat-
isfying differential privacy. In this work we focus on differentially private algorithms that answer
counting queries on the sensitive database. A counting query on f0;1gd is deﬁned by a function
q: f0;1gd ! [0;1]. Counting queries are also referred to as linear queries.3 Abusing notation, we
deﬁne the evaluation of a query q on a database D = (x(1);:::;x(n)) 2 (f0;1gd)n to be
q(D) =
1
n
n X
i=1
q(x
(i))
When d is a varying parameter, we use Q(d) to denote a set of counting queries on f0;1gd and
Q =
S
d2N Q(d). Typically we simply write Q when d is clear from context.
We call algorithms that answer counting queries sanitizers. A sanitizer takes a database and
a sequence of counting queries from some family Q as input and returns a sequence of answers
to those queries. Formally a sanitizer is a function M: (f0;1gd)n  (Q(d))k ! Rk (where n;d,
and k are varying parameters). Here we assume that M simply returns a list of k real-valued an-
swers, with the understanding that the j-th component of the output is an answer to the j-th query.
3Typically a counting query is deﬁne by a predicate q: f0;1gd ! f0;1g whereas linear query is deﬁned by a
real-valued function q: f0;1gd ! [0;1]. However, we use counting query for the more general deﬁnition.
11This assumption will turn out to be without loss of generality, even if we consider computational
efﬁciency. Any algorithm that encodes the answers to each of the queries in some arbitrary efﬁ-
cient data structure can be converted to one that encodes its answers as a list of real numbers by
querying the data structure k times. Since the length of M’s input is at least k, this additional
computation time is acceptable. Deﬁnition 2.1 extends naturally to sanitizers by requiring that for
every Q = (q1;:::;qk)  Q, the sanitizer MQ() = M(;Q) is (";)-differentially private as a
function of the input database.
Now we formally deﬁne what it means for a sanitizer to accurately answer counting queries
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Accuracy of Sanitizers). Let D be a database and Q = (q1;:::;qk) be a set of
counting queries and  > 0 be a parameter. A sequence of answers a1;:::;ak is -accurate for
q1;:::;qk on D if
8j 2 [k];jqj(D)   ajj  :
Let Q be a set of counting queries, k 2 N and ; > 0 be parameters. A sanitizer M is (;)-
accurate for k queries from Q if for every database D 2 (f0;1gd)n and every sequence of queries
Q = (q1;:::;qk)  Q
Pr
M’s coins
[M(D;Q) is -accurate for Q on D]  1   :
In some cases we will suppress certain parameters from the deﬁnition of accuracy. In particular, if
M is (;)-accurate for k queries from Q, for every k 2 N and some ; (possibly depending on
the other parameters), we will say that M is (;)-accurate for Q. When Q is clear from context
we will suppress it, and if  is omitted it should be assumed to be some function  = (n) =
negl(n). If M is -accurate for k queries from Q, for  = 1=3, we will drop  and  and say that
M is accurate for k queries from Q.
The above deﬁnition of a sanitizer captures the setting where the queries are speciﬁed by the
analyst. Many applications of differential privacy necessitate a one-shot data release, where the
data owner computes and publishes a single differentially private summary of the database that
enables analysts to compute an answer to any query in Q. In this setting, we typically think of the
class of queries as ﬁxed, rather than being input to the sanitizer. We call such a sanitizer a one-shot
sanitizer. Conceptually, the difference between the two models is that a sanitizer is answering a
set Q of queries explicitly requested by the data analyst, and thus it is both natural and necessary
12to run in time poly(jQj). However, in the one-shot model, we typically imagine that the family
Q of queries contains all the queries the analyst may ask, which is a much larger set that those
the analyst will actually compute. Thus in the one-shot model the natural running time for the
algorithm may even be sublinear in jQj (e.g. when Q contains all marginal queries, and jQj = 2d).
We will consider the one-shot model in Chapters 4-6 when we study the family of marginal queries.
When concerned about computational complexity, it is not without loss of generality to assume
that a one-shot sanitizer outputs a list of jQj real-valued answers, since jQj may be exponentially
large in the length of the sanitizer’s input. Thus, we allow M to output an arbitrary data structure
S from a range S, and that there be an evaluator function E : S  Q ! R that estimates q(D)
from the output of M(D) and the description of q. For example, M may output a vector S =
(q(D) + Zq)q2Q where Zq is a random variable for each q 2 Q, and E(S;q) is the q-th component
of S 2 R = RjQj. Abusing notation, we will write q(S) and q(M(D)) as shorthand for E(S;q)
and E(M(D);q), respectively.
We will say that a one-shot sanitizer M is accurate for the concept class Q if the answers
q(M(D)) are close to the fractional counts q(D). Formally
Deﬁnition 2.5 (Accuracy for One-Shot Sanitizers). An output S of a one-shot sanitizer M(D) is
-accurate for a family of counting queries Q on D if
8q 2 Q;jq(S)   q(D)j  :
A one-shot sanitizer M is (;)-accurate for Q if for every database D,
Pr
M’s coins
[M(D) is -accurate for Q on D]  1   :
When Q is clear from context, we simply write that M is an (;)-accurate one-shot sanitizer.
Synthetic Data. It is especially desirable to design one-shot sanitizers that generate synthetic
data. A one-shot sanitizer generates synthetic data if its output is a summary b D 2 (f0;1gd)b n, for a
suitable choice of b n, and its evaluator is E(b D;q) = q(b D). That is, the output is a new database with
the same number of columns (though possibly a different number of rows), and the evaluation of
a query is performed simply by evaluating the query on this new database as if it were the original
database. In Chapter 4 we show strong computational hardness results for one-shot sanitizers that
generate private synthetic data.
132.3.1 Efﬁciency of Sanitizers
Simply stated, we view a sanitizer as efﬁcient if it runs in time polynomial in the length of
its input. For a one-shot sanitizer, the only input is the database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, thus an efﬁcient
one-shot sanitizer runs in time poly(d;n). In Chapters 4-6 we will take a more reﬁned view and
show speciﬁc upper and lower bounds on the time complexity of certain one-shot sanitizers, but it
is useful to keep in mind that poly(d;n) is the natural notion of efﬁciency for a one-shot sanitizer.
For sanitizers that are not one-shot, the natural notion of efﬁciency will depend on how the
queries are given to the sanitizer as input. Notice that to specify an arbitrary counting query
q: f0;1gd ! f0;1g requires 2d bits. In this case, a sanitizer whose running time is polynomial
in the time required to specify the query is not especially efﬁcient. Thus, we restrict attention to
queriesthatareefﬁcientlycomputable, soarenotthebottleneckincomputation. Forourresults, we
will ﬁx the representation to be Boolean circuits over the basis f^;_;:g with possibly unbounded
fan-in. In this representation, any query can be evaluated in time jqj, where j  j denotes the size
of the circuit computing q. We also want to consider the case where the queries are computable
by circuits of low depth. For a constant h 2 N, we use Q
(d)
depth h to denote the set of all counting
queries on f0;1gd speciﬁed by circuits of depth h. Finally, we use Q
(d)
all to denote the set of all
counting queries on f0;1gd.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (Efﬁciency of Sanitizers). A sanitizer M is efﬁcient if, on input a database
D 2 (f0;1gd)n and k queries q1;:::;qk 2 Q
(d)
all , M runs in time poly(d;n;jq1j +  + jqkj). For
every h 2 N, a sanitizer M is efﬁcient for depth-h queries if, on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n
and k queries q1;:::;qk 2 Q
(d)
depth h, M runs in time poly(d;n;jq1j +  + jqkj).
2.4 Some Differentially Private Algorithms
We now introduce two interesting differentially private algorithms. In this chapter we focus on
the algorithms necessary to provide context for our new results. In later chapters we will introduce
additional algorithmic techniques as they are needed.
142.4.1 The Laplace Mechanism
The most basic differentially private algorithm is the so-called Laplace mechanism, introduced
by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [30]. Essentially, the Laplace mechanism computes
the correct answers to the queries and perturbs them independently with noise from a Laplace
distribution. We can apply the Laplace mechanism to more than just counting queries; it can be
applied more generally to low-sensitivity queries. Let q: (f0;1gd)n ! R be a real-valued function.
We deﬁne the (global) sensitivity of q as
q = max
DD0 jq(D)   q(D
0)j:
If q has sensitivity , then we say q is -sensitive. For a parameter  > 0, we deﬁne the Laplace
distribution, Lap() over R to be have the probability density function Lap()[z] / exp( jzj=).
Deﬁnition 2.7 (Laplace mechanism [30]). Let MLap()(D;q) = q(D) + Z where Z is chosen
according to Lap().
The deﬁnition of accuracy (Deﬁnitions 2.4 and 2.5) extends naturally to answering real-valued
queries other than counting queries.
For an appropriate choice of , the Laplace mechanism guarantees differential privacy.
Theorem 2.8 ([30]). Let q be a query with global sensitivity q. For  = q=", the Laplace
mechanism MLap()(D;q) is (";)-differentially private.
An elementary fact about the Laplace distribution is that for any ;t > 0,
Pr
Z RLap()
[jZj > t]  e
 t:
This fact will be useful for bounding the error introduced by the Laplace mechanism in order to
obtain privacy.
When answering a small number of queries with low-sensitivity, the Laplace mechanism pro-
vides good accuracy. In particular, we can obtain the following lemma, which follows by combin-
ing Theorem 2.8, composition theorems for differential privacy (Theorem 2.3) and the above fact
about the tails of the Laplace distribution.
Lemma 2.9. Let Q = fq1;:::;qkg be a set of -sensitive queries qj: (f0;1gd)n ! R, and let
D 2 (f0;1gd)n be a database. For any  > 0, let MLap()(D;Q) be the sanitizer that outputs
15MLap()(D;qj) for each qj 2 Q (using independent randomness for each query). Then the follow-
ing both hold:
1) For every "; > 0, if  = k=", then MLap() is (";0)-differentially private and (;)-
accurate for
 =
k log(k=)
"
:
2) For every ";; > 0 if  = 
p
8k log(1=)=", then MLap() is (";)-differentially private
and (;)-accurate for
 =

p
8k log(1=)log(k=)
"
:
The Discrete Laplace Mechanism
As we discussed, we will actually assume that algorithms have discrete outputs. In addition to
simplifying the deﬁnition of privacy, assuming a discrete range will also make it easier to make a
precisestatementaboutthecomplexityoftheLaplacemechanism. Althoughwewillcontinueview
the output of the Laplace mechanism as a real number, since this leads to cleaner mathematical
statements, forpurposesofcomputationalcomplexitywewillassumethattheoutputoftheLaplace
mechanism is rounded to a discrete range. That is, to compute the answer, we will round the true
answer q(D) down to an integer multiple of , for a suitable choice of  > 0, and then add
a noise term Z 2 Z from a discretized version of the Laplace mechanism Lap(), in which
PrZ RLap() [Z = z] / exp( z=) for every z 2 Z.
First, weobservethatroundingcanonlyincreasethesensitivityofaqueryby. Wewillchoose
 small enough that +  2, and the discretized Laplace mechanism remains 2"-differentially
private. In most cases (e.g. counting queries) we could even eliminate this constant-factor blowup.
Since all of the results of this paper are asymptotic, we will ignore this constant-factor increase.
Similarly, privacy is not affected when we apply the Laplace mechanism to multiple queries and
apply the composition theorem.
Second, we note that Lap() can be sampled in expected time  e = using the following
procedure: generate a random sign b 2 f0;1g. Then, generate a non-negative integer z by ini-
tializing z to 0 and then repeatedly incrementing z by 1, deciding to stop after each increment
independently with probability 1   e =. Finally, output Z = b  z. If we want a worst-case
bound on running time we can stop the incrementing of z at a suitable value and this will come at
16the expense of achieving only (";)-differential privacy for  > 0. Since the appropriate value at
which to stop will depend on , and in turn on the application, we will omit the details here.
Finally, we need to consider how  should be set. In all of our applications, it will be sufﬁcient
to take  = poly() (note that in most applications, e.g. counting queries,  < 1). Since dis-
cretizing to multiples of  can only introduce additional error , and we are already accounting for
error at least   , discretizing will only introduce additional error that is smaller than a constant
factor. Again, since all of our accuracy bounds are asymptotic, we will simply ignore this constant
factor when proving accuracy, and ignore the small additional error incurred by discretization.
Summary of the Laplace Mechanism
The only additional work done by the Laplace mechanism beyond what would be required to
answer the queries non-privately is to add independent noise to each query. As we discussed, for
a discrete version of the Laplace mechanism this noise can be added in time poly() per query.
Thus the mechanism is clearly efﬁcient in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.6. Also note that for a counting
query, q(D) = 1
n
Pn
i=1 q(x(i)), the sensitivity is  = 1=n. So we can summarize the properties of
the Laplace mechanism for answering counting queries with the following corollary:
Corollary 2.10. For an appropriate choice of , the Laplace mechanism MLap is 1) differentially
private, 2) efﬁcient, and 3) accurate for e 
(n2) queries from Qall.
We remark that this statement is essentially tight, because there exists a k = e O(n2) such that
for any choice of  > 0, the Laplace mechanism does not satisfy both differential privacy and
non-trivial accuracy for k counting queries.
2.4.2 The Private Sparse Vector Technique
An extremely useful building block for differentially private sanitizers is the private sparse
vector algorithm. This technique was ﬁrst introduced in the work of Dwork et al. [31] and has
subsequently been abstracted and generalized (cf. [77]). Intuitively the sparse vector algorithm
takes as input a database and a set of low-sensitivity queries, with the promise that only a small
number of the queries have large answers on the input database. Its output is a set of queries with
large answers on the input database. For this work, we will need a slight modiﬁcation of the private
sparse vector algorithm that ensures (";0)-one-query-to-many-analyst differential privacy (here we
17assume each query has been issued by a separate analyst). We achieve this additional property by
randomizing the parameter b `, specifying the number of queries with large answer that are allowed
before the sparse vector algorithm terminates. This modiﬁcation is the only place in which our
presentation of the algorithm differs from the standard presentation (e.g. [77]).
MSV(D;Q = fq1;:::;qkg;;;`):
Let "0 = "=
p
8`log(1=),  = 2="0, c = 0.
Let b ` = 2` + z where z  R Lap(1=")
For: j = 1;:::;k
Let b j =  + 2 log(4k=) + vj where vj  R Lap().
Let zj  R Lap().
If: qj(D) + zj  b j Then:
Output: qj(D) + zj
Let c = c + 1.
Else:
Output: ?
End If.
If: c  b ` Then: Halt.
End For.
Figure 2: The private sparse vector algorithm.
We can summarize the properties of the private sparse vector algorithm (Figure 2) in the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 2.11 (Modiﬁcation of [77]). Fix "; > 0 in the private sparse vector algorithm. Let
Q = fq1;:::;qkg be a set of -sensitive queries, qj: (f0;1gd)n ! R. Let D 2 (f0;1gd)n be a
database. Let ; 2 R and ` 2 f1;:::;kg be such that `  log(4=)=" and
jfj j qj(D) > gj  `:
Then the following all hold:
1) MSV is (";)-differentially private.
182) MSV(D;Q;;;`) returns a set I  f1;:::;kg such that with probability at least 1   , I
is of size at most 3` and contains the index of every query with answer signiﬁcantly larger
than . Speciﬁcally, with probability at least 1   ,
(
j j qj(D)   +
24
p
`log(1=)log(4k=)
"
)
 I
3) Finally, for every j 2 f1;:::;kg, the j-th output does not depend signiﬁcantly on any other
query. Speciﬁcally if Q0 =

q1;:::;qj 1;q0
j0;qj+1;:::;qk
	
, then for every D, every j 6= j0,
and every I  f1;:::;kg n fj0g
Pr[MSV(D;Q) = I]  e
"Pr[MSV(D;Q
0) = I]:
The ﬁrst two properties articulated in Lemma 2.11 are reasonably intuitive and describe the
privacy and utility properties of the private sparse vector algorithm. Property 3 is somewhat non-
standard, andstatesthatthej-thoutputofthesparsevectoralgorithmisnotsigniﬁcantlyinﬂuenced
by the j0-th query for j0 6= j. In other words, the sparse vector algorithm satisﬁes differential
privacy for a single input query. The intuition for why Property 3 holds is that all of the outputs
other than the j0-th output can be simulated using only the queries Q n fqj0g and the current value
of b ` c, and only the latter quantity contains any information about qj0—speciﬁcally, which branch
of the if-statement qj0 fell into can affect this quantity by at most 1. However, since noise chosen
from Lap(1=") was added to b `, the differential privacy of the Laplace mechanism ensures that this
change of at most 1 is largely hidden. Finally, we remark that the queries used in the sparse vector
algorithm need not be speciﬁed ahead of time, as each query is processed individually.
We will rely on the sparse vector technique itself in Chapter 7 as a tool for constructing sani-
tizers that satisfy analyst differential privacy.
2.4.3 The IDC Framework
One of the many powerful applications of the sparse vector technique is to convert a certain
kind of “online learning algorithm” called an iterative database construction (IDC) into a differ-
entially private sanitizer. This framework for designing differentially private sanitizers—the “IDC
framework”—was introduced by the author in joint work with Gupta and Roth [42], although we
19have chosen not to emphasize the results in this thesis. In this section we will introduce the deﬁni-
tion of an IDC and discuss how it can be used to construct sanitizers.
Roughly, an IDC works by maintaining a sequence of data structures S(1);S(2); 2 S that
give increasingly good approximations to some database D with respect to answering queries
from a family Q. Moreover, the mechanism produces the next approximation in the sequence by
considering only one query y(t) that “distinguishes” the real database in the sense that
jq
(t)(S
(t))   q
(t)(D)j
is large.4
Syntactically, an IDC is an object of the following type. There is an update function U :
S  Q  R ! S. The inputs to U are a database summary S 2 S, which represents the current
approximation; a query q 2 Q, which distinguishes the approximation S from the true database
D; and also a real number that estimates q(D). Formally, we deﬁne a database update sequence
to capture the sequence of inputs to U used to generate the sequence S(1);S(2);:::.
Deﬁnition 2.12 (Database Update Sequence). Let D 2 (f0;1gd)n be any database and let

(S(t);q(t);b a(t))
	
t=1;:::;C 2 (S QR)C be a sequence of tuples. We say the sequence of updates
is an (U;D;Q;;C)-database update sequence if the following properties are all satisﬁed:
1) S(1) = U(;;;).
2) For every t = 1;2;:::;C,

q(t)(D)   q(t)(S(t))

  .
3) For every t = 1;2;:::;C,
 q(t)(D)   b a(t)   =2.
4) For every t = 1;2;:::;C   1, S(t+1) = U(S(t);q(t);b a(t)).
We note that for all of the iterative database constructions we consider, the approximate answer
b a(t) is used only to determine the sign of q(t)(D) q(t)(S(t)), which is the motivation for requiring
that b a(t) have error smaller than . The main measures of efﬁciency we’re interested in from an
iterative database construction are the maximum number of updates we need to perform before
the database S(t) approximates D well with respect to the queries in Q and the time required to
compute U. To this end we deﬁne an iterative database construction as follows:
4As was the case with one-shot sanitizers, since S is an arbitrary data structure, we must specify a way to compute
the answer to a query q 2 Q from the approximation S. In all our applications, this procedure will be clear from
context and we will abuse notation by writing q(S) to indicate that this procedure should be applied to S.
20Deﬁnition 2.13 (Iterative Database Construction). Let U : S  Q  R ! S be an update
function. We say U is an iterative database construction with mistake bound B for query family Q
(where B may depend on the parameters of the IDC) if for every database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, every
(U;D;Q;;C)-database update sequence satisﬁes C  B.
Note that the deﬁnition of U is such that if U is an iterative database construction with mistake
bound B, then given any maximal (U;D;Q;;C)-database update sequence, the ﬁnal approxi-
mation S(C) must satisfy
8q 2 Q;
 q(D)   q(S
(C))
   :
Otherwise, there would exist another query satisfying property 2 of Deﬁnition 2.12, contradicting
maximality.
We can obtain the following theorem by combining any IDC with the sparse vector technique.
For a set of queries Q from a family of queries Q, and let MIDC(D;Q) be the following: processes
queries q 2 Q in an arbitrary order, for each query qj deﬁne a function fj(D) = jqj(D) qj(S(t))j,
where S(t) will be the current approximation used by the IDC when the j-th query is considered.
Run the sparse vector algorithm on D and the set of queries F = ffjg, with accuracy parameters
2 and , and ` = B. After each round in which fj(D) has a large answer, use qj as the distin-
guishing query for U to obtain a new approximation S(t+1). Since the IDC is publicly known, the
values S(t) can be computed by the analyst and thus the value jqj(D) qj(S(t))j+zj is sufﬁcient for
the analyst to recover an accurate answer to qj(D). We remark that typically the step of deriving
an approximation to qj(D) would be incorporated into the speciﬁcation of the algorithm.
We can summarize the privacy and accuracy of this approach with the following theorems:
Theorem 2.14. The algorithm MIDC(D;Q) deﬁned above is (";)-differentially private.
Theorem 2.15. Let  > 0 be a parameter and Q be a family of counting queries. If there is an
iterative database construction, U, with mistake bound B for Q then MIDC(D;Q) deﬁned above
is an (";)-differentially private sanitizer that is (4;)-accurate for any set of queries Q from Q
and runs in time poly(TU;d;n;jq1j +  + jqkj) so long as
n 
16
p
B log(jQj=)log(4=)
"
:
Here TU is the running time of U.
21The privacy of the IDC construction follows from privacy of the sparse vector technique
(Lemma 2.11). Accuracy will follow from the mistake bound of the IDC, which will ensure that
the number of functions fj such that fj(D) is large will be at most B. The requirement that n be
sufﬁciently large ensures that the noise added by the sparse vector algorithm is sufﬁciently small.
Speciﬁcally, if the noise is sufﬁciently small, then the set of queries qj such that fj(D) is large will
constitute a database update sequence and the mistake bound of the IDC will apply.
In Chapter 6 we will construct a new IDC for the family of k-way marginal queries, and thus
obtain a new sanitizer for k-way marginal queries via Theorem 2.15. In Chapter 7 we will design
a new sanitizer achieving analyst differential privacy and we will use the fact that it can be cast in
the IDC framework to argue that it satisﬁes differential privacy for the data subjects.
2.4.4 The Private Multiplicative Weights Algorithm
The Laplace mechanism is quite powerful, and is tough to match for simplicity and efﬁciency.
However, it is quite limited in that it can answer at most quadratically many counting queries
while maintaining privacy and non-trivial accuracy. One of the major achievements of differential
privacy has been the discovery of (inefﬁcient) sanitizers that accurately answer exponentially many
counting queries. The ﬁrst such algorithm was due to Blum, Ligett, and Roth [16]. The strongest
quantitative guarantees in terms of running time and accuracy are given by variants of the private
multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [44], and so we will use this algorithm as
a reference point. The private multiplicative weights algorithm will be used as a tool for obtaining
algorithms satisfying analyst differential privacy in Chatper 7, and a variant of the algorithm will
be used in Chapter 6 to give faster sanitizers for answering marginal queries. Private multiplicative
weights also serves as a foil for the hardness results of Chatpers 3 and 4.
The following lemma summarizes the properties of the private multiplicative weights algo-
rithm, using the improved analysis from Gupta et al. [42].
Lemma 2.16. Let D 2 (f0;1gd)n be a database and Q = fq1;:::;qkg be a set of (1=n)-sensitive
counting queries, qj: (f0;1gd)n ! [0;1]. Let MMW(D;Q) be the private multiplicative weights
algorithm. Then the following all hold:
1) MMW is (";)-differentially private.
222) For any  > 0, MMW is (;)-accurate for
 = O
 
d
1=4
p
log(k=)log(1=)
p
"n
!
;
and
3) MMW runs in time poly(2d;n;k;jq1j +  + jqkj).
In our terminology, we can summarize the properties of the private multiplicative weights al-
gorithm with the following corollary:
Corollary 2.17. The private multiplicative weights mechanism MMW is 1) differentially private,
2) is accurate for 2
e 
(n)=
p
d queries from Q
(d)
all , and, 3) on input a set of queries q1;:::;qk 2 Q
(d)
all ,
runs in time poly(2d;n;jq1j +  + jqkj).
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Answering n2+o(1) Arbitrary Counting
Queries is Hard
In this chapter we give new hardness results for differentially private sanitizers that answer
a large number of queries. Recall from Chapter 2 that the best efﬁcient sanitizer, the Laplace
mechanism, is capable of answering nearly n2 arbitrary counting queries with non-trivial accuracy.
On the other hand, inefﬁcient algorithms such as private multiplicative weights [44] can accurately
answer nearly 2n queries, and it is information-theoretically impossible to answer more than 2n
queries [26]. Thus, for efﬁcient sanitizers there is a huge gap in our knowledge between n2 and 2n
queries, and (under cryptographic assumptions) this gap is almost completely closed by the results
of this chapter.
3.1 Results and Techniques
We prove the following new hardness results for answering counting queries while satisfying
differential privacy.
Theorem 3.1. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is no efﬁcient, differentially
private sanitizer that is accurate for n2+o(1) queries from Qall.
That is, there is no algorithm that, on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n and n2+o(1) efﬁciently
(poly(d;n)-time)computablecountingqueries, runsintimepoly(d;n)andreturnsanapproximate
answer to each query to within 1=3, while satisfying differential privacy.
24Recall that we use Qall to denote the set of all counting queries. The choice of 1=3 in the
conclusion is arbitrary, and can be replaced with any constant less than 1=2.
In particular, Theorem 3.1 applies to online sanitizers, which are sanitizers that receive (pos-
sibly adaptively chosen) queries one at a time. Many positive results achieve this stronger notion
of sanitization. Although we have not presented it as such, the Laplace mechanism is an efﬁcient
online sanitizer that answers e 
(n2) queries and the private multiplicative weights algorithm is an
online sanitizer that can answer nearly 2n queries in time poly(2d;n) per query [78, 44, 42].
We also show that the same theorem holds even for queries that are computable by unbounded-
fan-in circuits of depth 6 over the basis f^;_;:g (a subset of the well-studied class AC0), albeit
under a strong (but plausible) cryptographic assumption.
Theorem 3.2. Under the assumptions described in Section 3.4.6, there is no efﬁcient, differentially
private sanitizer that is accurate for n2+o(1) queries from Qdepth 6.
That is, there is no algorithm that, on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n and n2+o(1) efﬁciently
(poly(d;n)-time) computable depth-6 queries (circuits), runs in time poly(d;n) and returns an
approximate answer to each query to within 1=3, while satisfying differential privacy.
Recall that, for a constant h 2 N, Qdepth h to denotes the set of all counting queries speciﬁed
by circuits of depth h.
In Chapters 5 and 6, we will see that these hardness results can be circumvented by only
requiring the sanitizer to answer marginal queries. In Chapter 5 we present an efﬁcient (one-
shot) sanitizer that answers n
(
p
k)  n2 many k-way marginal queries. And in Chapter 6 give
a sanitizer that answers up to an exponential number (2
e 
(n)=d:51) of arbitrary marginal queries
accurately with running time poly(2o(d);n;k).
We now describe our techniques.
3.1.1 The Connection with Traitor-Tracing
We prove our results by building on the connection between differentially private sanitizers
for counting queries and traitor-tracing schemes discovered by Dwork et al. [32]. Traitor-tracing
schemes were introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [23] for the purpose of identifying pirates who
violatecopyrightrestrictions. Roughlyspeaking, a(fullycollusion-resilient)traitor-tracingscheme
allows a sender to generate keys for n users so that 1) the sender can broadcast encrypted messages
25that can be decrypted by any user, and 2) any efﬁcient pirate decoder capable of decrypting mes-
sages can be traced to at least one of the users who contributed a key to it, even if an arbitrary
coalition of the users combined their keys in an arbitrary efﬁcient manner to construct the decoder.
Dwork et al. show that the existence of traitor-tracing schemes implies hardness results for
one-shot sanitizers. Very informally, they argue as follows: Suppose a coalition of users takes their
keys and builds a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n where each record contains one of their user keys. The
family Q will contain a query qc for each possible ciphertext c. The query qc asks “What fraction
of the records (user keys) in D would decrypt the ciphertext c to the message 1?” Every user can
decrypt, so if the sender encrypts a message m 2 f0;1g as a ciphertext c, then every user will
decrypt c to m. Thus the answer to the counting query, qc, will be m.
Suppose there were an efﬁcient one-shot sanitizer for Q. Then the coalition could use it to ef-
ﬁciently produce a summary of the database D that enables one to efﬁciently compute an approx-
imate answer to every query qc, which would also allow one to efﬁciently decrypt the ciphertext.
Such a summary can be viewed as an efﬁcient pirate decoder, and thus the tracing algorithm can
use the summary to trace one of the users in the coalition. However, if there is a way to identify
one of the users in the database from the summary, then the summary is not differentially private.
In order to instantiate their result, they need a traitor-tracing scheme. Since Q contains a query
for every ciphertext, the parameter to optimize is the length of the ciphertexts. Using the fully
collusion-resilient traitor-tracing scheme of Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [17], which has ciphertexts
of length e O(
p
n), they obtain a family of queries of size 2
e O(
p
n) for which there is no efﬁcient
one-shot sanitizer. Dwork et al. also discovered a partial converse—proving hardness of one-
shot sanitization for a smaller family of queries requires constructing traitor-tracing schemes with
shorter ciphertexts, which is a seemingly difﬁcult open problem.
3.1.2 Our Approach
In our setting of sanitization (rather than one-shot sanitization, as studied by Dwork et al. [32]),
we don’t expect to answer every query in Q, only a much smaller set of queries requested by the
analyst. At ﬁrst glance, this should make answering the queries much easier, and thus make it
more difﬁcult to demonstrate hardness. However, the attacker does have the power to choose the
queries that he wants answered, and can choose queries that are most difﬁcult to sanitize. Our
ﬁrst observation is that in the traitor-tracing scenario, the tracing algorithms only query the pirate
26decoder on a polynomial number of ciphertexts, which are randomly chosen and depend on the
particular keys that were instantiated for the scheme. For many schemes, even e O(n2) queries is
sufﬁcient. Thus it would seem that the tracing algorithm could simply decide which queries it will
make, give those queries as input to the sanitizer, and then use the answers to those queries to
identify a user and violate differential privacy.
However, this intuition ignores an important issue. Many traitor-tracing schemes (includ-
ing [17]) can only trace stateless pirate decoders, which essentially commit to a response to each
possible query (or a distribution over responses) once and for all. For one-shot sanitizers, the pri-
vate summary is necessarily stateless, and thus the result of Dwork et al. can be instantiated with
any scheme that allows tracing of stateless pirate decoders. However, an arbitrary sanitizer might
give answers that depend on the sequence of queries. Thus, in order to prove our results, we will
need a traitor-tracing scheme that can trace stateful pirate decoders.
The problem of tracing stateful pirates is quite natural even without the implications for private
data analysis. Indeed, this problem has been studied in the literature, originally by Kiayias and
Yung [54]. They considered pirates that can abort and record history. However, their solution, and
all others known, does not apply to our speciﬁc setting due to a certain “watermarking assump-
tion” that doesn’t apply when proving hardness-of-sanitization (see discussion below). To address
this problem, we also reﬁne the basic connection between traitor-tracing schemes and differential
privacy by showing that, in many respects, fairly weak traitor-tracing schemes sufﬁce to establish
the hardness of preserving privacy. In particular, although the pirate decoder obtained from a san-
itizer may be stateful and record history, the accuracy requirement of the sanitizer means that the
corresponding pirate decoder cannot abort, which will make it easier to construct a traitor-tracing
scheme for these kinds of pirates. Indeed, we construct such a scheme to establish Theorem 6.1.
The scheme also has weakened requirements in other respects, having nothing to do with the
statefulness of the pirate or the tracing algorithm. These weakened requirements allow us to reduce
the complexity of the decryption, which means that the queries used by the attacker do not need to
be arbitrary polynomial-size circuits, but instead can be circuits of constant depth, which allows us
to establish Theorem 6.3. Another technical issue arises in that all k queries must be given to the
sanitizer at once, whereas tracing algorithms typically are allowed to query the pirate interactively.
However, we are able to show that the scheme we construct can be traced using one round of
queries. See Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3 for a precise statement of the kind of traitor-tracing scheme
27that sufﬁces and Section 3.4 for our construction.
Our construction is based on a well-known fully collusion resilient traitor-tracing scheme [23],
but with a modiﬁed tracing algorithm. The tracing algorithm uses ﬁngerprinting codes [18, 86],
which have been employed before in the context of traitor-tracing and content distribution, but
our tracing algorithm is different from all those we are aware of. The resulting scheme allows for
tracing with a minimal number of non-adaptively chosen queries, achieves tracing without context-
speciﬁc watermarking assumptions, simpliﬁes the decryption circuit (at the expense of weakening
the security parameters and functionality). The restriction to non-aborting pirates may not be so
natural in the setting of content distribution, which may explain why the scheme was not previously
known.
3.1.3 Related Work
In addition to the hardness results for one-shot sanitizations [32], which apply to arbitrary one-
shot sanitizers, there are several hardness-of-sanitization results for restricted classes of sanitizers.
As we will show in Chapter 4 (building on earlier work of Dwork et al. [32], it is hard (assuming
the existence of one-way functions) to generate a private synthetic database that is accurate for
essentially any non-trivial family of queries, even 2-literal conjunctions. Recall from Chapter 2
that a synthetic database is, roughly, a new database (of the same dimensions) that approximately
preserves the answer to some set of queries.
Gupta et al. [41] considered algorithms that can only access the database by making a poly-
nomial number of “statistical queries” (essentially counting queries). They showed that such al-
gorithms cannot be a one-shot sanitizer (even ignoring privacy constraints) that approximately
answers certain simple families of counting queries with high accuracy.
Finally, Dwork, Naor, and Vadhan [33] gave information-theoretic lower bounds for stateless
sanitizers, which take k queries as input, but whose answers to each query do not depend on the
other k 1 input queries. They showed that (even computationally unbounded) stateless sanitizers
can answer at most e O(n2) queries with non-trivial accuracy, while satisfying differential privacy.
The Laplace Mechanism is a stateless sanitizer that answers e 
(n2) queries, and thus their result is
tight in this respect. Although their result is information theoretic, and considers a highly restricted
type of sanitizer, their techniques are related to ours.
283.2 Traitor-Tracing Schemes
In this section we give deﬁne a traitor-tracing scheme. Throughout, we will use ATT to denote
algorithms associated with traitor-tracing schemes.
3.2.1 Traitor-Tracing Schemes
We now give a deﬁnition of a traitor-tracing scheme, heavily tailored to the task of proving
hardness results for generic sanitizers. We will sacriﬁce some consistency with the standard def-
initions. See below for further discussion of the ways in which our deﬁnition departs from the
standard deﬁnition of traitor-tracing. In some cases, the non-standard aspects of the deﬁnition will
be necessary to establish our results, and in others it will be for convenience. Despite these dif-
ferences, we will henceforth refer to schemes satisfying our deﬁnition simply as traitor-tracing
schemes.
Intuitively, a traitor-tracing scheme is a form of broadcast encryption, in which a sender can
broadcast an encrypted message that can be decrypted by each of a large set of users. The standard
notion of security for such a scheme would require that an adversary that doesn’t have any of the
keys cannot decrypt the message. A traitor-tracing scheme has the additional property that given
any decoder capable of decrypting the message (which must in a very loose sense “know” at least
one of the keys), there is a procedure for determining which user’s key is being used. Moreover,
we want the scheme to be “collusion resilient,” in that even if a coalition of users gets together and
combines their keys in some way to produce a decoder, there is still a procedure that identiﬁes at
least one member of the coalition.
Wenowformallydescribethesyntaxofatraitor-tracingscheme. Forfunctionsn;kTT: N ! N,
an (n;kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme is a tuple of four algorithms (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT;TraceTT).
The parameter n speciﬁes the number of users of the scheme and the parameter kTT will specify
the number of queries that the tracing algorithm makes to the pirate decoder. We allow all the
algorithms to be randomized except for DecTT.5
 The algorithm GenTT takes a security parameter, , and returns a sequence of n = n() user
keys ~ sk = (sk(1);:::;sk(n)) 2 f0;1g. Formally, ~ sk = (sk(1);:::;sk(n))  R GenTT(1).
5It would not substantially affect our results if DecTT were randomized, but we will assume that DecTT is deter-
ministic for ease of presentation.
29 The algorithm EncTT takes a sequence of n user keys ~ sk and a message bit b 2 f0;1g, and
generates a ciphertext c 2 C = C(). Formally, c  R EncTT(~ sk;b).
 The algorithm DecTT takes any single user key sk and a ciphertext c 2 C, runs in time
poly(;n()) and deterministically returns a message bit b b 2 f0;1g. Formally we write
b b = DecTT(sk;c).
 The algorithm TraceTT takes as input a set of user keys ~ sk 2 (f0;1g)n() and an oracle
P: (C())kTT() ! f0;1gkTT(), makes one kTT-tuple of queries, (c1;:::;ckTT) 2 C() to
its oracle (kTT = kTT()), and returns the name of a user i 2 [n()]. Formally, i  R
TraceP
TT(~ sk).
Intuitively, think of the oracle P as being given some subset of keys ~ skS = (sk(i))i2S for a
non-empty set S  [n], and TraceTT is attempting to identify a user i 2 S. Clearly, if P ignores its
input and always returns 0, TraceTT cannot have any hope of success, so we must assume that P is
capable of decrypting ciphertexts.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Available Pirate Decoder). Let TT = (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT;TraceTT) be an
(n;kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme. Let P be a (possibly randomized) algorithm. We say that P is
a kTT-available pirate decoder if for every  2 N, every set of user keys ~ sk = (sk(1);:::;sk(n)) 2
f0;1g, every S  [n] such that jSj  n   1, and every c1;:::;ckTT 2 C(),
Pr
2
4
(b b1;:::;b bkTT)  R P(~ skS;c1;:::;ckTT)
9j 2 [kTT];b 2 f0;1g

(8i 2 S;DecTT(sk(i);cj) = b) ^

b bj 6= b

3
5  o

1
n()2

:
In other words, if every user key sk(i) (for i 2 S) decrypts c to 1 (resp. 0), then P(~ skS;) decrypts
c to 1 (resp. 0), with high probability.
We can now deﬁne a secure, (n;kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme:
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Traitor-Tracing Scheme). Let the scheme TT = (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT;TraceTT)
be an (n;kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme. Let kTT: N ! N be a function. We say that TT is a
secure (n;kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme if for every S  [n()] such that jSj  n()   1, for
every (possibly randomized) algorithm P that 1) runs in time poly(;n();kTT()) and 2) is a
kTT-available pirate decoder, we have
Pr
~ sk RGenTT(1)
P’s, TraceTT’s coins
h
Trace
P(~ skS;)
TT (~ sk) 62 S
i
= o

1
n()

30Remarks About Our Deﬁnition of Traitor-Tracing The traitor-tracing schemes we consider
are somewhat different than those previously studied in the literature.
 We do not require the encryption or tracing algorithms to use public keys. In the typical ap-
plication of traitor-tracing schemes to content distribution, these would be desirable features,
however they are not necessary for proving hardness of sanitization.
 We only require that the tracing algorithm succeeds with probability 1   o(1=n). Typically
one would require that the tracing algorithm succeeds with probability 1   n !(1).
 We do not give the pirate decoder access to an encryption oracle. In other words, we do not
require CPA security. Most traitor-tracing schemes in the literature are public-key, making
this distinction irrelevant. Here, we only need an encryption scheme that is secure for an a
priori bounded number of messages.
 We allow the pirate decoder to be stateful, but in an unusual way. In many other models,
the pirate is allowed to abort, and answer ? if it detects that it is being traced. However,
in our model we require (roughly) that if any of the queries are ciphertexts generated by
Enc(~ sk;b), then the pirate decoder answers b to those queries, regardless of the other queries
issued, which in a sense precludes aborting. However, we do allow our pirate to correlate its
answers to different queries, subject to this accuracy constraint. We also allow the pirate to
see all the queries made by the tracer at once, which is more power than is typically given to
the pirate.
Roughly, the ﬁrst three modiﬁcations will allow us to ﬁnd a candidate scheme with very simple
decryption and the fourth modiﬁcation will allow us to trace stateful pirates even in the setting of
bit-encryption.
3.2.2 Decryption Function Families
For Theorem 6.3, we are interested in traitor-tracing schemes where DecTT is a “simple” func-
tion of the user key (for every ciphertext c 2 C).
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Decryption Function Family). Let (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT) be any traitor-tracing
scheme where GenTT produces keys in f0;1g and EncTT produce ciphertexts in C = C(). For
31everyc 2 C, wedeﬁnethec-decryptionfunctionqc: f0;1g ! f0;1gtobeqc(sk) = DecTT(sk;c).
We deﬁne the decryption function family Q
()
DecTT = fqcgc2C().
In what follows, we will say that TT is an traitor-tracing scheme with decryption function
family Q
()
DecTT.
3.3 Attacking Efﬁcient Sanitizers
In this section we will prove our main result, showing that the existence of traitor-tracing
schemes (as in Deﬁnition 3.4) implies that efﬁcient sanitizers cannot answer too many counting
queries while satisfying differential privacy.
Theorem 3.6 (Attacking Efﬁcient Sanitizers). Assume that there exists an (n();kTT())-secure
traitor-tracing scheme TT = (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT;TraceTT) with decryption function family
Q() = Q
()
DecTT. Then there does not exist any sanitizer M: (f0;1gd)n  (Q(d))kTT(d) ! RkTT(d)
that is simultaneously 1) differentially private, 2) efﬁcient, and 3) accurate for kTT(d) queries from
Q = [d2NQ(d).
In the typical setting of parameters, n() = poly(), kTT() = e (n2), and decryption can be
implemented by circuits of size poly(n) = poly(). Then Theroem 3.6 will state that there is no
sanitizer M that takes a database D 2 (f0;1gd)poly(d), runs in poly(d) time, and accurately an-
swers e (n2) queries implemented by circuits of size poly(d), while satisfying differential privacy.
The main difference between Theorem 3.6 and the result of Dwork et al. [32] is that we only
assume the existence of a sanitizer for kTT(d) queries from Q(d) = Q
(d)
DecTT, whereas Dwork et
al. assume the existence of a one-shot sanitizer that answers every query in Q(d). To offset the
weaker assumption on the sanitizer, we assume that the traitor-tracing scheme is secure against
certain stateful pirate decoders (as in Deﬁnition 3.3) whereas Dwork et al. only need to trace
stateless pirates. Theorem 3.6 also explicitly allows the traitor-tracing scheme to have the relaxed
functionality and security properties discussed at the end of Section 3.2, although it is implicit in
Dwork et al. that the relaxed properties are sufﬁcient to prove hardness results.
We now sketch the proof: Every function qc 2 Q(d) is viewed as a query qc(x) on a database
row x 2 f0;1gd. Assume there is an efﬁcient sanitizer is that is accurate for kTT(d) queries from
Q(d). The fact that M is accurate for these queries will imply that (after small modiﬁcations)
32M is a kTT-available pirate decoder (Deﬁnition 3.3). Here is where we differ from Dwork et al.,
who assume that M accurately answers all queries in Q(d), in which case M can be viewed as a
stateless pirate decoder (but must solve a harder sanitization problem).
We complete the proof as in Dwork et al. Consider two experiments: In the ﬁrst, we construct
an n-row database D by running GenTT(1d) to obtain n user keys, and putting one in each row of
D. Then we run TraceTT on M(D;) and obtain a user i. Since M is useful, and TT is secure,
we will have that i 2 [n] with probability close to 1, and thus there is an i 2 [n] such that i = i
with probability & 1=n.
Inthesecondexperiment, weconstructadatabaseD0 exactlyasintheﬁrst, howeverweexclude
the key sk(i). Since D and D0 differ in only one row, differential privacy requires that TraceTT,
run with oracle M(D0;), still outputs i with probability 
(1=n). However, in this experiment,
i, sk(i) is no longer given to the pirate decoder, and thus security of TT says that TraceTT, run
with this oracle, must output i with probability o(1=n). Thus, we will obtain a contradiction.
Proof. Let TT = (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT;TraceTT) be the assumed traitor-tracing scheme, and
assume there exists an efﬁcient, differentially private, sanitizer M that is accurate for kTT(d)
queries from Q(d). We deﬁne the pirate decoder PM as follows:
Input: A set of user keys (~ skS) 2 f0;1gd and a sequence of kTT ciphertexts c1;:::;ckTT.
Construct circuits specifying the queries qc1;:::;qckTT 2 QDecTT;d.
Construct a database D = (sk(i))i2S 2 (f0;1gd)jSj.
Let a1;:::;akTT  R M(D;qc1;:::;qckTT).
Round the answers a1;:::;akTT 2 [0;1] to obtainb b1;:::;b bkTT 2 f0;1g (i.e. b bj = dajc)
Output: b b1;:::;b bkTT.
Figure 3: The pirate decoder PM
Since M is efﬁcient, its running time is poly(d;n(d);kTT(d);jqc1j + ::: + jqckTTj), which is
poly(d;n(d);kTT(d)). Recall that the size of the circuits (queries) qc 2 Q
(d)
DecTT is poly(d;n). In
this case PM runs in time poly(d;n(d);kTT(d)) as well, since constructing the queries can be done
in time polynomial in their size, and the ﬁnal rounding step can be done in time poly(kTT(d)).
Next, we claim that if M is accurate for Q(d), then PM is a useful pirate decoder.
33Claim 3.7. If M is accurate for kTT queries from QDecTT, then PM is a kTT-useful pirate decoder.
Proof of Claim 3.7. Let ~ sk 2 f0;1gd be a set of user keys for TT and let S  [n] be a subset of
the users such that jSj  n   1. Suppose c 2 C(d) and b 2 f0;1g are such that for every i 2 S,
DecTT(sk(i);c) = b. Then we have that, for D as in PM,
qc(D) =
1
jSj
X
i2S
qc(sk
(i)) =
1
jSj
X
i2S
DecTT(sk
(i);c) = b
Let c1;:::;ckTT be a set of ciphertexts, qc1;:::;qckTT and a1;:::;akTT be as in PM. The accuracy
of M (with constant error  < 1=2) guarantees that
Pr

9j 2 [kTT];
 aj   fcj(D)
   1=2

= o(1=jSj
2)
Since jSj  n   1, o(1=jSj2) = o(1=n2). Assuming a1;:::;akTT is accurate up to error  < 1=2
for qc1;:::;qckTT, aj will be rounded to exactly qcj whenever qcj(D) 2 f0;1g. That is,
Pr
2
4
9j 2 [kTT];b 2 f0;1g
(8i 2 S;DecTT(sk(i);cj) = b) ^

b bj 6= b

3
5 = o

1
n()2

Thus, PM is kTT-useful. This completes the proof of the claim.
Since PM is a kTT-useful pirate decoder, and TT is a (n;kTT)-secure traitor-tracing scheme,
running TraceTT on PM will always return some user i 2 [n]. Thus there must be some user i that
TraceTT returns with probability & 1=n. Speciﬁcally, for every  2 N, there exists i() 2 [n()]
such that,
Pr
~ sk RGenTT(1)
PM’s, TraceTT’s coins
h
Trace
PM(~ sk;)
TT (~ sk) = i
()
i

1
n()
  o

1
n()

: (3.1)
Let S() = [n()] n fi()g Now we claim that if M is differentially private, then TraceTT
will output i() with signiﬁcant probability, even PM is not given the key of user i().
Claim 3.8. If M is differentially private (for " = O(1),  = o(1=n)), then
Pr
~ sk RGenTT(1)
PM’s, TraceTT’s coins
h
Trace
PM(~ sk;)
TT (~ sk) = i
()
i
 


1
n()

:
Proof of Claim 3.8. Fix any  and let kTT = kTT() and i = i(), S = S() as above. Let
D = ~ sk and D i = ~ skS. Take T to be the set of responses b b1;:::;b bkTT such that TraceTT(~ sk),
34after querying its oracle on ciphertexts c1;:::;ckTT and receiving responsesb b1;:::;b bkTT, outputs i
(T depends on the coins of GenTT and TraceTT). By differential privacy, we have that
Pr
h
M(D;qc1;:::;qckTT) 2 T
i
 e
O(1)  Pr
h
M(D i;qc1;:::;qckTT) 2 T
i
+ o

1
n

:
Note that the queries constructed by PM depends only on c1;:::;ckTT, not on ~ skS. Also note that
the ﬁnal rounding step does not depend on the input at all. Thus, for every T  f0;1gkTT
Pr
h
PM(~ sk;c1;:::;ckTT) 2 T
i
 e
O(1)  Pr
h
PM(~ skS;c1;:::;ckTT) 2 T
i
+ o

1
n

: (3.2)
The claim follows by combining with (3.1).
To complete the proof, notice that the probability in Claim 3.8 is exactly the probability that
TraceTT outputs the user i, when given the oracle PM(~ skS), for S = [n] n fig. However, the
fact that PM is efﬁcient, and TT is a secure traitor-tracing scheme implies that this probability is
o(1=n). Thus we have obtained a contradiction. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
3.4 Constructions of Traitor-Tracing Schemes
In this section we show how to construct traitor-tracing schemes that satisfy Deﬁnition 3.4,
and thus can be used to instantiate Theorem 3.6. First we will informally describe a simple con-
struction that requires the tracing algorithm to make a sub-optimal number of queries, but will
hopefully give the reader more intuition about the construction and how it differs from previous
constructions of traitor-tracing schemes. Then we will give precise deﬁnitions of the encryption
schemes (Section 3.4.2) and ﬁngerprinting codes (Section 3.4.3) required for our construction.
Then we will present the ﬁnal construction more formally (Section 3.4.4) and prove its security.
Finally, we will use the weakened security requirements of the encryption scheme to show that
our traitor-tracing scheme can be instantiated so that decryption is computable by constant-depth
circuits (Section 3.4.6).
3.4.1 A Simple Construction
Our construction is a variant of the most basic tracing traitor-tracing scheme [23]. Start with
an encryption scheme (Gen;Enc;Dec). Generate an independent key sk(i)  R Gen for each user
35(we will ignore the security parameter in the informal description). To encrypt a bit b 2 f0;1g, we
encrypt it under each user’s key independently and concatenate the ciphertexts. That is
EncTT(~ sk;b) = (Enc(sk
(1);b);:::;Enc(sk
(n);b)):
Clearly each user can decrypt the ciphertext by applying Dec, as long as she knows which part of
the ciphertext to decrypt.
Now we describe how an available pirate decoder for this scheme can be traced. As with all
traitor-tracing schemes, we will form ciphertexts that different users would decrypt differently,
assuming they decrypt as intended using the algorithm DecTT(sk(i);). We can do so with the
following algorithm:
TrEncTT(~ sk;i) = (Enc(sk
(1);1);:::;Enc(sk
(i);1);Enc(sk
(i+1);0);:::;Enc(sk
(n);0)
for i = 0;1;:::;n. The algorithm forms a ciphertext that users 1;:::;i will decrypt to 0 and users
i + 1;:::;n will decrypt to 1.
The tracing algorithm generates a random sequence i1;:::;ikTT 2 f0;1;:::;ng, for kTT =
(n+1)s, such that each element of f0;1;:::;ng appears exactly s times, where s is a parameter to
be chosen later. Then, for every j it generates a ciphertext cj  R TrEncTT(~ sk;ij). Next, it queries
P~ skS(c1;:::;ckTT). Given the output of the pirate, the tracing algorithm computes
Pi =
1
s
X
j:ij=i
P(~ sk;c1;:::;ckTT)j
for i = 0;1;:::;n. Finally, the tracing algorithm outputs any i such that Pi   Pi 1  1=n.
The tracing algorithm generates a random sequence of indices i1;:::;ikTT 2 f0;1;:::;ng, for
kTT = (n + 1)s, such that each element of f0;1;:::;ng appears exactly s times, where s is a
parameter to be chosen later. Then, for every j it generates a ciphertext cj  R TrEncTT(~ sk;ij).
Next, it queries P~ skS(c1;:::;ckTT). Given the output of the pirate, the tracing algorithm computes
Pi = 1
s
P
j:ij=i P(~ sk;c1;:::;ckTT)j for i = 0;1;:::;n. Finally, the tracing algorithm outputs any
i such that Pi   Pi 1  1=n.
Now we explain why this algorithm successfully traces efﬁcient available pirate decoders. No-
tice that if we choose c according to TrEncTT(~ sk;0), then every user decrypts c to 0, so P0 = 0.
Similarly, Pn = 1. Thus, there exists i such that Pi  Pi 1  1=n. Next, we argue that i is in S
except with small probability. Notice that TrEncTT(~ sk;i) and TrEncTT(~ sk;i   1) differ only in
36the message encrypted under key sk(i), so if i 62 S, this key is unknown to the pirate decoder. The
security of the encryption scheme (made precise in Deﬁnition 3.10) guarantees that if sk(i) is un-
known to an efﬁcient pirate, then we can replace kTT uses of Enc(sk(i);1) with Enc(sk(i);0), and
this change will only affect the success probability of the pirate by o(1=n). But after we make this
replacement, TrEncTT(~ sk;i) and TrEncTT(~ sk;i 1) are (perfectly, information-theoretically) in-
distinguishable to the pirate. Since the sequence of indices i1;:::;ikTT is random, the pirate has no
information about which elements ij are i and which are i  1. Thus, if the pirate wants to make
Pi larger than Pi 1, for some i 62 S, she can do no better than to “guess”. If we take s = e O(n2),
and apply a Chernoff bound, it turns out that for every i 62 S, Pi Pi 1 = o(1=n). This conclusion
also holds after we take into account the security loss of the encryption scheme, which is o(1=n).
Thus, the scheme we described is a secure traitor-tracing scheme in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4.
In arguing that the scheme is secure, we used the fact that P0 = 0 and Pn = 1 no matter
what other queries are made to the pirate. In many applications, this assumption would not be
reasonable. However, when the pirate is derived from an accurate sanitizer, this condition will be
satisﬁed.
For this scheme, the tracer makes (n + 1)s = e O(n3) queries. Before proceeding, we will
explain how to reduce the number of queries from e O(n3) to e O(n2). The high-level argument that
the scheme is secure used two facts:
1. By the availability of the pirate decoder, if every user in S would decrypt a ciphertext c to b,
then the pirate decrypts c to b (in the above, P0 = 0;Pn = 1).
2. Because of the encryption, a pirate decoder without user i’s key “doesn’t know” how user i
would decrypt each ciphertext.
Systems leveraging these two properties to identify a colluding user are called ﬁngerprinting
codes [18], and have been studied extensively. In fact, the tracing algorithm we described is identi-
cal to the tracing algorithm we deﬁne in Section 3.4.4, but instantiated with the ﬁngerprinting code
of Boneh and Shaw [18], which has length e O(n3). Tardos [86] constructed shorter ﬁngerprinting
codes, with length e O(n2), which we use to reduce the number of queries to trace.
Next we deﬁne the precise security requirement we need out of the underlying encryption
scheme, and then we will give a formal deﬁnition of ﬁngerprinting codes.
373.4.2 Encryption Schemes
We will build our traitor-tracing scheme from a suitable encryption scheme. An encryption
scheme is tuple of efﬁcient algorithms (Gen;Enc;Dec). All the algorithms may be randomized
except for Dec. The scheme has the following syntactic properties:
 The algorithm Gen takes a security parameter , runs in time poly(), and returns a private
key sk 2 f0;1g. Formally sk  R Gen(1).
 The algorithm Enc takes a private key and a message bit b 2 f0;1g, runs in time poly(),
and generates a ciphertext c 2 C = C(). Formally, c  R Enc(sk;b).
 The algorithm Dec takes a private key sk 2 f0;1g and a ciphertext c 2 C(), runs in time
poly(), and returns a message bitb b.
First we deﬁne (perfectly) correct decryption6
Deﬁnition 3.9 (Correctness). An encryption scheme (Gen;Enc;Dec) is (perfectly) correct if for
every b 2 f0;1g, and every  2 N,
Pr
sk RGen(1)
[Dec(sk;Enc(sk;b)) = b] = 1:
We require that our schemes have the following kEnc-message security property.
Deﬁnition 3.10 (Security of Encryption). Let "Enc: N ! [0;1] and kEnc: N ! N;TEnc: N  N !
N be functions. An encryption scheme Enc = (Gen;Enc;Dec) is ("Enc;kEnc;TEnc)-secure if for
every TEnc(;kEnc())-time algorithm AEnc and every b = (b1;:::;bkEnc);b0 = (b0
1;:::;b0
kEnc) 2
f0;1g (for kEnc = kEnc()),
    
Pr
sk RGen(1)
[AEnc(Enc(sk;b1);:::;Enc(sk;bkEnc)) = 1]
  Pr
sk RGen(1)

AEnc(Enc(sk;b
0
1);:::;Enc(sk;b
0
kEnc)) = 1

    
 "Enc():
Notice that we do not require Enc to be secure against adversaries that are given Enc(sk;) as
an oracle. That is, we do not require CPA security.
6It would not substantially affect our results if Dec were allowed to fail with negligible probability, however we
will assume perfect correctness for ease of presentation.
38Deﬁnition 3.11 (Encryption Scheme). We say that a tuple of algorithms Enc = (Gen;Enc;Dec)
is an ("Enc;kEnc;TEnc)-encryption scheme if it satisﬁes correctness and ("Enc;kEnc;TEnc)-security.
3.4.3 Fingerprinting Codes
As we alluded to above, our tracing algorithm will use a ﬁngerprinting code, introduced by
Boneh and Shaw [18]. A ﬁngerprinting code is a pair of efﬁcient (possibly randomized) algorithms
(GenFP;TraceFP) with the following syntax.
 The algorithm GenFP takes a number of users n as input and outputs a codebook of n
codewords of length `FP = `FP(n), W = (w(1);:::;w(n)) 2 f0;1g`FP. Formally W  R
GenFP(1n). We will think of W 2 f0;1gn`FP as a matrix with each row containing a code-
word.
 The algorithm TraceFP takes an n-user codebook W and a word w0 2 f0;1g`FP and returns
an index i 2 [n]. Formally, i = TraceFP(W;w0).
Given a non-empty subset S  [n] and a set of codewords WS = (w(i))i2S 2 f0;1g`FP, we
deﬁne the set of feasible codewords to be
F(WS) =
n
w
0 2 f0;1g
`FP j 8j 2 [`FP]9i 2 S w
0
j = w
(i)
j
o
:
Informally, if all users in S have a 0 (resp. 1) in the j-th symbol of their codeword, then they must
produce a word with 0 (resp. 1) as the j-th symbol. We also deﬁne the critical positions to be the
set of indices for which this constraint is binding. That is,
Crit(WS) =
n
j 2 [`FP] j 8i;i
0 2 S w
(i)
j = w
(i0)
j
o
:
The security of a ﬁngerprinting code asserts that an adversary who is given a subset WS of the
codewords should not be able to produce an element of F(WS) that does not trace to a user i 2 S.
More formally,
Deﬁnition 3.12 (Secure Fingerprinting Code). Let "FP: N ! [0;1] and `FP: N ! N be functions.
A pair of algorithms (GenFP;TraceFP) is an ("FP;`FP)-ﬁngerprinting code if GenFP(1n) outputs a
39codebook W 2 f0;1gn`FP(n), and furthermore, for every (possibly inefﬁcient) algorithm AFP, and
every non-empty S  [n],
Pr
W RGenFP(1n)
[AFP(WS) 2 F(WS) ^ TraceFP(W;AFP(WS)) 62 S]  "FP(n)
where the two executions of AFP are understood to be the same.
Tardos [86] gave a construction of ﬁngerprinting codes of essentially optimal length, improving
on the original construction of Boneh and Shaw [18]. As we mentioned in in Section 3.4.1, the
simple construction we sketched was just out eventual traitor-tracing scheme instantiated with the
Boneh-Shaw ﬁngerprinting code. The construction and analysis of Tardos’ ﬁngerprinting code
also follows the blueprint of the tracing algorithm that we sketched: construct a random set of
codewords such that 1) any feasible codeword will have some signiﬁcant correlation with at least
one of the codewords, and 2) it is information-theoretically impossible (due to the randomness in
the codewords) to ﬁnd a feasible codeword that has signiﬁcant correlation with a codeword that
you haven’t seen, regardless of which codewords you have seen.
Theorem 3.13 ([86]). For every function "FP: N ! [0;1], there exists an ("FP;O(n2 log(n="FP)))-
ﬁngerprinting code. In particular, there exists a (o(1=n2);O(n2 logn))-ﬁngerprinting code.
3.4.4 The Traitor-Tracing Scheme
We are now ready to state the construction more formally. The key generation, encryption, and
decryption algorithms are as we described in the sketch (Section 3.4.1), and stated below.
3.4.5 Security of TT
In this section we will prove that out construction of TT = (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT;TraceTT)
is an (n;`FP(n))-secure traitor-tracing scheme. It can be veriﬁed from the speciﬁcation of the
scheme that it has the desired syntactic properties, that it generates n() user keys, and that the
tracing algorithm makes `FP(n()) non-adaptive queries to its oracle.
Now we show how an available pirate decoder for this scheme can be traced. As in the sketch
(Section 3.4.1), we want to generate a set of ciphertexts that different users decrypt in different
ways. Speciﬁcally, given a ﬁngerprinting code W 2 f0;1gn`FP (represented as a matrix with
40Let an encryption Enc = (Gen;Enc;Dec) and a function n: N ! N be parameters of the
scheme. Assume that n()  2=2 for every  2 N
GenTT(1):
For: every user i = 1;:::;n()
Let sk
(i)
 R Gen(1=2)
Let sk(i) = (sk
(i)
;i) (padded with zeros to have length exactly ).
Output: ~ sk = (sk(1);:::;sk(n))
(We will sometimes use sk(i) and sk
(i)
interchangeably)
EncTT(sk(1);:::;sk(n);b):
For every user i, let c(i)  R Enc(sk(i);b)
Output: c = (c(1);:::;c(n))
DecTT(sk(i);c):
Output: b b = Dec(sk(i);c(i))
Figure 4: The algorithms (GenTT;EncTT;DecTT) for TT.
w(i) in the i-th row), we want to generate a set of ciphertexts c1;:::;c`FP, such that user i, if she
decrypts as intended using DecTT(sk(i);), will decrypt cj to w
(i)
j . That is, DecTT(sk(i);cj) = w
(i)
j .
TraceTT will query the pirate decoder on these ciphertexts, treat these responses as a word w0, run
the tracing algorithm for the ﬁngerprinting code on w0, and use the output of TraceFP as its own
output.
If P is available, its output will be a feasible codeword for WS. To see this, recall that if every
user i 2 S decrypts cj to the same bit, then an available pirate decoder P(~ skS;), decrypts cj to that
bit. However, the critical positions of WS are exactly those for which every user i 2 S has the same
symbol in position j. Thus, the codeword returned by the pirate is feasible, and the ﬁngerprinting
code’s tracing algorithm can identify a user in S.
The catch in this argument is that TrEncTT takes all of W as input, however an attacker for
the ﬁngerprinting code is only allowed to see WS, and thus cannot simulate TrEncTT in a security
41The tracing algorithm for TT and the subroutine TrEncTT. Let a length `FP = `FP(n)
ﬁngerprinting code FP = (GenFP;TraceFP) be a parameter of the scheme and let Enc =
(Gen;Enc;Dec) be the encryption scheme used above.
TrEncTT(sk(1);:::;sk(n);W):
Let n  k be the dimensions of W
For: every i 2 [n];j 2 [k]
Let c
(i)
j  R Enc(sk(i);Wi;j)
For: every j 2 [k]
Let cj = (c
(1)
j ;:::;c
(n)
j )
Output: c1;:::;ck
(Notice that Dec(sk(i);c
(i)
j ) = Wi;j)
Trace
P
TT(~ sk):
Let n be the number of user keys and `FP = `FP(n)
Let W  R GenFP(1n)
Letb b1;:::;b b`FP  R P(TrEncTT(~ sk;W)) and let w0 = b b1k:::kb b`FP
Output: i  R TraceFP(W;w0)
Figure 5: The algorithm TraceTT for TT
reduction. However, if P only has keys ~ skS, and i 62 S, then an efﬁcient P cannot decrypt the
i-th component of a ciphertext c = (c(1);:::;c(n)). But these are the only components that depend
on w(i). So w(i) is computationally hidden from P anyway, and we could replace that codeword
with a string of zeros without signiﬁcantly affecting the success probability of P. Formalizing this
intuition will yield a valid attacker for the ﬁngerprinting code, and obtain a contradiction.
Theorem 3.14 (From Encryption to Traitor-Tracing). Let Enc be an ("Enc;kEnc;TEnc)-secure en-
cryption scheme, and FP be a ("FP;`FP)-ﬁngerprinting code, FP. Let n;kTT: N ! N be any
functions such that for every  2 N, n()  2=2 and
421. the encryption scheme and ﬁngerprinting code have sufﬁciently strong security,
n()  "Enc() + "FP(n()) = o

1
n()2

;
2. the encryption scheme is secure for sufﬁciently many queries,
kEnc()  kTT() = `FP(n());
3. the encryption scheme is secure against adversaries whose running time is as long as the
pirate decoder’s, for every a > 0,
TEnc(=2;kTT())  ( + n() + kTT())
a:
Then TT instantiated with Enc and FP is an (n;kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme.
Proof. Suppose there exists a poly(;n();kTT())-time pirate decoder P that violates the secu-
rity of TT. That is, for every  2 N, there exists S = S()  [n()], jSj  n()   1, such
that
Pr
~ sk RGenTT(1)

Trace
P(~ skS();)
TT (~ sk) 62 S

= 


1
n()

where the probability is also taken over the coins of P and TraceTT. Since there are only n() such
sets, for a randomly chosen i  R [n()], we have
Pr
~ sk RGenTT(1)
i R[n()]

Trace
P(~ skS i;)
TT (~ sk) 62 S

= 


1
n()2

:
Both of these probabilities are also taken over the coins of P and TraceTT. We will show that such
a pirate decoder must either violate the security of the encryption scheme or violate the security of
the ﬁngerprinting code.
Given a matrix W 2 f0;1g(n)`FP(n), we deﬁne W i 2 f0;1g(n 1)`FP to be W with the i-th
codeword removed and f W i 2 f0;1gn`FP(n) to be W with the i-th codeword replaced with~ 0`FP(n).
We also use S i as a shorthand for [n] n fig
Consider the following algorithm AP
FP
Since the ﬁngerprinting code is secure, for a randomly chosen i  R [n] (in fact, for every
i 2 [n]),
Pr
W RGenFP(1n)
i R[n]

A
P
FP(S i;W i) 2 F(W i) ^ TraceFP(W;A
P
FP(S i;W i)) = i

 "FP(n) (3.3)
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FP(S i;W i):
Let n be the number of users for the ﬁngerprinting code and  be such that n() = n
Generate keys ~ sk  R GenTT(1) and ciphertexts (c1;:::;c`FP)  R TrEncTT(~ sk;f W i)
Output w0 = (b b1;:::;b b`FP)  R P(~ sk i;c1;:::;c`FP)
(Note that f W i is just W i with a row of zeros added, so the attacker is well-deﬁned.)
Figure 6: The ﬁngerprinting security adversary.
This condition could hold simply because AFP outputs an infeasible codeword with high proba-
bility, not because we are successfully tracing a user in S. The next claim states that if P is an
available pirate decoder, then this is not the case.
Claim 3.15. Let kTT = kTT() = `FP(n()) for every  2 N. If P is a kTT-available pirate
decoder, then for every  2 N, every i 2 [n()], and every W 2 f0;1gn`FP(n) (for n = n())
Pr

A
P
FP(S i;W i) 62 F(W i)

= o

1
n()2

Proof of Claim 3.15. If P is kTT-useful, then, by deﬁnition, for every ~ sk = (sk(1);:::;sk(n)),
every i  [n], and every c1;:::;ckTT, if every user i0 6= i decrypts some cj to the same bit bj, then
so does P(~ sk i;) (with high probability). That is, forb b1;:::;b bkTT  R P(~ sk i;c1;:::;ckTT),
Pr
h
9j 2 [kTT];b 2 f0;1g

8i
0 6= i;DecTT(sk
(i0);cj) = b

^

b bj 6= b
i
= o

1
n()2

(3.4)
Consider any critical position j 2 Crit(W i). These are the positions for which every user i0 6= i
has the same bit w
(i0)
j = bj. It’s easy to see from the deﬁnition of TrEncTT (and the correctness of
Enc) that if c1;:::;ckTT  R TrEncTT(~ sk;f W i) then every user i0 6= i will decrypt cj to bj. Thus,
with probability close to 1, for every critical position j, the j-th output of P(~ sk i;c1;:::;ckTT)
will be equal to bj, which implies w0 = (b b1;:::;b b`FP) is feasible.
Since P outputs feasible codewords with high probability, we obtain
Pr
W RGenFP(1n)
i R[n]

TraceFP(W;A
P
FP(S i;W i)) = i

 "FP(n()) + o

1
n()2

(3.5)
by combining the previous claim with (3.3).
44There are only two differences between the success of the pirate decoder in fooling TraceTT
and the success of the ﬁngerprinting adversary in fooling TraceFP (in the experiment described
in (3.5)): The ﬁrst is that in the traitor-tracing security condition, P is given ~ sk i for a ﬁxed
i 2 [n], whereas the ﬁngerprinting adversary is given W i for a random i  R [n]. This difference
only affects the error by a factor of n. That is, for every i 2 [n]
Pr
h
Trace
P(~ sk i;)
TT (~ sk) = i
i
 n  Pr
i R[n]
h
Trace
P(~ sk i;)
TT (~ sk) = i
i
The second difference is that in TraceTT, the ciphertexts given to the pirate are generated by
TrEncTT(~ sk;W) whereas in AFP the ciphertexts are generated by TrEncTT(~ sk;f W i). But these
ciphertexts only differ in the i-th component, and sk(i) is unknown to P, so this does not affect the
behavior of the pirate decoder signiﬁcantly. This fact is established in the following claim.
Claim 3.16. If Enc is ("Enc;kEnc;TEnc)-secure for kEnc;TEnc as in the statement of the Theorem,
then for every poly(;n();kTT()) pirate decoder P,
   

Pr
W RGenFP(1n)
~ sk RGenTT;i R[n]
h
TraceFP(W;P(~ sk i;TrEncTT(~ sk;W))) = i
i
  Pr
W RGenFP(1n)
~ sk RGenTT;i R[n]
h
TraceFP(W;P(~ sk i;TrEncTT(~ sk;f W i))) = i
i
 
  
 "Enc()
Proof of Claim 3.16. Let Enc = (Gen;Enc;Dec) be the encryption scheme. The main observation
required to prove the claim is that the two experiments we want to relate can both be simulated
without sk(i), given challenges for the encryption scheme (Deﬁnition 3.10). Fix a codebook W  R
GenFP(1n). Now consider two distributions on ciphertexts (of Enc): In either case, generate a
random key sk(i)  R Gen(1)
 In the ﬁrst case c
(i)
1  R Enc(sk(i);w
(i)
1 );:::;c
(i)
`FP  R Enc(sk(i);w
(i)
`FP)
 In the second case sk(i)  R Gen(1) and c
(i)
1  R Enc(sk(i);0);:::;c
(i)
`FP  R Enc(sk(i);0)
Suppose we receive a set of `FP ciphertexts from one of these two distributions. Note that GenTT
chooses keys for each user independently, and TrEncTT generates ciphertext components for each
user independently. So we can generate keys ~ sk i, and ciphertext components for users other
than i independently, and use the challenge ciphertexts in place of the ciphertext components for
user i, without knowing sk(i). Suppose we simulate TrEncTT(~ sk;W) in this way. Notice that if the
45challenge ciphertexts come from the ﬁrst distribution, then simulated ciphertexts will be distributed
exactly as in TrEncTT(~ sk;W), and if the challenge ciphertexts come from the second distribution,
then the simulated ciphertexts will be distributed exactly as in TrEncTT(~ sk;f W i). But, if the claim
were false, then we would have found an adversary for the encryption scheme that can distinguish
between the two distributions with advantage greater than "Enc(). It is easy to see that if the pirate
decoder is efﬁcient, then so will the adversary for the encryption scheme (since TraceFP;Gen;Enc
are all assumed to be efﬁcient. We conclude that if the claim is false, then AEnc violates the security
of Enc.
We now complete the proof of the theorem by combining Equation (3.5) and Claim 3.16.
3.4.6 Decryption Function Family of TT
Recall that the two goals of constructing a new traitor-tracing scheme were to trace stateful
pirates and to reduce the complexity of decryption. We addressed tracing of stateful pirates in the
previous section, and now we turn to the complexity of decryption. We do so by instantiating the
traitor-tracing scheme with various encryption schemes and making two observations: 1) The type
of encryption schemes we require are sufﬁciently weak that there already exist plausible candidates
with a very simple decryption operation, and 2) Decryption for the traitor-tracing scheme is not
much more complex than decryption for the underlying encryption scheme. We summarize the
second point with the following simple lemma.
Lemma 3.17 (Decryption Function Family for TT). Let TT be as deﬁned, with Enc as its
underlying encryption scheme. Let (sk;i) = sk 2 f0;1g and c = (c(1);:::;c(n)) 2 C() be any
user key and ciphertext for TT. Then
DecTT;c(sk) = DecTT;c(sk;i) =
_
i02[n]
 
1i0(i) ^ Decc(i0)(sk)

Here, the function 1x(y) takes the value 1 if y = x and 0 otherwise. The lemma follows directly
from the construction of DecTT. Also note that the function 1i0: f0;1gdlogne ! f0;1g is just a
conjunction of dlogne bits (a single gate of fan-in O(logn)), and we need to compute n of these
functions. In addition to computing 1i0 and Decc(i0), there are n conjunctions and a single outer
46disjunction. Thus we add an additional n + 1 gates, compute decryption n times, and increase the
depth by 2. Hence, an intuitive summary of the lemma is that if Dec can be implemented by circuits
of size s and depth h, DecTT can be implemented by circuits of size n  (s + O(logn)) = e O(ns)
and depth h + 2. This summary will be precise enough to state our main results.
By combining Lemma 3.17 with Theorem 3.14, we easily obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.18 (One-way Functions Imply Traitor-Tracing w/ Poly-Time Decryption). Let n =
n() be any polynomial in . Assuming the existence of (non-uniformly secure) one-way functions,
there exists an (n; e O(n2))-secure traitor-tracing scheme with decryption function family QDecTT;
consisting only of circuits of size poly()
Proof. The existence of one-way functions implies the existence of an encryption scheme Enc that
is (1=a;a;a)-secure for every constant a > 0 and sufﬁciently large  with decryption function
QDec; consisting only of circuits of size t() = poly() for every  2 N. From Lemma 3.17, it is
easy to see that if TT uses Enc as its encryption scheme, then QDecTT; consists only of circuits
of size e O(n()t(=2)) = poly().
Theorem 6.1 in the introduction follows by combining Theorem 3.6 with Corollary 3.18.
We will now consider the possibility of constructing a traitor-tracing scheme where the decryp-
tion functionality can be implemented by circuits of constant depth, and thus obtaining hardness
results for generic sanitizers that are efﬁcient for constant-depth queries (Theorem 6.3). First,
we summarize our observation that the traitor-tracing scheme almost preserves the depth of the
decryption function.
Corollary 3.19 (Encryption with Constant-Depth Decryption Impies Traitor-Tracing w/ Constan-
t-Depth Decryption). Let n = n() be any polynomial in . If there exists an encryption scheme,
(Gen;Enc;Dec), that is (o(1=n2);!(n4);na)-secure for every a > 0 and has decryption fam-
ily Q
()
Dec consisting of circuits of size poly() and depth h, then there exists a (n; e O(n2))-secure
traitor-tracing scheme with decryption function family Q
()
DecTT consisting of circuits of size
e O(n)  poly() and depth h + 2.
The corollary is clear from Lemma 3.17 and Theorem 3.14. The corollary is not interesting
without an encryption scheme that can be decrypted by constant-depth circuits. However, we
observe that such a scheme (meeting our relaxed security criteria) can be constructed from a suf-
ﬁciently good local pseudorandom generator (PRG). A recent result of Applebaum [3] gave the
47ﬁrst plausible candidate construction of a local PRG for the range of parameters we need, giv-
ing plausibility to the assumption that such PRGs (and, as we show, traitor-tracing schemes with
constant-depth decryption) exist. We note that local PRGs actually imply encryption schemes with
local decryption, which is stronger than just constant-depth decryption. Although it may be sig-
niﬁcantly easier to construct encryption schemes that only have constant-depth decryption, we are
not aware of any other ways of constructing such a scheme.
Deﬁnition 3.20 (Local Pseudorandom Generator). An algorithm G: f0;1g ! f0;1gsPRG() is a
"PRG-pseudorandom generator if it is efﬁcient (poly()-time) and for every poly(sPRG())-time
adversary APRG
 Pr[APRG(G(U)) = 1]   Pr

APRG(UsPRG()) = 1
   "PRG()
If, in addition, if each bit of the output depends only on some set of L bits of the input, then G is a
("PRG;L)-local pseudorandom generator.
It is a well known result in Cryptography that pseudorandom generators imply encryption
schemes satisfying Deﬁnition 3.10 (for certain ranges of parameters). We will use a particular
construction whose decryption can be computed in constant-depth whenever the underlying PRG
is locally-computable (or, more generally, computable by constant-depth circuits). The construc-
tion is the standard “computational one-time pad”, however we give a construction to verify that
the decryption can be computed by constant-depth circuits.
Gen(1):
Let s  R f0;1g and output sk = s
Enc(sk;b):
Let r  R f1;2;:::;sPRG()g and output c = (r;G(sk)r  b)
Dec(sk;c):
Let (r0;b0) = c and output: b = G(sk)r  b0
Figure 7: An encryption scheme LocalEnc that can be decrypted in constant depth.
48Lemma 3.21 (Local PRGs ! Encryption). If there exists a ("PRG();L)-local pseudorandom
generator G: f0;1g ! f0;1gsPRG(), then there exists an ("Enc = "PRG + k2
Enc=sPRG;kEnc)-Secure
Encryption Scheme (Gen;Enc;Dec) with decryption function family QDec; consisting of circuits
of size poly() and depth 4.
Proof. The security follows from standard arguments: If we choose a random s  R f0;1g, then
G(s) is indistinguishable from uniform up to error "PRG. If we generate kEnc encryptions with
key s, and no two encryptions use the same choice of r, then the output is indistinguishable from
encryptions using uniform random bits in place of G(s). If we use uniform random bits in place of
G, then the message is information-theoretically hidden. The probability that no two encryptions
out of kEnc use the same choice of r is at most k2
Enc=sPRG, so we lose this term in the security of the
encryption scheme.
Let 1i(j) be the indicator variable for the condition j = i. For every c = (r;b) 2 C, we can
write
Dec(r;b)(s) =
_
i2[sPRG()]
(1i(r) ^ (Gi(s)  b)):
Observe that, since Gi is a function of L bits of the input, it can be computed by a size-2L DNF
(depth-2 circuit), thus Gi(s)b can be computed by a size 2L+1, depth-3 circuit. The indicator 1i
can be computed by a conjunction of dlog2 sPRG()e bits, which is a size-dlog2 sPRG()e, depth-1
circuit. The outer disjunction increases the depth by one level and the size by 1. Putting it all to-
gether, we have shown that Decr;b(s) can be computed by depth-4 circuits of size e O(2LsPRG()) =
poly(sPRG()).
Combining Corollary 3.19 with Lemma 3.21 easily yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3.22 (Local Pseudorandom Generators Imply traitor-tracing w/ AC0 Decryption). Let
n = n() be any polynomial in . Assuming the existence of a (o(1=n2);n7;L)-local pseudoran-
dom generator for some constant L 2 N, there exists an (n; e O(n2))-secure traitor-tracing scheme
with decryption function family QDecTT; consisting of circuits of size e O(n)  poly() and depth 6.
Theorem 6.3 in the introduction follows by combining Theorem 3.6 with Corollary 3.22.
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The Hardness of Generating Private
Synthetic Data
In Chapter 3 we saw that if we want efﬁcient sanitizers for counting queries that provide better
utility than the Laplace mechanism, then we have to do something more than just restrict the num-
ber of queries (as answering n2+o(1) queries is hard, by Theorem 3.1). In this chapter we take a
different approach and consider restricting the complexity of the queries. In particular, we focus on
a restricted family of counting queries, called marginal queries. Recall from the introduction that
a marginal query is speciﬁed by a set S  [d] and a pattern t 2 f0;1gjSj. The query asks, “What
fraction of the individual records in D has each of the attributes j 2 S set to tj?” A natural restric-
tion is to the set of k-way marginal queries, which are marginal queries speciﬁed by sets of size
at most k. The set of answers to all k-way marginal queries is alternatively known as the “k-way
contingency table” of the database. Contingency tables are a workhorse of categorical data analy-
sis, as they are easy to interpret and are sufﬁcient statistics for many popular probabilistic models.
For example, the set of pairwise correlations between different binary attributes—the covariance
matrix—is equivalent to the 2-way contingency table. Marginal queries are also sometimes known
as “conjunction queries” in the differential privacy literature, since a marginal query is simply a
counting query in which the predicate q is a conjunction on the bits of it input.
In this chapter, we focus on one-shot sanitizers for k-way marginal queries. Recall that a one-
shot sanitizer computes and releases a single differentially private “summary” of the database that
enables others to determine accurate answers to a large class of queries. What form should this
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which is a new database b D = M(D) whose rows are “fake”, but come from the same universe as
those of D and are guaranteed to share many statistics with those of D (up to some accuracy). In
particular, we would like the synthetic database to yield answers to k-way marginal queries that
are approximately the same as those given by the input database. Some advantages of synthetic
data are that it can be easily understood by humans, and statistical software can be run directly on
it without modiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst result on producing differentially private synthetic data came in the work of Barak et
al. [8]. Given a database D consisting of n rows from f0;1gd, they show how to construct a dif-
ferentially private synthetic database b D, also of n rows from f0;1gd, in which the answer to every
marginal query, is approximately preserved up to an additive error of 2O(d)=n. The running time of
their algorithm is poly(n;2d), which is feasible for small values of d. They pose as an open prob-
lem whether the running time of their algorithm can be improved for the case where we only want
to preserve the k-way marginals for small k (e.g. k = 2). Indeed, the number of k-way marginal
queries is only d(k) (when k  d), and we can produce differentially private estimates for all of
these queries in time poly(n;dk) with error d(k)=n, using the Laplace mechanism (Lemma 2.9).
Moreover, a version of the Barak et al. algorithm [8] can ensure that even these noisy answers are
consistent with a real database.7
As we have discussed, there are more powerful techniques than the Laplace mechanism for
answering counting queries. Indeed, all of these techniques generate synthetic data, either explic-
itly or as a byproduct of their design. For every class Q = fq : f0;1gd ! f0;1gg of predicates,
the private multiplicative weights algorithm (Lemma 2.16) yields a differentially private one-shot
sanitizer M that produces a synthetic database b D = M(D) such that all counting queries corre-
sponding to predicates in Q are preserved to within an accuracy of e O(d1=4p
logjQj=n1=2), with
high probability. In particular, with n = poly(d), the synthetic data can provide simultaneous ac-
curacy for an exponential-sized family of queries (e.g. jQj = 2d). Indeed, nearly every technique
we are aware of for answering a large number of counting queries crucially relies on synthetic data
as part of its design.8 Unfortunately, the running time of every such known algorithm is at least 2d.
7Technically, this “real database” may assign fractional weight to some rows.
8A notable exception is the new algorithm of Nikolov, Talwar, and Zheng [70], which does not explicitly maintain
a synthetic database as part of its state.
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inherent. Speciﬁcally, assuming the existence of one-way functions, they exhibit an efﬁciently
computable family Q of predicates (e.g. consisting of circuits of size d2) for which it is infeasible
to produce a differentially private synthetic database preserving the counting queries correspond-
ing to Q (for databases of any n = poly(d) number of rows). However, these results left open
the possibility that for natural families of counting queries (e.g. k-way marginal queries), pro-
ducing a differentially private synthetic database (or non-synthetic summarization) can be done
efﬁciently. Indeed, one may have gained optimism from a comparison to the early history of
computational learning theory, where one-way functions were used to show hardness of learning
arbitrary efﬁciently computable concepts in computational learning theory but natural subclasses
(like conjunctions) were found to be learnable [91].
4.1 Our Results and Techniques
We prove that it is infeasible to produce synthetic databases preserving even very simple count-
ing queries, such as 2-way marginals:
Theorem 4.1. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is a constant  > 0 such that
for any constant  < 1, there is no efﬁcient one-shot sanitizer whose output is a synthetic database
that is (;)-accurate for 2-way marginals.
That is, for every polynomial p, there is no polynomial-time, differentially private algorithm M
that takes a database D 2 (f0;1gd)p(d) and produces a synthetic database b D 2 (f0;1gd) such
that jq(D)   q(b D)j   for all 2-way marginals q.
Stated differently, there is no efﬁcient, differentially private, one-shot sanitizer for the family of
2-way marginals whose summary is a synthetic database. In fact, our impossibility result extends
from conjunctions of 2 literals to any family of constant arity predicates that contains a function
depending on at least two variables, such as parities of 3 literals.
As mentioned earlier, all 2-way marginals can be easily summarized with non-synthetic data
(by just adding noise to each of the (2d)2 values). Thus, our result shows that requiring a syn-
thetic database may severely constrain what sorts of differentially private data releases are possi-
ble. (Dwork et al. [32] also showed that there exists a poly(d)-sized family of counting queries that
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data. Our contribution is to show that such a separation holds for a very simple and natural family
of predicates, namely 2-way marginals.)
This separation between synthetic data and non-synthetic data seems analogous to the separa-
tions between proper and improper learning in computational learning theory [73, 36], where it is
infeasible to learn certain concept classes if the output hypothesis is constrained to come from the
same representation class as the concept, but it becomes feasible if we allow the output hypothesis
to come from a different representation class. This analogy gives hope for designing efﬁcient, dif-
ferentially private algorithms that take a database and produce a compact summary of it that is not
synthetic data but somehow can be used to accurately answer exponentially many questions about
the original database (e.g. all marginals). The negative results of Dwork et al. [32] and those of
Chapter 3 on non-synthetic data (assuming the existence of efﬁcient traitor-tracing schemes) do not
say anything about natural classes of counting queries, such as marginals. Indeed, in Chapters 5
and 6 we will design one-shot sanitizers for marginal queries that do not generate synthetic data
and are faster than what can be achieved for arbitrary counting queries.
To bypass the complexity barrier stated in Theorem 4.1, it may not be necessary to introduce
exotic data representations; some mild generalizations of synthetic data may sufﬁce. For example,
several recent algorithms [16, 78, 35] produce several synthetic databases, with the guarantee that
the median answer over these databases is approximately accurate. More generally, we can con-
sider summarizations of a database D that that consist of a collection b D of rows from the same
universe as the original database, and where we estimate q(D) by applying the predicate q to each
row of b D and then aggregating the results via some aggregation function f. With standard syn-
thetic data, f is simply the average, but we may instead allow f to take a median of averages, or
apply an afﬁne shift to the average. For such relaxed synthetic data, we prove the following results:
 There is a constant k such that counting queries corresponding to k-juntas (functions de-
pending on at most k variables) cannot be accurately and privately summarized as relaxed
synthetic data with a median-of-averages aggregator, or with a symmetric and monotone
aggregator (that is independent of the predicate q being queried).
 For every constant k, counting queries corresponding to k-juntas can be accurately and pri-
vately summarized as relaxed synthetic data with an aggregator that applies an afﬁne shift to
53the average (where the shift does depend on the predicate being queried).
Our proof of Theorem 4.1 and our other negative results are obtained by combining the hard-to-
sanitize databases of Dwork et al. [32] with PCP reductions. They construct a database consisting
of valid message-signature pairs (mi;i) under a digital signature scheme, and argue that any
differentially private sanitizer that preserves accuracy for the counting query associated with the
signature veriﬁcation predicate can be used to forge valid signatures. We replace each message-
signature pair (mi;i) with a PCP encoding i that proves that (mi;i) satisﬁes the signature
veriﬁcation algorithm. We then argue that if accuracy is preserved for a large fraction of the
(constant arity) constraints of the PCP veriﬁer, then we can “decode” the PCP either to violate
privacy (by recovering one of the original message-signature pairs) or to forge a signature (by
producing a new message-signature pair).
We remark that error-correcting codes were already used in [32] for the purpose of producing
a ﬁxed polynomial-sized set of counting queries that can be used for all veriﬁcation keys. Our
observationisthatbyusingPCPencodings, wecanreducenotonlythenumberofcountingqueries
in consideration, but also their computational complexity.
Our proof has some unusual features among PCP-based hardness results:
 As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst time that PCPs have been used in conjunction with crypto-
graphic assumptions for a hardness result. (They have been used together for positive results
regarding computationally sound proof systems [55, 64, 9].) It would be interesting to see
if such a combination could be useful in, say, computational learning theory (where PCPs
have been used for hardness of “proper” learning [2, 37] and cryptographic assumptions for
hardness of representation-independent learning [91, 52]).
 While PCP-based inapproximability results are usually stated as Karp reductions, we actu-
ally need them to be Levin reductions—capturing that they are reductions between search
problems, and not just decision problems. (Previously, this property has been used in the
same results on computationally sound proofs mentioned above.)
544.2 Relationship with Hardness of Approximation
The objective of a privacy-preserving sanitizer is to reveal some properties of the underlying
database without giving away enough information to reconstruct that database. This requirement
has different implications for sanitizers that produce synthetic databases and those with arbitrary
output.
The SuLQ framework of [15] is a well-studied and efﬁcient technique for achieving (;)-
differential privacy, with non-synthetic output. To get accurate, private output for a family of
counting queries with predicates in Q, we can release a vector of noisy counts (q(D) + Zq)q2Q
where the random variables (Zq)q2Q are drawn independently from a distribution suitable for pre-
serving privacy (e.g. a Laplace distribution with standard deviation O(jQj=n)).
Consider the case of an n-row database D that contains satisfying assignments to a 3CNF
formula', andsupposeourconceptclassincludesalldisjunctionsonthreeliterals(or, equivalently,
all conjunctions on three literals). Then the technique above releases a set of noisy counts that
describes a database in which every clause of ' is satisﬁed by most of the rows of D. However,
sanitizers with synthetic-database output are required to produce a database that consists of rows
that satisfy most of the clauses of '.
Because of the noise added to the output, the requirement of a synthetic database does not
strictly force the sanitizer to ﬁnd a satisfying assignment for the given 3CNF. However, it is
known to be NP-hard to ﬁnd even approximate satisfying assignments to 3CNF formulae. In our
main result, Theorem 4.16, we will show that there exists a distribution over databases that is
hard-to-sanitize with respect to synthetic data for any concept class that is sufﬁcient to express a
hard-to-approximate constraint satisfaction problem.
4.2.1 Hard to Approximate CSPs
We deﬁne a constraint satisfaction problem to be the following.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP)). For a non-decreasing function q = q(d) 
d, a family of q(d)-CSPs, denoted   = ( d)d2N, is a sequence of sets  d of boolean predicates
deﬁned on up to q(d) variables. We assume for convenience that  1   2  :::. If q(d) and  d do
not depend on d then we refer to   as a ﬁxed family of q-CSPs.
55For every d  q(d), let Q
(d)
  be the class consisting of all predicates q : f0;1gd ! R of the form
q(u1;:::;ud) = (ui1;:::;uiq(d)) for some  2  d and i1;:::;iq(d) 2 [d]. We call Q  = [1
d=0Q
(d)
 
the class of constraints of  . Finally, we say a multiset '  Q
(d)
  is a d-variable instance of Q 
and each 'i 2 ' is a constraint of '.
We say that an assignment  satisﬁes the constraint 'i if 'i() = 1. For ' = f'1;:::;'mg,
deﬁne
val(';) =
1
m
m X
i=1
'i() and val(') = max
2f0;1gd val(';):
Our hardness results will apply to concept classes Q
(d)
  for CSP families   with certain addi-
tional properties. Speciﬁcally we deﬁne,
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Nice CSP). A family   = ( d)d2N of q(d)-CSPs nice if
1. q(d) = d1 
(1), and
2. for every d 2 N, there exists a non-constant predicate ' : f0;1gq(d) ! f0;1g, and two
assignments u
0;u
1 2 f0;1gq(d) such that '(u0) = 0 and '(u1) = 1 can be found in time
poly(d).
We note that any ﬁxed family of q-CSP that contains a non-constant predicate is a nice CSP.
Indeed, these CSPs (e.g. conjunctions of 2 literals) are the main application of interest for our
results. However it will sometimes be useful to work with generalizations to nice CSPs with
predicates of non-constant arity.
For our hardness result, we will need to consider a strong notion of hard constraint satisfaction
problems, which is related to probabilistically checkable proofs. First we recall the standard notion
of hardness of approximation under Karp reductions (stated for additive, rather than multiplicative
approximation error).
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Inapproximability under Karp Reductions). Let ; : N ! [0;1] be functions. A
family of CSPs   = ( d)d2N is (;)-hard-to-approximate under Karp reductions if there exists a
polynomial-time computable function R such that for every circuit C with jCj gates and input size
d, if we set 'C = R(C)  Q , then
1. if C is satisﬁable, then val('C)  (d), and
562. if C is unsatisﬁable, then val('C) < (d)   (d).
For our hardness result, we will need a stronger notion of inapproximability, which says that
we can efﬁciently transform satisfying assignments of C into solutions to 'C of high value, and
vice-versa. In order to make the statement of our hardness result more precise, we also want to
put explicit bounds on both the input length of the instance produced by the reduction and the time
required to transform assignments to C into solutions to 'C and vice versa.
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Inapproximability under Levin Reductions). Let ; : N ! [0;1] and LPCP : N !
N be functions. A family of CSPs   = ( d)d2N is (;)-hard-to-approximate under Levin reduc-
tions with length blowup LPCP if there exist polynomial-time computable functions R;Enc;Dec
such that for every circuit C with jCj gates and input of size d
1. 'C = R(C)  Q
(d)
  for d = LPCP(jCj),
2. for every u 2 f0;1gd such that C(u) = 1, val('C;Enc(u;C))  (d),
3. for every  2 f0;1gd such that val('C;)  (d)   (d), C(Dec(;C)) = 1,
4. for every u 2 f0;1gd, Dec(Enc(u;C)) = u, and
5. Enc and Dec are both computable in time poly(jCj;d).
When we do not wish to specify the value  we will simply say that the family   is -hard-to-
approximate under Levin reductions with length blowup LPCP to indicate that there exists such
a  2 (;1]. When we do not specify a length blowup LPCP, then LPCP is assumed to be a
polynomial. If we drop the requirement that R is efﬁciently computable, then we say that   is
(;)-hard-to-approximate under inefﬁcient Levin reductions with length blowup LPCP. Finally, if
LPCP(s)  s1+o(1) then we will write that   is (;)-hard-to-approximate under Levin reductions
with nearly-linear length blowup.
The notation Enc;Dec reﬂects the fact that we think of the set of assignments  such that
val('C;)   as a sort of error-correcting code on the satisfying assignments to C. Any  with
value close to  can be decoded to a valid satisfying assignment.
Levin reductions are a stronger notion of reduction than Karp reductions. To see this, let   be
-hard-to-approximate under Levin reductions, and let R;Enc;Dec be the functions described in
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tions 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 4.4. Speciﬁcally, if there exists an assignment u 2 f0;1gd that satisﬁes
C, then Enc(u;C) satisﬁes at least a  fraction of the constraints of 'C. Conversely if any assign-
ment  2 f0;1gd satisﬁes at least a     fraction of the constraints of 'C, then Dec(;C) is a
satisfying assignment of C.
Variants of the PCP Theorem can be used to show that essentially every class of CSP is hard-
to-approximate in this sense. Indeed,  = Enc(u;C) corresponds to a “probabilistically checkable
proof”thatC issatisﬁable: ifwecheckarandomconstraintof'C = R(C)(whichrequiresreading
only a few bits of ) then we will accept with probability at least . Conversely, if the above test
passes for some string  2 f0;1gd with probability at least    , then C must be satisﬁable (as
Dec(;C) is a satisfying assignment to C).
We restrict to CSP’s that are closed under negation as it sufﬁces for our application.
Theorem 4.6 (variant of PCP Theorem). For every ﬁxed family of CSPs   that is closed under
negation and contains a function that depends on at least two variables, there is a constant  =
( ) > 0 such that   is -hard to approximate under Levin reductions.
Proof sketch. Hardness of approximation under Karp reductions follows directly from the classi-
ﬁcation theorems of Creignou [24] and Khanna et al. [53]. These theorems show that all CSPs
are either -hard under Karp reductions for some constant  > 0 or can be solved optimally in
polynomial time. By inspection, the only CSPs that fall into the polynomial-time cases (0-valid,
1-valid, and 2-monotone) and are closed under negation are those containing only dictatorships
and constant functions.
The fact that standard PCPs actually yield Levin reductions has been explicitly discussed and
formalized by Barak and Goldreich [9] in the terminology of PCPs rather than reductions (the
function Enc is called “relatively efﬁcient oracle-construction” and the function Dec is called “a
proof-of-knowledge property”). They verify that these properties hold for the PCP construction
of Babai et al. [7], whereas we need it for PCPs of constant query complexity. While the prop-
erties probably hold for most (if not all) existing PCP constructions, the existence of the efﬁcient
“decoding” function g requires some veriﬁcation. We observe that it follows as a black box from
the PCPs of Proximity of [12, 27]. There, a preﬁx of the PCP (the “implicit input oracle”) can
be taken to be the encoding of a satisfying assignment of the circuit C in an efﬁciently decodable
error-correcting code. If the PCP veriﬁer accepts with higher probability than the soundness error
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to a satisfying assignment. By the correspondence between PCPs and CSPs [6], this yields a CSP
(with constraints of constant arity) that is -hard to approximate under Levin reductions for some
constant  > 0 (and  = 1). The sequence of approximation-preserving reductions from arbitrary
CSPs to MAX-CUT [71] can be veriﬁed to preserve efﬁciency of decoding (indeed, the correctness
of the reductions is proven by specifying how to encode and decode). Finally, the reductions of
[53] from MAX-CUT to any other CSP all involve constant-sized “gadgets” that allow encoding
and decoding to be done locally and very efﬁciently.
It seems likely that optimized PCP/inapproximability results (like [47]) are also Levin reduc-
tions, whichwouldyieldfairlylargevaluesfor fornaturalCSPs(e.g.  = 1=8 "if containsall
conjunctions of 3-literals, because then Q  contains MAX 3-SAT.) We are particularly interested
in optimizing the length of the PCP, in order to establish tighter reductions between generating
private synthetic data and forging digital signatures. Below we sketch a proof that a particular
construction of short PCPs is also a Levin reduction.
Theorem 4.7. There exists a ﬁxed family of constant-arity CSPs   that is 1=2-hard-to-approximate
under nearly-linear Levin reductions.
Proof sketch. The existence of a family of constant-arity CSPs   that is 1=2-hard-to-approximate
under nearly-linear-length Karp reductions was shown by Dinur [25], building on a PCP construc-
tion of Ben-Sasson and Sudan [13]. Thus in order to establish the theorem we only need to verify
that satisfying assignments can be encoded and decoded in polynomial time. To this end, we will
outline the construction and sketch the encoding and decoding procedures. In the outline we will
focus only on the properties of the construction relevant to encoding and decoding of assignments.
See [13] and [25] for details regarding the length and soundness parameters of the construction.
1. The ﬁrst step of the construction is a sequence of reductions from circuit satisﬁability to a
certain “algebraic CSP”; efﬁcient encoding and decoding of assignments is implicit in the
analysis of these reductions. See [13, Section 5.2] and [84, Section 4.3] for details of the
reductions.
2. Next, [13] gives a polylogarithmic-query PCP for this algebraic CSP with soundness er-
ror < 1=2. In the language of CSPs (Deﬁnition 4.4), this construction gives a family of
59polylog(d)-CSPs that are 1=2-hard-to-approximate. In their PCP construction, the assign-
ment to the instance of the algebraic CSP—a low-degree univariate polynomial over a ﬁnite
ﬁeld—is included as a preﬁx of the PCP. The remainder of the PCP consists of evaluations
of related polynomials on various linear subspaces of the ﬁeld, which can all be computed
in polynomial time (in the size of the ﬁeld, which is the measure of instance size for the
algebraic CSP). The soundness analysis of their construction shows implicitly that any PCP
accepted with probability greater than 1=2 contains a polynomial that is close (in Ham-
ming distance) to a valid satisfying assignment to the instance of the algebraic CSP. That
is, the preﬁx of the PCP that should contain a low-degree univariate polynomial satisfying
the algebraic CSP will be close to a unique polynomial that is a valid satisfying assignment.
This satisfying assignment can be efﬁciently decoded from the PCP using polynomial time
algorithms for decoding Reed-Solomon codes (see e.g. [14]). See [13] for details of the
construction. In particular, see Section 3.3.1 for the argument related to decoding.
3. This PCP can be transformed into a different PCP that only makes two queries to its proof,
at the cost of increasing the soundness error to be too large (1   o(1), rather than 1   
(1))
for our desired result. This reduction proceeds in two steps:
(a) First, in the CSP perspective, we add a new variable (over a large alphabet  =
f0;1gpolylog(d)) for each constraint. The correct proof will consist of a satisfying as-
signment to the original CSP and, for each new variable, a copy of all the variables rel-
evant to a particular constraint. The new encoding can clearly be produced efﬁciently
since there are only polynomially many constraints, and thus polynomially many new
variables that need to be assigned. The analysis in [25] shows that if any assignment
(PCP) satisﬁes a sufﬁciently large fraction of the constraints of the new CSP, then the
preﬁx of the assignment corresponding to the original CSP must in fact satisfy a large
fraction of the constraints of that CSP. See [25, Section 7.2] for details.
(b) The second is to reduce the alphabet size back down to binary. This can be accom-
plished using a standard composition with a PCP of Proximity (see e.g. [4]). The
new PCP will consist of an encoding of each symbol with a linear-rate, constant dis-
tance, error correcting code that admits efﬁcient encoding and decoding, as well as a
polynomial-sizedPCPofProximityadmittingefﬁcientencoding. Theexistenceofsuch
60a PCP of Proximity is well-known (and discussed in the context of Theorem 4.6). Here
we can afford to use a PCP of Proximity with any polynomial length blowup, since it is
applied to symbols of length polylog(d). Dinur [25] establishes the existence of such a
PCP of Proximity using a small number of rounds of gap ampliﬁcation (see Step 4) and
it can easily be seen that efﬁcient encoding for each round of gap ampliﬁcation holds
in the case of PCPs of Proximity as well. See [25, Section 3] for details of composition
and Section 8 for a construction of PCPs of Proximity.
4. Finally, we decrease the soundness error to a constant s < 1. This can be accomplished, as
in [25] via a small number of rounds of “gap ampliﬁcation.” We will check that the CSP
produced by each round of gap ampliﬁcation allows for efﬁcient encoding and decoding.
Each step of gap ampliﬁcation consists of three phases
(a) A preprocessing phase that ensures the CSP instance has certain useful properties. This
phase consists of several simple transformations on the CSP and its assignment and it
is implicit in the analysis of these transformations that assignments can be encoded and
decoded efﬁciently. See [25, Section 3.1] for details.
(b) A “powering” step that creates a new CSP over a larger (but still constant-sized) al-
phabet. In the correct proof, we replace each variable of the original CSP with a new
variable that contains an assignment to every original variable that is “nearby” in an ap-
propriate sense. Thus to encode we simply have to copy the assignment to each variable
a small (constant) number of times. The analysis of [25] shows that if an assignment
to this new CSP satisﬁes a large fraction of its constraints, then we can efﬁciently com-
pute an assignment to the original CSP that satisﬁes a large fraction of its constraints.
Speciﬁcally, we assign each variable in the original CSP to be a “plurality vote” of the
variables of the new CSP, and this plurality vote, which can be computed efﬁciently.
See [25, Section 5] for details.
(c) Finally, we want to produce a CSP over a binary alphabet. As in Step 3b, we can
achieve this via composition with a PCP of Proximity. However here the alphabet we
begin with is constant-sized, so we can afford to use an inefﬁcient PCP of Proximity,
and encoding and decodingcan be achieved via brute-force enumerationof code words.
See [25], Section 6 for details.
61For some of our results we will need CSPs that are very hard to approximate (under possibly
inefﬁcient reductions), which we can obtain by “sequential repetition” of constant-error PCPs.
Theorem 4.8. There is a constant C such that for every " = "(d) > 0, the constraint family
  = ( d)d2N of k(d)-clause 3-CNF formulas is (1   "(d))-hard-to-approximate under inefﬁcient
Levin reductions, for k(d) = C log(1="(d)).
Proof sketch. As in the proof of Theorem 4.6, disjunctions of 3 literals are (1   ;1)-hard-to-
approximate under Levin reductions for some constant  > 0. By taking `(d) = log("(d))
sequential repetitions of this PCP, we get a PCP with completeness 1 and soundness "(d) whose
constraints are 3-CNF formulas with `(d) = log(1="(d)) clauses. Note that the resulting CSP will
have arity at most k(d) = 3`(d).
We have to check that this resulting PCP preserves the properties of inefﬁcient Levin reduc-
tions. The encoder for the `-fold sequential repetition is unchanged. If the initial reduction is
R(C) = 'C = f'1;:::;'mg (a set of 3-literal disjunctions), then the reduction R`(C) for the `-
fold sequential repetition will produce m`, `-clause 3-CNF formulae by taking every subcollection
of ` clauses in 'C. Speciﬁcally, for every i1;i2;:::;i` 2 [m], Rk(C) will contain a `-clause 3-CNF
formula 'i1 ^ 'i2 ^  ^ 'i`.
The decoder also remains unchanged. If the value of an assignment  is at least ` with respect
to R`(C) then it must have value at least  with respect to R(C) and thus Dec(;C) will return a
satisfying assignment to C, that is C(Dec(;C)) = 1.
Notice that when k = k(d) = !(1), the reduction will produce m!(1) clauses and be inefﬁcient.
Thus we will have an inefﬁcient Levin reduction if we want to obtain "(d) = o(1) from this
construction.
4.3 Hard-to-Sanitize Distributions from Hard CSPs
In this section we prove that to efﬁciently produce a synthetic database that is accurate for the
constraints of a CSP that is hard-to-approximate under Levin reductions, we must pay constant
error in the worst case. Following [32], we start with a digital signature scheme, and a database of
valid message-signature pairs. There is a verifying circuit Cvk and valid message-signature pairs
62are satisfying assignments to that circuit. Now we encode each row of database using the function
Enc, described in Deﬁnition 4.5, that maps satisfying assignments to Cvk to assignments of the
CSP instance 'Cvk = R(Cvk) with value at least . Then, any assignment to the CSP instance that
satisﬁes a   fraction of clauses can be decoded to a valid message-signature pair. The database
of encoded message-signature pairs is what we will use as our hard-to-sanitize distribution.
4.3.1 Hardness of Sanitizing
Differential privacy is a very strong notion of privacy, so it is common to look for hardness
results that rule out weaker notions of privacy. These hardness results show that every sanitizer
must be “blatantly non-private” in some sense. For these results, our notion of blatant non-privacy
roughly states that there exists an efﬁcient adversary who can ﬁnd a row of the original database
using only the output from any efﬁcient sanitizer. Such deﬁnitions are also referred to as “row non-
privacy.” We deﬁne hardness-of-sanitization with respect to a particular concept class, and want
to exhibit a distribution on databases for which it would be infeasible for any efﬁcient sanitizer
to give accurate output without revealing a row of the database. Speciﬁcally, following [32], we
deﬁne the following notions
Deﬁnition 4.9 (Database Distribution Ensemble). Let D = Dd be an ensemble of distributions on
d-column databases with n+1 rows D 2 (f0;1gd)n+1. Let (D;D0;i)  R e D denote the experiment
in which we choose D0  R D and i 2 [n] uniformly at random, and set D to be the ﬁrst n rows of
D0 and D0 to be D with the i-th row replaced by the (n + 1)-st row of D0.
Deﬁnition 4.10 (Hard-to-sanitize Distribution). Let Q be a concept class,  : N ! [0;1] and
TSan : N ! N be functions, and D = Dd be a database distribution ensemble.
The distribution D is (;TSan;Q)-hard-to-sanitize if there exists an efﬁcient adversary A such
that for any alleged sanitizer M running in time at most TSan(d) the following two conditions hold:
1. Whenever M(D) is (d)-accurate, then A(M(D)) outputs a row of D:
Pr
(D;D0;i) R e D
M0s and A0s coins
[(M(D) is (d)-accurate for Q) ^ (A(M(D)) \ D = ;)]  negl(d):
2. For every efﬁcient sanitizer M, A cannot extract x(i) from the database D0:
Pr
(D;D0;i) R e D
M0s and A0s coins

A(M(D
0)) = x
(i)
 negl(d)
63where x(i) is the i-th row of D.
In [32], it was shown that every distribution that is (;TSan;Q)-hard-to-sanitize in the sense of
Deﬁnition 4.10, is also hard to sanitize while achieving even weak differential privacy
Claim 4.11. [32] If a distribution ensemble D = Dd on n(d)-row databases is (;TSan;Q)-hard-
to-sanitize, then for every constant a > 0 and every  = (d)  1   1=poly(d), no TSan(d)-
time one-shot sanitizer that is (;)-accurate with for Q can achieve (alog(n);(1 8)=2n1+a)-
differential privacy.
In particular, for all constants ; > 0, no TSan(d)-time one-shot sanitizer can be simultane-
ously (;)-accurate and (;negl(n))-differentially private.
We could use a weaker deﬁnition of hard-to-sanitize distributions, which would still sufﬁce to
rule out differential privacy, and only require that for every efﬁcient M, there exists an adversary
AM that almost always extracts a row of D from every -accurate output of M(D). In our deﬁni-
tion we require that there exists a ﬁxed adversary A that almost always extracts a row of D from
every -accurate output of any efﬁcient M. Reversing the quantiﬁers in this fashion only makes
our negative results stronger.
We are concerned with sanitizers that output synthetic databases, so we will relax Deﬁni-
tion 4.10 by restricting the quantiﬁcation over sanitizers to only those sanitizers that output syn-
thetic data.
Deﬁnition 4.12 (Hard-to-sanitize Distribution as Synthetic Data). A database distribution ensem-
ble D is (;TSan;Q)-hard-to-sanitize as synthetic data if the conditions of Deﬁnition 4.10 hold for
every sanitizer M that outputs a synthetic database.
The deﬁnition of hard-to-sanitize databases can be specialized in a similar way to other output
representations besides synthetic data (e.g. medians of synthetic databases).
4.3.2 Super-Secure Digital Signature Schemes
Before proving our main result, we formally deﬁne a super-secure digital signature scheme.
These digital signature schemes have the property that it is infeasible under chosen-message attack
to ﬁnd a new message-signature pair that is different from all those obtained during the attack, even
a new signature for an old message. First we formally deﬁne digital signature schemes
64Deﬁnition 4.13 (Digital signature scheme). For a functions Lvk;TVer : N ! N. A (Lvk;TVer)-
digital signature scheme is a tuple of three polynomial time algorithms  = (Gen;Sign;Ver)
such that
1. Gen takes as input the security parameter 1 and outputs a key pair (sk;vk)  R Gen(1)
such that vk 2 f0;1gLvk() for a polynomial Lvk().
2. Sign takes sk and a message m 2 f0;1g as input and outputs   R Signsk(m) such that
 2 f0;1g.
3. Ver takes vk and pair (m;) and deterministically outputs a bit b 2 f0;1g, such that for
every (sk;vk) in the range of Gen, and every message m, we have Vervk(m;Signsk(m)) =
1. Moreover, when m 2 f0;1g, and m is signed under (sk;vk) generated by Gen(1), then
Vervk can be computed by a circuit of size TVer() (for a polynomial TVer).
We deﬁne the security of a digital signature scheme with respect to the following game.
Deﬁnition 4.14 (Weak forgery game). For any signature scheme  = (Gen;Sign;Ver) and prob-
abilistic polynomial time adversary F, WeakForge(F;;;QFor) is the following probabilistic
experiment.
1. (sk;vk)  R Gen(1).
2. F is given vk and oracle access to Signsk. The adversary adaptively queries Signsk on
a set of at most QFor messages M  f0;1g, receives a set of message-signature pairs
A  f0;1g, and outputs (m;).
3. The output of the game is 1 if and only if (1) Vervk(m;) = 1, and (2) (m;) 62 A.
The weak forgery game is easier for the adversary to win than the standard forgery game
because the ﬁnal condition requires that the signature output by F be different from all pairs
(m;) 2 A, but allows for the possibility that m 2 M. In the standard deﬁnition, the ﬁnal
condition would be replaced by m 62 M. Thus the adversary has more possible outputs that
would result in a “win” under this deﬁnition than under the standard deﬁnition.
65Deﬁnition 4.15 (Super-secure digital signature scheme). For functions TFor;QFor : N ! N.
A (Lvk;TVer)-digital signature scheme  = (Gen;Sign;Ver) is a (TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-super-
secure digital signature scheme (under adaptive chosen message attack) if for every TFor-time
adversary, F,
Pr[WeakForge(F;;;QFor()) = 1]  negl():
Although the above deﬁnition is stronger than the usual deﬁnition of existentially unforgeable
digital signatures, in [40] it is shown how to modify known constructions [66, 75] to obtain a
super-secure digital signature scheme from any one-way function.
In our terminology, the existence of one-way functions implies the existence of a digital signa-
ture scheme that is a (TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-super-secure digital signature scheme for Lvk;TVer =
poly() and every polynomial TFor;QFor. Under stronger hardness assumptions, super-secure
digital signature schemes withe even better parameters exist. In particular, under certain hard-
ness assumptions in ideal lattices, there exists a digital signature scheme for TFor = 21 o(1),
Lvk = 1+o(1), TVer = 1+o(1) and every polynomial QFor [62]. For our results, we need a super-
secure digital signature scheme, and we do not know if the scheme of [62], or any other, satisﬁes
this additional property with the same parameters.
4.3.3 A Family of Hard-to-Sanitize Distributions
We are now ready to construct a general form of database distribution ensemble, which we can
instantiate with various CSPs and signature schemes to prove our hardness results.
Let   = ( d)d2N be a family of nice q(d)-CSPs (Deﬁnition 4.3) and let Q  = [1
d=1Q
(d)
  be
the class of constraints of   (Deﬁnition 4.2). Let  = (Gen;Sign;Ver) be a (Lvk;TVer)-digital
signature scheme and let Cvk be a circuit computing Vervk. Let n : N ! N be a function.
We deﬁne the database distribution ensemble D = Dd(n; ;) for any function n : N ! N. A
sample from Dd consists of n(d) + 1 random message-signature pairs encoded as PCP witnesses
with respect to the signature-veriﬁcation algorithm. Each row will also contain an encoding of the
veriﬁcation key for the signature scheme using the non-constant constraint ' : f0;1gq(d) ! f0;1g
in  d and the assignments u
0;u
1 2 f0;1gq(d) such that '(u
0) = 0 and '(u
1) = 1, as described
in the deﬁnition of nice CSPs (Deﬁnition 4.3).
Recall that s1ks2 denotes the concatenation of the strings s1 and s2. Before moving on to
66Let n = n(d). Let ' : f0;1gq(d) ! f0;1g be a non-constant constraint in  d and u
0;u
1 2
f0;1gq(d) be such that '(u
0) = 0 and '(u
1) = 1. Let  = (d) be the largest integer such
that LPCP(TVer())  d=2 and Lvk()q(d)  d=2.
Let (sk;vk)  R Gen(1), let vk = vk1vk2 :::vk`, where ` = Lvk()
Let (m1;:::;mn+1)  R (f0;1g)n+1
For: i = 1 to n + 1
Let yi := Enc(mikSignsk(mi);Cvk), be a PCP encoding of mi and its signature, padded
with zeros to be of length exactly d=2
Let zi := u
vk1ku
vk2k:::ku
vk`, be an encoding of vk, padded with zeros to length d=2
Let xi := yikzi be the concatenation of these two strings
Return: D0 := (x(1);:::;x(n+1))
Figure 8: Database Distribution Ensemble D = Dd(n; ;):
instantiating D and proving our hardness results, we make some observations about the construc-
tion. First, observe that the construction is well deﬁned. That is, the length of yi before padding
is exactly LPCP(TVer()), and the length of zi before padding is exactly Lvk()q(d) and  was
chosen so that these quantities are both at most d=2. Also, note that (d) = d
(1). This statement
holds because   is nice (Deﬁnition 4.3), so q(d) = d1 
(1), and because LPCP;TVer, and Lvk are all
boundedbysomepolynomialintheirinputlength. Finally, notethatourdistributionoverd-column
databases contains PCPs of length L = LPCP(TVer())  d=2, thus R(Cvk)  Q
(d=2)
   Q
(d)
  (by
Deﬁnition 4.2).
4.3.4 Main Hardness Result
We are now ready to state and prove our main hardness result.
Theorem 4.16. Let   = ( d)d2N be a family of nice (Deﬁnition 4.3) q(d)-CSPs such that  d[: d
is-hard-to-approximateunder(possiblyinefﬁcient)LevinreductionswithlengthblowupLPCP for
 = (d) 2 (0;1=2). Assume the existence of a (TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-digital signature scheme,
. Let  : N ! N be as deﬁned in the construction of D and let  = (d). Let TSan;n : N ! N be
67any functions such that
n(d)  d
a + TSan(d) = o(TFor((d)))
for any a > 0. and
n(d)  QFor((d))
for every d 2 N. Then the distribution ensemble D = Dd(n; ;) on n(d)-row databases is
(;TSan(d);Q
(d)
  )-hard-to-sanitize as synthetic data.
Proof. Let  = (Gen;Sign;Ver) be the assumed (TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-super-secure digital sig-
nature scheme and let Cvk be a circuit computing Vervk. Let   be the assumed family of nice
q(d)-CSPs that is -hard-to-approximate under (possibly inefﬁcient) Levin reductions with length
blowup LPCP. Let R;Enc;Dec be the functions corresponding to the Levin reduction to   and
 = (d) 2 (;1] be the parameter from Deﬁnition 4.5.
Every valid pair (m;Signsk(m)) is a satisfying assignment of the circuit Cvk, hence every row
of D0 constructed by D will satisfy at least a  fraction of the clauses of the formula 'Cvk =
R(Cvk)  Q
(d)
  . Additionally, for every bit of the veriﬁcation key, there is a block of q = q(d)
bits in each row that contains either a satisfying assignment or a non-satisfying assignment of ',
depending on whether that bit of the key is 1 or 0. Speciﬁcally, deﬁne the predicates '
j(x) =
'(xd=2+(j 1)q+1;xd=2+(j 1)q+2;:::;xd=2+jq) for j = 1;2;:::;Lvk(). Then, by construction,
'
j(D0) = vkj, the j-th bit of the veriﬁcation key. Note that '
j 2 Q
(d)
  for j = 1;2;:::;`, by
our construction of Q
(d)
  (Deﬁnition 4.2).
We now prove the following two lemmas that will establish D is hard-to-sanitize:
Lemma 4.17. There exists a polynomial-time adversary A such that for every TSan-time sanitizer
M,
Pr
(D;D0;i) R e D
M0s and A0s coins
h
(M(D) is -accurate for Q
(d)
  ) ^ (A(M(D)) \ D = ;)
i
 negl(d) (4.1)
Proof. Our privacy adversary tries to ﬁnd a row of the original database by trying to PCP-decode
each row of the “sanitized” database and then re-encoding it. In order to do so, the adversary needs
to know the veriﬁcation key used in the construction of the database, which it can discover from
the answers to the queries '
j, deﬁned above. Formally, we deﬁne the privacy adversary by means
of a subroutine that tries to learn the veriﬁcation key and then PCP-decode each row of the input
database:
68Subroutine K(b D):
Let d be the dimension of rows in b D, let  be as in the construction of D, and ` = Lvk().
For: j = 1 to `
c vkj =
h
'
j(b D) rounded to f0;1g
i
Return: c vk1kc vk2k:::kc vk`
Subroutine A0(b D):
Let b n be the number of rows in b D, c vk = K(b D)
For: i = 1 to b n
If: Cc vk(Dec(b x(i);Cc vk)) = 1
Return: Dec(b x(i);Cc vk)
Return: ?
Privacy Adversary A(b D):
Let c vk = K(b D).
Return: Enc(A0(b D);Cc vk)
Figure 9: An adversary for private synthetic data.
Let M be a TSan-time sanitizer, we will show that Inequality (4.1) holds.
Claim 4.18. If b D = M(D) is -accurate for Q
(d)
  , then A0(b D) will output a pair (m;) s.t.
Cvk(m;) = 1.
Proof. First we argue that if b D is -accurate for Q
(d)
  for  < 1=2, then K(b D) = vk, where vk
is the veriﬁcation key used in the construction of D0. By construction, '
j(D) = vkj. If vkj = 0
and b D is -accurate for D then '
j(b D)   < 1=2, and c vkj = vkj. Similarly, if vkj = 1 then
'
j(b D)  1    > 1=2, and c vkj = vkj. Thus, for the rest of the proof we will be justiﬁed in
substituting vk for c vk.
Next we show that if b D is -accurate, then A0(b D) 6= ?. It is sufﬁcient to show there exists
b x(i) 2 b D such that val('Cvk;x(i))     , which implies Cvk(Dec(b x(i);Cvk)) = 1.
Since every (mi;Signsk(mi)) pair is a satisfying assignment to Cvk, the deﬁnition of Enc (Def-
inition 4.5) implies that each row x(i) of D has val('Cvk;x(i))  . Thus if 'Cvk = f'1;:::;'mg,
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1
m
m X
j=1
'j(D) =
1
m
m X
j=1
 
1
n
n X
i=1
'j(x
(i))
!
=
1
n
n X
i=1
val('Cvk;x
(i))  :
Since b D is -accurate for Q
(d)
  , and for every constraint 'j, either 'j 2   or :'j 2  , then for
every constraint 'j 2 'Cvk, we have 'j(b D)  'j(D)   . Thus
1
b n
b n X
i=1
val('Cvk;b x
(i)) =
1
m
m X
j=1
'j(b D) 
1
m
m X
j=1
'j(D)        :
So for at least one row b x() 2 b D it must be the case that val('Cvk;b x())     . The deﬁnition of
Dec (Deﬁnition 4.5) implies Cvk(Dec(b x();Cvk)) = 1.
Now notice that if A0(M(D)) outputs a valid message-signature pair but A(M(D)) \ D =
;, then this means A0(M(D)) is forging a new signature not among those used to generate D.
Formally, we construct a signature forger as follows:
Use the oracle Signsk to generate an n-row database D just as in the deﬁnition of Dd (con-
sisting of PCP encodings of valid message-signature pairs and an encoding of vk).
Let b D := M(D)
Return: b x() := A0(b D)
Figure 10: Forger F(vk) with oracle access to Signsk.
First we analyze the running time of F. In order to construct D, the forger must PCP-encode
the signatures, which requires time n(d)  poly(TVer()) = n(d)  poly(d). Running M requires
time TSan(d) by assumption. Finally, the time to run A0(b D) to decode a message-signature pair is
n(d)  poly(d), since A0 has to run the PCP decoder on each row of b D. Put together, the running
time of F is n(d)  poly(d) + TSan(d) = o(TFor((d))); where the inequality is an assumption of
the theorem. Next, we note that the forger makes at most n(d)  o(QFor((d))) queries to Signsk,
and this inequality is also an assumption of the theorem.
Now observe that running F in the experiment WeakForge(F;;;QFor()) is equivalent to
running A in the experiment of Inequality (4.1), except that F does not re-encode the output of
A0(M(D)). By the super-security of the signature scheme, if the b x() output by F is a valid
70message-signature pair (as holds if M(D) is -accurate for Q
(d)
  , by Claim 4.18), then it must
be one of the message-signature pairs used to construct D (except with probability negl() =
negl(d
(1)) = negl(d)). This implies that A(M(D)) = Enc(b x();Cvk) 2 D (except with negligi-
ble probability). Thus, we have
Pr
(D;D0;i) R e D
M0s coins
[M(D) is -accurate for Q
(d)
  ) A(M(D)) 2 D]  1   negl(d);
which is equivalent to the statement of the lemma.
Lemma 4.19.
Pr
(D;D0;i) R e D
M0s and A0s coins

A(M(D
0)) = x
(i)
 negl(d)
Proof. Since the messages mi used in D0 are drawn independently, D0 contains no information
about the message mi, thus no adversary can, on input M(D0) output the target row x(i) except
with probability 2  = negl(d).
These two claims sufﬁce to establish that D is (;Q )-hard-to-sanitize as synthetic data.
Theorem 4.1 in the introduction follows by combining Theorems 4.6 and 4.16.
If we assume the existence of an efﬁcient digital signature scheme secure against nearly-
exponential-time adversaries then we obtain the following variant of Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.20. Assume the existence of a digital signature scheme that is (TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-
super-secure for TFor = 21 o(1), Lvk = 1+o(1), TVer = 1+o(1) and every polynomial QFor. Then
there exists a family   of constant-arity CSPs such that for every polynomial n, the distribution
ensembleD = Dd(d; ;)onn(d)-rowdatabasesis(1=2;TSan;Q
(d)
  )-hard-to-sanitizeassynthetic
data for some TSan(d) = 2d1 o(1).
Proof. By Theorem 4.7, there exists a ﬁxed family of constant-arity q-CSPs that is 1=2-hard-to-
approximate under Levin reductions with nearly-linear length blowup. That is, LPCP(s) = s1+o(1).
Now in the construction of D, we can choose  = d1 o(1) such that LPCP(TVer())  d=2 and
Lvk  q  d=2. Thus we have TFor() = 21 o(1) = 2d1 o(1).
Now we can ﬁnd some function TSan(d) = 2d1 o(1), such that
n(d)  d
a + TSan(d) = o(TFor((d)))
71for every a > 0. Additionally, for every polynomial n(d), we will have
n(d)  QFor((d)):
Thus the assumptions of Theorem 4.16 are satisﬁed.
4.4 Relaxed Synthetic Data
The proof of Theorem 4.16 requires that the sanitizer output a synthetic database. In this
section we present similar hardness results for sanitizers that produce other forms of output, as
long as they still produce a collection of elements from f0;1gd, that are interpreted as the data
of (possibly “fake”) individuals. More speciﬁcally, we consider sanitizers that output a database
b D 2 (f0;1gd)b n but are interpreted using an evaluation function of the following form: To evaluate
predicate q 2 Q on b D, apply q to each row b x(i) of b D to get a string of b n bits, and then apply a
function f : f0;1gb nQ ! [0;1] to determine the answer. For example, when the sanitizer outputs
a synthetic database, we have f(b1;:::;bb n;q) = (1=b n)
Pb n
i=1 bi, which is just the fraction of rows
that get labeled with a 1 by the predicate q (independent of q).
We now give a formal deﬁnition of relaxed synthetic data
Deﬁnition 4.21 (Relaxed Synthetic Data). A sanitizer M : (f0;1gd)n ! (f0;1gd)b n with evaluator
E outputs relaxed synthetic data for a family of predicates Q if there exists f : f0;1gb nQ ! [0;1]
such that
 For every q 2 Q
E(b D;q) = f(q(b x
(1));q(b x
(2));:::;q(b x
(b n));q);
and
 f is monotone9 in the ﬁrst b n inputs.
This relaxed notion of synthetic data is of interest because many natural approaches to sanitiz-
ing yield outputs of this type. In particular, several previous sanitization algorithms [16, 78, 35]
produce a set of synthetic databases and answer a query by taking a median over the answers given
9Given two vectors a = (a1;:::;an) and b = (b1;:::;bn) we say b  a iff bi  ai for every i 2 [n]. We say a
function f : f0;1gn ! [0;1] is monotone if b  a =) f(b)  f(a).
72by the individual databases. Sanitizers that use medians of synthetic databases no longer have the
advantage that they are “interchangeable” with the original data, but are still be desirable for data
releases because they retain the property that a small data structure can give accurate answers to a
large number of queries. We view such databases as a single synthetic database but require that f
have a special form. Unfortunately, the sanitizers of [78] and [35] run in time exponential in the
dimension of the data, d, and the results of the next subsection show this limitation is inherent even
for simple concept classes.
Throughout this section we will continue to use c(b D) to refer to the answer given by b D when
interpreted as a synthetic database.
We now present our hardness results for relaxed synthetic data where the function f takes
the median over synthetic database (Section 4.4.1), where f is an arbitrary monotone, symmetric
function (Section 4.4.2), or when the family of concepts contains CSPs that are very hard to ap-
proximate (Section 4.4.3). Our proofs use the same construction of hard-to-sanitize databases as
Theorem 4.16 with a modiﬁed analysis and parameters to show that the output must still contain a
PCP-decodable row.
4.4.1 Hardness of Sanitizing as Medians
In this section we establish that the distribution D used in the proof of Theorem 4.16 is hard-
to-sanitize as medians of synthetic data, formally deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 4.22 (Medians of Synthetic Data). A sanitizer M : (f0;1gd)n ! (f0;1gd)b n with
evaluator E outputs medians of synthetic data if there is a partition [b n] = S1 [S2 [S` such that
E(b x
(1);:::;b x
(b n);q) = median
(
1
jS1j
X
i2S1
q(b x
(i));
1
jS2j
X
i2S2
q(b x
(i));:::;
1
jS`j
X
i2S`
q(b x
(i))
)
:
Notethatmediansofsyntheticdataareaspecialcaseofrelaxedsyntheticdata. Inthefollowing,
we rule out efﬁcient sanitizers with medians of synthetic data for CSPs that are hard to approximate
within a multiplicative factor larger than 2. By Theorem 4.8, these CSPs include k-clause 3-CNF
formulas for some constant k.
Theorem 4.23. Let   = ( d)d2N be a family of nice (Deﬁnition 4.3) q(d)-CSPs such that  d[: d
is (( + )=2;)-hard-to-approximate under (possibly inefﬁcient) Levin reductions with length
73blowup LPCP for  = (d) 2 (0;1=2). Assume the existence of a (TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-digital
signature scheme, . Let  : N ! N be as deﬁned in the construction of D and let  = (d). Let
TSan;n : N ! N be any functions such that
n(d)  d
a + TSan(d) = o(TFor((d)))
for any a > 0. and
n(d)  QFor((d))
for every d 2 N. Then the distribution ensemble D = Dd(n; ;) on n(d)-row databases is
(;TSan(d);Q
(d)
  )-hard-to-sanitize as medians of synthetic data.
Proof. Let   be the assumed family of nice q(d) CSPs that is ((+)=2;)-hard-to-approximate
under (possibly inefﬁcient) Levin reductions with length blowup LPCP. Let R;Enc;Dec be the
functions corresponding to the Levin reduction to  . Let M(D) = b D and let
n
b D1; b D2;:::; b D`
o
be the partition of the rows of b D corresponding to S1;:::;S`, i.e. b Di = (b x(j))j2Si.
Assuming that b D is -accurate as medians of synthetic data, we will show that there must exist
a row b x() 2 b D such that val('Cvk;b x())     ( + )=2 = (   )=2. To do so, we observe that
if b D is accurate as medians of synthetic databases, then for each predicate, half of b D’s synthetic
databases must give an answer that is “close to D’s answer”. Thus one of these synthetic datsbases
must be “close” to D for half of the predicates in 'Cvk. By our construction of D, we conclude
that each of these predicates is satisﬁed by many rows of this synthetic database and thus some row
satisﬁes enough of the predicates to decode a message-signature pair.
We need to show that there exists an adversary A such that for every TSan-time sanitizer M,
Pr
(D;D0;i) R e D
M0s and A0s coins
h
(M(D) is -accurate for Q
(d)
  ) ^ (A(M(D)) \ D = ;)
i
 negl(d) (4.2)
To do so, we will use the same subroutine A0(b D) we used for the proof of Lemma 4.17. That
is, we consider a subroutine that looks for rows satisfying sufﬁciently many clauses of 'Cvk and
returns the PCP-decoding of that row. It will sufﬁce to establish the following claim, analogous to
Claim 4.18:
Claim 4.24. If b D is -accurate for Q
(d)
  as medians of synthetic data, then A0(b D) outputs a pair
(m;) s.t. Cvk(m;) = 1.
74Proof. As in the proof of Claim 4.18, if b D is -accurate for Q
(d)
  for  < 1=2, then K(b D) = vk,
the veriﬁcation key used in the construction of D0. For the rest of the proof we will be justiﬁed in
substituting vk for c vk.
If 'Cvk = f'1;:::;'mg, then 1
m
Pm
j=1 'j(D)  . We say that b Dk is good for 'j if 'j(b Dk) 
'j(D) . Since the median over
n
b D1; b D2;:::; b D`
o
is -accurate for every constraint 'j 2 'Cvk
we have
Pr
k R[`]
h
b Dk is good for 'j
i

1
2
Then
E
k R[`]
2
4 1
jSkj
X
i2jSkj
val('Cvk;b x
(i))
3
5 = E
k R[`]
"
1
m
m X
j=1
'j(b Dk)
#
=
1
m
m X
j=1
E
k R[`]
h
'j(b Dk)
i

1
m
m X
j=1

Pr
k R[`]
h
b Dk is good for 'j
i
 (('j(D)   )


1
m
m X
j=1

1
2
 ('j(D)   )


   
2
So for at least one row b x() 2 b D it must be the case that val('Cvk;b x())  (   )=2. Since the
distribution D is unchanged, Lemma 4.19 still holds in this setting. Thus we have established that
D is ((d);TSan(d);Q
(d)
  )-hard-to-sanitize as medians of synthetic data.
4.4.2 Hardness of Sanitizing with Symmetric Evaluation Functions
In this section we establish the hardness of sanitization for relaxed synthetic data where the
evaluator function is symmetric.
Deﬁnition 4.25 (Symmetric Relaxed Synthetic Data). A sanitizer M : (f0;1gd)n ! (f0;1gd)b n
with evaluator E outputs symmetric relaxed synthetic data if there exists a monotone function
75g : [0;1] ! [0;1] such that
E(b x
(1);:::;b x
(b n);q) = g
 
1
b n
b n X
i=1
q(b x
(i))
!
:
Note that symmetric relaxed synthetic data is also a special case of relaxed synthetic data. Our
deﬁnition of symmetric relaxed synthetic data is actually symmetric in two respects, because we
require that g does not depend on the predicate q and also that g only depends on the fraction of
rows that satisfy q. Similar to medians of synthetic data,we show that it is intractable to produce
a sanitization as symmetric relaxed synthetic data that is accurate when the queries come from a
CSP that is hard to approximate.
Theorem 4.26. Let   = ( d)d2N be a family of nice (Deﬁnition 4.3) q(d)-CSPs that is closed
under complement ( d = : d) and is ( + 1=2)-hard-to-approximate under (possibly inefﬁcient)
Levin reductions with length blowup LPCP for  = (d) 2 (0;1=2). Assume the existence of a
(TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-digitalsignaturescheme, . Let : N ! Nbeasdeﬁnedintheconstruction
of D and let  = (d). Let TSan;n : N ! N be any functions such that
n(d)  d
a + TSan(d) = o(TFor((d)))
for any a > 0. and
n(d)  QFor((d))
for every d 2 N. Then the distribution ensemble D = Dd(n; ;) on n(d)-row databases is
(;TSan(d);Q
(d)
  )-hard-to-sanitize as symmetric relaxed synthetic data.
By Theorem 4.8, the family of k-clause CNF formulas, for some constant k, is (1=2+)-hard-
to-approximate under Levin reductions for  > 0.
Proof. Let   be the assumed family of nice q(d)   CSPs that is ( + 1=2)-hard-to-approximate
under (possibly inefﬁcient) Levin reductions with length blowup LPCP. Let R;Enc;Dec be the
functions corresponding to the Levin reudction to   and  = (d) 2 (;1] be the parameter from
Deﬁnition 4.5.
We will use the same approach as in the proof ofTheorem 4.16, which is to show that the
underlying synthetic database cannot contain a row that satisﬁes too many clauses of 'Cvk, in
76order to show that g must map a small input to a large output and a large input to a small answer,
contradicting the monotonicity of g.
Let 'Cvk = f'1;:::;'mg, then 1
m
Pm
j=1 'j(D)  : It must also be that 1
m
Pm
j=1 'j(b D)   
 1=2. Otherwise there would exist a row b x() 2 b D = M(D) such that val('Cvk)    1=2.
But if this were the case we could PCP-decode b x() as in the proof of Theorem 4.16. Thus
1
m
m X
j=1

'j(D)   'j(b D)

  + 1=2
so there must exist J 2 [m] s.t. 'J(D)   'J(b D)   + 1=2. Since 'J(b D)  0 we also have
'J(D)   + 1=2 > 1=2, and since 'J(D)  1 we also have 'J(b D)  1=2    < 1=2.
By monotonicity of g and -accuracy of b D as symmetric relaxed synthetic data we have
g(1=2   )  g('J(b D))  'J(D)    
1
2
:
Consider the negation of 'J. Since :'J(D) = 1   'J(D) we can conclude that :'J(D) 
1=2    and :'J(b D)  1=2 + . Thus we have
g(1=2 + )  g(:'J(b D))  :'J(D) +  
1
2
:
But g(1=2   )  1=2  g(1=2 + ) and  > 0 contradicts the monotonicity of g.
4.4.3 Hardness of Sanitizing Very Hard CSPs with Relaxed Synthetic Data
Inthissectionweshowthatnoefﬁcientsanitizercanproduceaccuraterelaxedsyntheticdatafor
a sequence of CSPs that is (1   negl(d))-hard-to-approximate under inefﬁcient Levin reductions.
By Theorem 4.8, these CSPs include 3-CNF formulas of !(logd) clauses.
Intuitively, an efﬁcient sanitizer must produce a synthetic database of b n(d) = poly(d) rows,
and thus as d grows, an efﬁcient sanitizer cannot produce a synthetic database that contains a
row satisfying a non-negligible fraction of clauses from a particular CSP instance (the signature-
veriﬁcation CSP from our earlier results). Thus using evaluators of the type in Deﬁnition 4.21
there can only be one answer to most queries, and thus we cannot get an accurate sanitizer.
Theorem 4.27. Let   = ( d)d2N be a family of nice (Deﬁnition 4.3) q(d)-CSPs such that  d[: d
is (1   ";1)-hard-to-approximate under (possibly inefﬁcient) Levin reductions with length blowup
77LPCP for a negligible function " = "(d). Assume the existence of a (TFor;QFor;Lvk;TVer)-digital
signature scheme, . Let  : N ! N be as deﬁned in the construction of D and let  = (d). Let
TSan;n : N ! N be any functions such that
n(d)  d
a + TSan(d) = o(TFor((d)))
for any a > 0. and
n(d)  QFor((d))
for every d 2 N. Then the distribution ensemble D = Dd(n; ;) on n(d)-row databases is
(1=3;TSan(d);Q
(d)
  )-hard-to-sanitize as relaxed synthetic data.
Proof. Let   be the assumed family of nice q(d)   CSPs that is (1   "(d);1;LPCP)-hard-to-
approximate under (possibly inefﬁcient) Levin reductions. Let R;Enc;Dec be the functions cor-
responding to the Levin reudction to  . Let D  R Dd, and M(D) = b D.
Let 'Cvk = f'1;:::;'mg. By the construction of Dd we have
'j(D) = 1
for every j 2 [m]. As in the proof of Theorem 4.26 it must be that
1
m
m X
j=1
'j(b D)  "(d):
Otherwise there would exist a row b x() 2 b D = M(D) such that val('Cvk)  "(d). But if this were
the case we could PCP-decode b x() as in the proof of Theorem 4.16.
Since Ej R[m]['j(b D)]  "(d), there must exist a subset J  [m] of size jJj  2m=3 such that
for all j 2 J, 'j(b D)  3"(d)  negl(d).
Since b D 2 (f0;1gd)b n for b n = b n(d) = poly(d) (by the efﬁciency of M),
1
b n
b n X
i=1
'j(b x
(i)) = 'j(b D) 2 f0;1=b n(d);2=b n(d);:::;1g
and thus 'j(b D)  negl(d) implies 'j(b D) = 0 for large n.
Let E(b D;q) = f(q(b x(1));:::;q(b x(b n));q). If we assume b D is 1=3-accurate as relaxed synthetic
data then f(0b n;'j)  2=3 for every j 2 J.
78Now consider the execution of M on the database D0 = (0d)n. With probability 1   negl(d),
Dec(0d;Cvk) is not a valid message-signature pair, thus by Deﬁnition 4.5 Part 3, we have
'Cvk(D
0) = 'Cvk(0
d)  "(d):
Since the rows of D0 are idenitcal, 'j(D0) 2 f0;1g for every j 2 [m]. So for at least a 1   "(d)
fraction of j 2 [m], we have 'j(D0) = 0.
Let b D0 = M(D0). By repeating the signature-forging argument, we see that with probability
1   negl(d)
1
m
m X
j=1
'j(b D
0)  "(d)
and thus there must exist a subset J0  [m] of size jJ0j  2m=3 such that j 2 J0 =) 'j(b D0) 
3"(d)  negl(d). So 'j(b D0) = 0 for every j 2 J0 as well. There must also exist a set J00  J0
of size jJ00j = (2=3   "(d))m, such that for every j 2 J00, 'j(D0) = 'j(b D0) = 0. So if b D0 is
1=3-accurate for Q as relaxed synthetic data it must be that f(0b n;'j)  1=3 for every j 2 J00.
By our choice of J and J00 there must exist j 2 J \ J00 such that:
1. f(0b n;'j)  2=3, and
2. f(0b n;'j)  1=3,
which is a contradiction.
4.4.4 Positive Results for Relaxed Synthetic Data
In this section we present an efﬁcient, accurate sanitizer for small (e.g. polynomial in d) fam-
ilies of parity queries that outputs symmetric relaxed synthetic data and show that this sanitizer
also yields accurate answers for any family of constant-arity predicates when evaluated as a relaxed
synthetic data. Our result for parities shows that relaxed synthetic data (and even symmetric re-
laxed synthetic data) allows for more efﬁcient sanitization than standard synthetic data, since The-
orem 4.16 rules out an accurate, efﬁcient sanitizer that produces a standard synthetic database, even
for the class of 3-literal parity predicates. Our result for parities also shows that our hardness result
for symmetric relaxed synthetic data (Theorem 4.26) is tight with respect to the required hardness
ofapproximation, sincetheclassof3-literalparitypredicatesis(1=2 ")-hard-to-approximate[47]
79A function f : f0;1gd ! f0;1g is a k-junta if it depends on at most k variables. Let Jd;k be
the set of all k-juntas on d variables.
Theorem 4.28. There exists an -differentially private sanitizer that runs in time poly(n;d) and
produces relaxed synthetic data and is (;)-accurate for Jd;k when
n 
C
  d
k

log
  d
k

=


for a sufﬁciently large constant C, where
  d
k

=
Pk
i=0
 d
i

.
The privacy, accuracy, and efﬁciency guarantees of our theorem can be achieved without re-
laxed synthetic data simply by releasing a vector of noisy answers to the queries [30]. Our sanitizer
will, in fact, begin with this vector of noisy answers and construct relaxed synthetic data from those
answers. Our technique is similar to that of Barak et. al. [8], which begins with a vector of noisy
answers to parity queries (deﬁned in Section 4.4.4) and constructs a (standard) synthetic database
that gives answers to each query that are close to the initial noisy answers. They construct their
synthetic database by solving a linear program over 2d variables that correspond to the frequency
of each possible row x 2 f0;1gd, and thus their sanitizer runs in time exponential in d. Our sani-
tizer also starts with a vector of noisy answers to parity queries and efﬁciently constructs symmetric
relaxed synthetic data that gives answers to each query that are close to the initial noisy answers
after applying a ﬁxed linear scaling. We then show that the database our sanitizer constructs is also
accurate for the family of k-juntas using an afﬁne shift that depends on the junta.
Efﬁcient Sanitizer for Parities
To prove Theorem 4.28, we start with a sanitizer for parity predicates.
Deﬁnition 4.29 (Parity Predicate). A function  : f0;1gd ! f 1;1g is a parity predicate10 if
there exists a vector s 2 f0;1gd s.t.
(x) = s(x) = ( 1)
hx;si:
We will use wt(s) =
Pd
i=1 si to denote the number of non-zero entries in s.
10In the preliminaries we deﬁne a predicate to be a f0;1g-valued function but our deﬁnition naturally generalizes
to f 1;1g-valued functions. For q : f0;1gd ! f 1;1g and database D = (x(1);:::;x(n)) 2 (f0;1gd)n, we deﬁne
q(D) = 1
n
Pn
i=1 q(x(i))
80Theorem 4.30. Let P be a family of parity predicates on d variables such that 0d 62 P. There
exists an -differentially private sanitizer M(D;P) that runs in time poly(n;d) and produces
symmetric relaxed synthetic data that is (;)-accurate for P when
n 
2jPjlog(2jPj=)

:
Theanalysisofoursanitizerwillmakeuseofthefollowingstandardfactaboutparitypredicates
Fact 4.31. Two parity predicates s;t : f0;1gd ! f 1;1g are either identical or orthogonal.
Speciﬁcally, for s 6= t, s 6= 0d and b 2 f 1;1g,
E
x Rf0;1gd
[s(x)jt(x) = b] = E
x Rf0;1gd
[s(x)] = 0:
Our sanitizer will start with noisy answers to the predicate queries s(D). Each noisy answer
will be the true answer perturbed with noise from a Laplace distribution. The Laplace distribution
Lap() is a continuous distribution on R with probability density function p(y) / exp( jyj=).
The following theorem of Dwork, et. al. [30] shows that these queries are differentially private for
an appropriate choice of .
Theorem 4.32 ([30]). Let (q1;q2;:::;qk) be a set of predicates and let  = k=n" and let D 2
(f0;1gd)n beadatabase. ThenthemechanismM(D) = (q1(D)+Z1;q2(D)+Z2;:::;qk(D)+Zk),
where (Z1;:::;Zk) are independent samples from Lap() is -differentially private.
In order to argue about the accuracy of our mechanism we need to know how much error is
introduced by noise from the Laplace distribution. The following fact gives a bound on the tail of
a Laplace random variable.
Fact 4.33. The tail of the Laplace distribution decays exponentially. Speciﬁcally,
Pr[jLap()j  t] = exp( t=):
Now we present our sanitizer for queries that are parity functions. We will not consider the
query 0d as 0d(x) = 1 for every x 2 f0;1gd. Let P be a set of parity functions that does not
contain 0d. We now present a poly(n;d;jPj)-time sanitizer for P.
Our sanitizer starts by getting noisy estimates of the quantities (D) for each predicate  2 P
by adding Laplace noise. Then it builds the relaxed synthetic data b D in blocks of rows. Each block
81of rows is “assigned” to contain an answer to a query . In that block we randomly choose rows
such that the expected value of  on each row equals the noisy estimate of (D). By Fact 4.31, the
expected value of every other predicate 0 is 0 for rows in this block. The sanitizer is accurate so
long as the total number of rows is sufﬁcient for the value of (b D) to be concentrated around its
expectation.
Sanitizer M(D;P), where P =

(1);:::;(t)	
:
Let  := jPj=n T := (2jPj=2)log(4jPj=)
For: j = 1;:::;t
Let aj := (j)(D) + Lap()
For: i = jT + 1 to (j + 1)T
With probability (aj + 1)=2: Let b x(i)  R

x 2 f0;1gd j (j)(x) = 1
	
Otherwise: Let b x(i)  R

x 2 f0;1gd j (j)(x) =  1
	
Return: b D = (b x(1);:::;b x(tT))
Evaluator EP(b D;):
Return: jPj  (b D)
Figure 11: An efﬁcient one-shot sanitizer for juntas generating relaxed synthetic data.
The following claims will sufﬁce to establish Theorem 4.30
Claim 4.34. M is -differentially private.
Proof. The output of M only depends on the answer to jPj predicate queries. By Theorem 4.32
the answers to jPj predicate queries perturbed by independent samples from Lap(jPj=n) is -
differentially private.
Claim 4.35. M is (;)-accurate for P when
n 
2jPjlog(2jPj=)

:
Proof. We want to show that for every (j) 2 P
  jPj  
(j)(b D)   
(j)(D)
    
82except with probability . To do so we consider separately the error introduced in going from
(j)(D) to aj using Laplacian noise and the error introduced in going from noisy answers aj to
(j)(b D) by sampling rows at random.
First we bound the error introduced by the noisy queries to D. Speciﬁcally, we want to show
that for every (j) 2 P
 
(j)(D)   aj
   =2
except with probability =2. For each (j) we have
Pr[j
(j)(D)   ajj  =2]  exp( n=2jPj)
by Fact 4.33. So by a union bound we have
Pr[9
(j) j
(j)(D)   ajj  =2]  jPjexp( =2)  jPjexp( n=2jPj) < =2;
so long as
n 
2jPjlog(2jPj=)

:
We also want to show that for every (j) 2 P
 
jPj  
(j)(b D)   aj
 
  =2
except with probability =2, where aj is the noisy answer for (j)(D) computed in M(D). To
do so, we will show that the expectation of jPj(j)(b D) is indeed aj, then we will use a Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound to show that the random rows generated by M(D) are close to their expectation.
Finally we take a union bound over all  2 P.
Fix (j) 2 P and consider (j)(b D). (j)(b D) is the sum of T independent biased coin ﬂips. In
rows jT +1;jT +2;:::;(j +1)T (the rows where we focus on (j)) the expectation of each coin
ﬂip is aj, and in all other rows the expectation of each coin ﬂip is 0 by Fact 4.31. Thus
E
h

(j)(b D)
i
= E
"
1
b n
b n X
i=1

(j)(b x
(i))
#
= aj=jPj
for every (j) 2 P.
By a Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound11 we conclude
Pr
h  jPj  
(j)(b D)   aj
    =2
i
< 2exp( T
2=2jPj):
11One form of the Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound states if X1;:::;Xn are independent random variables over [0;1]
and X = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 Xi then Pr[jX   E[X]j  t] < 2exp( nt2=2)
83By taking a union bound over P we conclude
Pr
h
9
(j)
  jP  j
(j)(b D)   aj
 
  =2
i
< 2jPjexp( T
2=2jPj)  =2:
Combining the two bounds sufﬁces to prove the claim.
Efﬁcient Sanitizer for k-Juntas
We now show that our sanitizer for parity queries can also be used to give accurate answers
for any family of k-juntas, for constant k. We start with the observation that k-juntas only have
Fourier mass on coefﬁcients of weight at most k. Alternatively, this says that any k-junta can be
written as a linear combination of parity functions on at most k variables. (In the language of
our previous construction, s such that wt(s)  k.) Thus we start by running our sanitizer for
parity predicates on the set Pk containing all parity predicates on at most k variables. We have to
modify the evaluator function to take into account that not every k-junta predicate has the same
bias. Indeed, we cannot control 0d(b D) in our output, as 0d(D) = 1 for any database. Thus our
evaluator will apply an afﬁne shift to each result that depends on the junta. Because the evaluator
depends on the predicate, the resulting sanitizer no longer outputs symmetric relaxed synthetic
data.
The use of a sanitizer for parity queries as a building block to construct a sanitizer for arbitrary
k-juntasisinspiredby[8], whichusesanoisyvectorofanswerstoparityqueriesasabuildingblock
to construct synthetic data for a particular class of k-juntas (conjunctions on k-literals). However,
while their sanitizer constructs a standard synthetic database and is inefﬁcient, our construction of
symmetric relaxed synthetic data for parity predicates is efﬁcient, and thus our eventual sanitizer
for k-juntas will also be efﬁcient.
Consider a predicate c : f0;1gd ! f0;1g. Then we can take the Fourier expansion
c(x) =
X
s2f0;1gd
b c(s)s(x)
where
b c(s) = E
x Rf0;1gd
[c(x)s(x)]:
The accuracy of our sanitizer relies on the following fact about the Fourier coefﬁcients of k-juntas
Fact 4.36. If c : f0;1gd ! f0;1g is a k-junta, then wt(s) > k =) b c(s) = 0
84Let Pk =

s j s 2 f0;1gd;1  wt(s)  k
	
. Our sanitizer for k-juntas is just the sanitizer for
parities applied to the set Pk. We now deﬁne the evaluator that computes the answer to conjunction
queries from the output of M(D;Pk).
Evaluator E(b D;q) for a k-junta q:
return jPkjq(b D)   (jPkj   1) b q(;)
Efﬁciency and privacy follow from the analysis of M. Let Jd;k be a family of all k-juntas on d
variables.
Theorem 4.37. M(D;Pk) is (;)-accurate for Jd;k using E when
n 
2jPkjlog(2jPkj=)

:
Proof. Let c 2 Jd;k be a ﬁxed predicate. Assume that b D is -accurate for Pk using EP. This event
occurs with probability at least 1  by Theorem 4.30 and our assumption on n. We now analyze
the quantity c(b D).
q(b D) =
1
b n
b n X
i=1
q(b x
(i))
=
1
b n
b n X
i=1
X
s2f0;1gd
b q(s)s(b x
(i))
=
X
s2f0;1gd:jsjk
b q(s)s(b D) (4.3)
= b q(;) +
X
s2f0;1gd:1jsjk
b q(s)s(b D) (4.4)
 b q(;) +
X
s2f0;1gd:1jsjk
b q(s)

s(D) + 
jPkj

(4.5)

1
jPkj
0
@(jPkj   1) b q(;) +
X
s2f0;1gd:jsjk
(b q(s)s(D) + )
1
A
=
1
jPkj
((jPk   1) b q(;) + q(D)) + 
where step 4.3 uses Fact 4.36, step 4.4 uses the fact that 0d(x) = 1 everywhere, and step 4.5 uses
85the fact that b D is -accurate for Pk when evaluated by EP. A similar argument shows that
q(b D) 
1
jPkj
((jPkj   1) b q(;) + q(D))   
Thus b D = M(D) is -accurate for Jd;k using E with probability at least 1   .
86Chapter 5
Faster Algorithms for Privately Releasing
Marginal Queries
In this chapter and the next, we continue our study of marginal queries, one of the most im-
portant classes of statistics on a dataset. In Chapter 4 we discussed some of the prior work on
differentially private release of marginal queries. However, we will review that background so that
the next two chapters will be reasonably self-contained.
Recall that a marginal query is speciﬁed by a set S  [d] and a pattern t 2 f0;1gjSj. The
query asks, “What fraction of the individual records in D has each of the attributes j 2 S set
to tj?” Designing efﬁcient one-shot sanitizers for marginals has been identiﬁed as a major open
problem in differential privacy (cf. [8]). That is, we would like an efﬁcient algorithm to create
a differentially private summary of the database that enables analysts to answer each of the 3d
marginal queries up to some small additive error, say :01. A natural subclass of marginals are
k-way marginals, the subset of marginals speciﬁed by sets S  [d] such that jSj  k.
As we’ve discussed in Chapter 2, if we perturb the answers to every marginal query with
independent noise, then we can release the answers to every k-way marginal query with non-trivial
accuracy as long as jDj & d(k). However, it may not be practical to collect enough data to
ensure that this condition holds. Even if we do have a sufﬁciently large database, it would require
time d(k) just to compute the answers to every k-way marginal query, which may be prohibitive.
Fortunately, algorithms such as private multiplicative weights show that it is possible to privately
answer all k-way marginals as long as jDj  e (k
p
d). Unfortunately, all of these algorithms
87have running time at least 2d, even when jQj is the set of 2-way marginals. As we have shown in
Chapter 4, this running time is inherent for algorithms such as these that generate private synthetic
data. In fact, under a strong hardness assumption, even releasing a synthetic database that is
accurate for just the set of all 2-way marginals requires time nearly 2d.
Given this state of affairs, it is natural to seek efﬁcient one-shot sanitizers that do not generate
synthetic data capable of privately releasing approximate answers to marginal queries even when
jDj  dk. A series of works [41, 22, 45] have shown how to construct such one-shot sanitizers
for k-way marginal queries with small average error (over various distributions on the queries)
with both running time and minimum database size much smaller than dk (e.g. dO(1) for product
distributions [41, 22] and minfdO(
p
k);dO(d1=3)g for arbitrary distributions [45]). Hardt et al. [45]
also gave an algorithm for privately releasing k-way marginal queries with small worst-case error
and minimum database size much smaller than dk. However the running time of their algorithm is
still d(k), which is polynomial in the number of queries.
In this chapter, we give the ﬁrst algorithms capable of releasing k-way marginals up to small
worst-case error with both running time and minimum database size substantially smaller than
dk. Speciﬁcally, we show how to create a private summary in time dO(
p
k) that gives approximate
answers to all k-way marginals as long as jDj is at least dO(
p
k). When k = d, our algorithm runs
in time 2
e O(
p
d), and is the ﬁrst algorithm for releasing all marginals in time 2o(d) (and thus the ﬁrst
to overcome the “synthetic data barrier.”
5.1 Our Results and Techniques
In this chapter, we present faster algorithms for releasing marginals and other classes of count-
ing queries.
Theorem 5.1 (Releasing Marginals). There exists a constant C such that for every k;d;n 2 N
with k  d, every  2 (0;1], and every " > 0, there is an "-differentially private one-shot sanitizer
that, on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, runs in time jDj  dC
p
k log(1=) and releases a summary
that enables computing each of the k-way marginal queries on D up to an additive error of at most
, provided that jDj  dC
p
k log(1=)=".
For notational convenience, we focus on monotone k-way disjunction queries. However, our
results extend straightforwardly to general non-monotone k-way disjunction queries (see Sec-
88tion 5.4.1), which are equivalent to k-way marginals. A monotone k-way disjunction is speciﬁed
by a set S  [d] of size k and asks what fraction of records in D have at least one of the attributes
in S set to 1.
Our algorithm is inspired by a series of works reducing the problem of private query release
to various problems in learning theory [41, 22, 45, 38]. One ingredient in this line of work is
a shift in perspective introduced by Gupta, Hardt, Roth, and Ullman [41]. Instead of viewing
disjunction queries as a set of functions on the database, they view the database as a function
fD: f0;1gd ! [0;1], in which each vector s 2 f0;1gd is interpreted as the indicator vector of a
set S  [d], and fD(s) equals the evaluation of the disjunction speciﬁed by S on the database D.
They use the structure of the functions fD to privately learn an approximation gD that has small
average error over any product distribution on disjunctions.12
Cheraghchi, Klivans, Kothari, and Lee[22]observedthatthe functionsfD canbeapproximated
by a low-degree polynomial with small average error over the uniform distribution on disjunctions.
They then use a private learning algorithm for low-degree polynomials to release an approximation
to fD; and thereby obtain an improved dependence on the accuracy parameter, as compared to [41].
Hardt, Rothblum, and Servedio [45] observe that fD is itself an average of disjunctions (each
row of D speciﬁes a disjunction of bits in the indicator vector s 2 f0;1gd of the query), and
thus develop private learning algorithms for threshold of sums of disjunctions. These learning
algorithms are also based on low-degree approximations of sums of disjunctions.
They show how to use their private learning algorithms to obtain a sanitizer with small average
error over arbitrary distributions with running time and minimum database size dO(
p
k). They then
are able to apply the private boosting technique of Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan [35] to obtain
worst-case accuracy guarantees. Unfortunately, the boosting step incurs a blowup of dk in the
running time.
We improve the above results by showing how to directly compute (a noisy version of) a poly-
nomial pD that is privacy-preserving and still approximates fD on all k-way disjunctions, as long
as jDj is sufﬁciently large. Speciﬁcally, the running time and the database size requirement of
our algorithm are both polynomial in the number of monomials in pD, which is dO(
p
k). By “di-
rectly”, we mean that we compute pD from the database D itself and perturb its coefﬁcients, rather
12In their learning algorithm, privacy is deﬁned with respect to the rows of the database D that deﬁnes fD, not with
respect to the examples given to the learning algorithm (unlike earlier works on “private learning” [51]).
89than using a learning algorithm. Our construction of the polynomial pD uses the same low-degree
approximations exploited by Hardt et al. in the development of their private learning algorithms.
In summary, the main difference between prior work and ours is that prior work used learning
algorithms that have restricted access to the database, and released the hypothesis output by the
learning algorithm. In contrast, we do not make use of any learning algorithms, and give our
release algorithm direct access to the database. by doing so, we enable our algorithm to achieve
a worst-case error guarantee while maintaining a minimal database size and running time much
smaller than the size of the query set. Our algorithm is also substantially simpler than that of Hardt
et al.
Our approach extends beyond approximations by polynomials. More generally, suppose there
is a feature space of functions S such that for every database D, fD can be approximated by a
linear combination of functions in S with bounded coefﬁcients. Then there is an algorithm that
releases an approximation to fD with running time and minimum database size polynomial in jSj.
In the case where we approximate fD by a polynomial of degree t, the feature space would consist
of all monomials of total degree at most t.
We also consider other families of counting queries. We deﬁne the class of r-of-k queries.
Like a monotone k-way disjunction, an r-of-k query is deﬁned by a set S  [d] such that jSj  k.
The query asks what fraction of the rows of D have at least r of the attributes in S set to 1. For
r = 1, these queries are exactly monotone k-way disjunctions, and r-of-k queries are a strict
generalization.
Theorem 5.2 (Releasing r-of-k Queries). For every r;k;d;n 2 N with r  k  d, every  2
(0;1], and every " > 0 there is an "-differentially private one-shot sanitizer that, on input a
database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, runs in time jDj  d
e O
p
rk log(1=)

and releases a summary that enables
computing each of the r-of-k queries on D up to an additive error of at most , provided that
jDj  d
e O
p
rk log(1=)

=".
Since monotone k-way disjunctions are just r-of-k queries where r = 1, thus Theorem 5.2
implies a release algorithm for disjunctions with quadratically better dependence on log(1=), at
the cost of slightly worse dependence on k (implicit in the switch from O() to e O()).
Finally, we give a sanitizer for privately releasing databases in which the rows of the database
are interpreted as decision lists, and the queries are inputs to the decision lists. That is, instead
of each record in D being a string of d attributes, each record is an element of the set DLk;m,
90which consists of all length-k decision lists over m input variables. (See Section 5.4.3 for a precise
deﬁnition.) A query is speciﬁed by a string y 2 f0;1gd and asks “What fraction of database
participants would make a certain decision based on the input y?”
As an example application, consider a database that allows high school students to express
their preferences for colleges in the form of a decision list. For example, a student may say, “If
the school is ranked in the top ten nationwide, I am willing to apply to it. Otherwise, if the school
is rural, I am unwilling to apply. Otherwise, if the school has a good basketball team then I am
willing to apply to it.” And so on. Each student is allowed to use up to k attributes out of a set
of m binary attributes. Our sanitizer allows any college (represented by its m binary attributes) to
determine the fraction of students willing to apply.
Theorem 5.3 (Releasing Decision Lists). For any k;m 2 N s.t. k  m, any  2 (0;1], and any
" > 1=n, there is an "-differentially private one-shot sanitizer with running time m
e O(
p
k log(1=))
that, on input a database D 2 (DLk;m)n, releases a summary that enables computing any length-
k decision list query up to an additive error of at most  on every query, provided that jDj 
m
e O(
p
k log(1=))=".
For comparison, we note that all the results on releasing k-way disjunctions (including ours)
also apply to a dual setting where the database records specify a k-way disjunction over m bits
and the queries are m-bit strings (in this setting m plays the role of d). Theorem 5.3 generalizes
this dual version of Theorem 5.1, as length-k decision lists are a strict generalization of k-way
disjunctions.
We prove the latter two results (Theorems 5.2 and 5.3) using the same approach outlined for
marginals (Theorem 5.1), but with different low-degree polynomial approximations appropriate
for the different types of queries.
See Table 1 for a summary of the prior results on differentially private release of k-way
marginal queries. In that table, the database size column indicates the minimum database size
required to release answers to k-way marginals up to an additive error of . For clarity, Table 1
ignores the dependence on the privacy parameters and the failure probability of the algorithms.
91Table 1: Summary of results on differentially private release of k-way marginals.
Paper Running Time Database Size Error Type Synth. Data
[26, 34, 15, 30] dO(k) O(dk=2=) Worst case N
[8] 2O(d) O(dk=2=) Worst case Y
[16, 32, 35, 43] 2O(d) e O(k
p
d=2) Worst case Y
[41] d
e O(1=2) d
e O(1=2) Product Dists. N
[38] e O(d2=10) e O(d=6) Uniform Dist. N
[38] d  2log2(1=) d2  2log2(1=) Uniform Dist. Y
[45] dO(d1=3 log(1=)) dO(d1=3 log(1=)) Any Dist. N
[45] dO(k) dO(d1=3 log(1=)) Worst case N
[45] dO(
p
k log(1=)) dO(
p
k log(1=)) Any Dist. N
[45] dO(k) dO(
p
k log(1=)) Worst case N
This chapter dO(
p
k log(1=)) dO(
p
k log(1=)) Worst case N
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 The Vector-Valued Laplace Mechanism
In Chapter 2 we described the Laplace mechanism as a technique for answering real-valued
queries. For the results of this chapter it will be more convenient to apply the Laplace mechanism
to a vector-valued query. In cases where the query is vector-valued, we can apply the Laplace
mechanism to each coordinate individually. Suppose f : (f0;1gd)n ! Rm has low (global) L1-
sensitivity, which we deﬁne to be
f = max
DD0 kf(D)   f(D
0)k1:
Let Lap
m() denote the m-variate probability distribution that arises when each coordinate is
chosen independently according to Lap(). We have the following lemma, which is a corollary of
Lemma 2.9.
Lemma 5.4. Let f : (f0;1gd)n ! Rm be a query with L1-sensitivity f and let MLap(D;f) =
f(D) + Z = a, where Z  R Lap
m() for a parameter  > 0. Then the following both hold:
1. For any " > 0, if Z is chosen according to Lap
m(fm="), then MLap is (";0)-differentially
92private. Furthermore, for any  > 0, with probability at least 1   ,
ka   f(D)k1 
fm2 log(m=)
"
:
2. For any "; > 0, if Z is chosen according to Lap
m(f
p
8mlog(1=)="), then MLap is
(";)-differentially private. Furthermore, for any  > 0, with probability at least 1   ,
ka   f(D)k1 
fm3=2p
8log(1=)log(m=)
"
:
Recall from Chapter 2 that we are assuming that noise from the Laplace distribution is replaced
with noise from a similar discrete distribution, and that a sample from this distribution can be
drawn in time poly(). Thus the running time of the Laplace mechanism as used in Lemma 5.4 is
poly() = poly(f;m;1=";log(1=);log(1=)).
5.2.2 Query Function Families
We take the approach of Gupta et al. [41] and think of the database D as specifying a function
fD mapping queries q to their answers q(D), which we call the Q-representation of D. We now
describe this transformation more formally:
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Q-Function Family). Let Q = fqygy2YQf0;1gm be a set of counting queries on a
data universe X, where each query is indexed by an m-bit string. We deﬁne the index set of Q to
be the set YQ = fy 2 f0;1gm j qy 2 Qg.
We deﬁne the Q-function family FQ = ffx : f0;1gm ! f0;1ggx2X as follows: For every
possible database row x 2 X, the function fQ;x : f0;1gm ! f0;1g is deﬁned as fQ;x(y) = qy(x).
Given a database D 2 X n we deﬁne the function fQ;D : f0;1gm ! [0;1] where fQ;D(q) =
1
n
Pn
i=1 fQ;x(i)(q). When Q is clear from context we will drop the subscript Q and simply write fx,
fD, and F.
For some intuition about this transformation, when the queries are monotone k-way disjunc-
tions on a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, the queries are deﬁned by sets S  [d] , jSj  k. In this case
each query can be represented by the d-bit indicator vector of the set S, with at most k non-zero
entries. Thus we can take m = d and YQ =
n
y 2 f0;1gd j
Pd
j=1 yj  k
o
.
935.2.3 Low-Dimensional Linear Approximations
Let S = fs: f0;1gm ! [0;1]g be a feature space of efﬁciently computable (time poly(m))
m-variate functions. For a vector~ c = (cs)s2S 2 RjSj, let g~ c be the function
g~ c(y) =
X
s2S
cs  s(y):
Abusing notation, we will often associate the function g~ c with its coefﬁcient vector ~ c and use ~ c(y)
in place of g~ c(y). Notice that computing ~ c(y) is equivalent to computing ~ c  ~ y, where ~ y 2 [0;1]jSj
is the vector (ys)s2S formed by taking ~ ys = s(y) for every s 2 S.
In many cases, the function fQ;x : f0;1gm ! f0;1g can be approximated well on all the
indices in YQ by a linear combination of functions in S, where the linear combination has bounded
coefﬁcients. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5.6 (Uniform Approximation by a Feature Space). Given a family of m-variate func-
tions F = ffxgx2X and a set Y  f0;1gm, we say that the feature space S uniformly -
approximates F on Y with (L1-)norm T if for every x 2 X, there exists ~ cx 2 [ T;T]jSj such
that
8y 2 Y; jfx(y)  ~ cx(y)j  :
We say that S efﬁciently and uniformly -approximates F if there is an algorithm SF that takes
x 2 X as input, runs in time poly(logjXj;jSj;logT) and outputs a coefﬁcient vector~ cx such that
8y 2 Y; jfx(y)  ~ cx(y)j  :
5.3 From Low-Dimensional Approximations to One-Shot San-
itizers
Inthissectionwepresentaone-shotsanitizerforanyfamilyofcountingqueriesQsuchthatFQ
that can be efﬁciently and uniformly approximated by a feature space S. The algorithm will take an
n-row database D and, for each row x 2 D, constructs a linear combination of functions in S, ~ cx
that uniformly approximates the function fQ;x (recall that fQ;x(q) = q(x), for each q 2 Q). From
these, it constructs a new linear combination ~ cD = 1
n
P
x2D~ cx that uniformly approximates fQ;D.
94The ﬁnal step is to perturb each of the coefﬁcients of ~ cx using noise from a Laplace distribution
(Lemma 5.4) and bound the error introduced from the perturbation.
Theorem 5.7 (Releasing Low-Dimensional Approximations). Let Q = fqygy2YQf0;1gm be a set
of counting queries over X, and FQ be the Q function family (Deﬁnition 5.5). Assume that S
efﬁciently and uniformly -approximates FQ on YQ with norm T (Deﬁnition 5.6). Then there is a
sanitizer M: X n ! RjSj that
1. is "-differentially private,
2. runs in time poly(n;logjXj;jSj;logT;log(1=")), and
3. is (;)-accurate for Q for
 =  +
4TjSj2 log(jSj=)
"n
:
Proof. First we construct the sanitizer M. See the relevant codebox below.
Input: A database D 2 X n, an explicit feature space S, and a parameter " > 0.
For: i = 1;:::;n
Using efﬁcient approximation of F by S, compute a coefﬁcient vector~ cx(i) = SF(x(i))
that -approximates fx(i) on YQ.
Let~ cD = 1
n
Pn
i=1~ cx(i), where the sum denotes standard entry-wise vector addition.
Let b cD = ~ cD + Z, where Z is drawn from an jSj-dimensional Laplace distribution with
parameter 2T="n (Section 5.2.1).
Output: b cD.
Figure 12: The Sanitizer M
Privacy. We establish that M is "-differentially private. This follows from the observation that
for any two adjacent D  D0 that differ only on row i,
k~ cD  ~ cD0k1 =

   
1
n
n X
i=1
~ cx(i)  
1
n
n X
i=1
~ cx0(i)

   
1
=
1
n
k~ cx(i)  ~ cx0(i)k1 
2T
n
:
95The last inequality is from the fact that for every x, ~ cx is a vector of L1 norm at most T. Part 1
of the Theorem now follows directly from the properties of the Laplace Mechanism (Lemma 5.4).
Now we construct the evaluator E.
Input: A vector b c 2 RjSj and the description of a query y 2 f0;1gm.
Output: b c(y). Recall that we view b c as an m-variate function and b c(y) is the evaluation of
that function on the point y.
Figure 13: The Evaluator E for the Sanitizer M.
Efﬁciency. Next, we show that M runs in time poly(n;logjXj;jSj;logT;log(1=")). Recall that
we assumed the polynomial construction algorithm SF runs in time poly(logjXj;jSj;logT). The
algorithm M needs to run SF on each of the n rows, and then it needs to generate a sample
from a jSj-dimensional Laplace distribution. This sampling can be done simply by taking jSj
samples from a univariate Laplace distribution with magnitude poly(jSj;T;1=n;1="). As we have
discussed in Section 5.2.1, these samples can be computed in time poly(jSj;T;n;1="). We also
establish that E runs in time poly(jSj;logT;logn;log(1=")), observe that E needs to expand the
input into an appropriate vector of dimension jSj and take the inner product with the vector e c,
whose entries have magnitude poly(jSj;T;1=n;1="). These observations establish Part 2 of the
Theorem.
Accuracy. Finally, we analyze the accuracy of the sanitizer M. First, by the assumption that S
uniformly -approximates F on Y  f0;1gm with norm T, we have
max
y2Y
jfD(y)  ~ cD(y)j = max
y2Y
 
  
1
n
n X
i=1
fx(i)(y)  
1
n
n X
i=1
~ cx(i)(y)
 
  

1
n
n X
i=1
max
y2Y
jfx(i)(y)  ~ cx(i)(y)j  :
Now we want to establish that
Pr

max
y2f0;1gm jb cD(y)  ~ cD(y)j  
0

 1   
96for

0 =
4TjSj2 log(jSj=)
"n
;
where the probability is taken over the coins of M. Part (3) of the Theorem will then follow by
the triangle inequality.
To see that the above statement is true, observe that by the properties of the Laplace mechanism
(Lemma 5.4), we have Pr[kb cD  ~ cDk1  0]  1 ; where the probability is taken over the coins
of M. Given that kb cD  ~ cDk1  0, it holds that for every y 2 f0;1gm,
jb cD(y)  ~ cD(y)j = j(b cD  ~ cD)  ~ yj  kb cD  ~ cDk1  
0:
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that every monomial evaluates to 0 or 1 at the point y,
and thus kyk1  1. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Using the second part of Lemma 5.4, we can improve the bound on the error at the expense of
relaxing the privacy guarantee to (";)-differential privacy. This improved error only affects the
hidden constants in Theorems 5.1-5.3, so we only state those theorems for "-differential privacy.
Theorem 5.8. Let Q = fqygy2YQf0;1gm be a set of counting queries over X, and FQ be the Q
function family (Deﬁnition 5.5). Assume that S efﬁciently and uniformly -approximates FQ on
YQ with norm T (Deﬁnition 5.6). Then there is a sanitizer M: (f0;1gd)n ! RjSj that
1. is (";)-differentially private,
2. runs in time poly(n;logjXj;jSj;logT;log(1=");log(1=)),
3. is (;)-accurate for Q for  =  +
12TjSj3=2 log(jSj=)
p
log(1=)
"n :
The proof of this theorem is identical to that of Theorem 5.7, but using the second property of
the Laplace mechanism from Theorem 5.4 in place of the ﬁrst property.
5.4 Low-Dimensional Approximations
In this section we establish the existence of explicit low-dimensional linear approximations for
the families FQ for some interesting query sets. All of our low-dimensional approximations are
derived from low-degree polynomials with bounded coefﬁcients.
97An m-variate real multilinear polynomial p~ c : f0;1gm ! R of degree t and (L1-)norm T can
be written as
p~ c(y) =
X
S[m]
cS
Y
`2S
y`
where jcSj  T for every S  [m]. Note that a polynomial of degree t is simply a linear combi-
nation of functions over the feature space Pt =

pS(y) =
Q
`2S y` j S  [m]
	
. If the polynomial
has coefﬁcients bounded in absolute value by T, the the linear combination of features in Pt has
L1-norm bounded by T. The size of this feature space is Hm;t :=
Pt
j=0
 m
t

. We remark that it
is essentially without loss of generality to restrict to multilinear polynomials, since the domain is
f0;1gm.
Deﬁnition 5.9 (Uniform Approximation by Polynomials). Given a family of m-variate functions
F = ffxgx2X and a set Y  f0;1gm, we say that the family Pt uniformly -approximates F on
Y if for every x 2 X, there exists~ cx 2 [ T;T]Hm;t such that
8y 2 Y; jfx(y)   p~ cx(y)j  :
We say that Pt efﬁciently and uniformly -approximates F if there is an algorithm PF that
takes x 2 X as input, runs in time poly(logjXj;Hm;t;logT), and outputs a coefﬁcient vector ~ cx
such that
8y 2 Y; jfx(y)   p~ cx(y)j  :
5.4.1 Releasing Monotone Disjunctions
We deﬁne the class of monotone k-way disjunctions as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.10 (Monotone k-Way Disjunctions). Let X = f0;1gd. The query set QDisj;k =
fqygy2Ykf0;1gd of monotone k-way disjunctions over f0;1gd contains a query qy for every y 2
Yk =

y 2 f0;1gd j jyj  k
	
. Each query is deﬁned as qy(x1;:::;xd) =
Wd
j=1 yjxj. The QDisj;k
function family FQDisj;k = ffxgx2f0;1gd contains a function fx(y1;:::;yd) =
Wd
j=1 yjxj for every
x 2 f0;1gd.
Thus the family FQDisj;k consists of all disjunctions, and the image of QDisj;k, which we denote
Yk, consists of all vectors y 2 f0;1gd with at most k non-zero entries. We can approximate
disjunctions over the set Yk using a well-known transformation of the Chebyshev polynomials (see,
e.g., [58] and [45]). First we recall the useful properties of the univariate Chebyshev polynomials.
98Fact 5.11 (Chebyshev Polynomials). For every k 2 N and  > 0, there exists a univariate real
polynomial gk(x) =
Ptk
i=0 cixi of degree tk such that
1. tk = O(
p
k log(1=)),
2. for every i 2 f0;1;:::;tkg;jcij  2O(
p
k log(1=)),
3. gk(0) = 0, and
4. for every x 2 f1;:::;kg, 1     gk(x)  1 + .
Moreover, such a polynomial can be constructed in time poly(k;log(1=)) (e.g. using linear pro-
gramming, though more efﬁcient algorithms are known).
We can use Lemma 5.11 to approximate k-way monotone disjunctions. Note that our result
easily extends to monotone k-way conjunctions via the identity
^d
j=1xjyj = 1   _d
j=1(1   xj)yj. Moreover, it extends to non-monotone conjunctions and dis-
junctions: we may extend the data universe as in [45, Theorem 1.2] to f0;1g2d, and include the
negation of each item in the original domain. Non-monotone conjunctions over domain f0;1gd
correspond to monotone conjunctions over the expanded domain f0;1g2d.
The next lemma shows that FQDisj;k can be efﬁciently and uniformly approximated by poly-
nomials of low degree and low norm. The statement is a well-known application of Chebyshev
polynomials, and a similar statement appears in [45] but without bounding the running time of the
construction or a bound on the norm of the polynomials. We include the statement and a proof for
completeness, and to verify the additional properties we need.
Lemma 5.12 (Approximating FQDisj;k by polynomials, similar to [45]). For every k;d 2 N such
that k  d and every  > 0, the family Pt consisting of d-variate real polynomials of degree
t = O(
p
k log(1=)) and norm T = dO(
p
k log(1=)) efﬁciently and uniformly -approximates the
family FQDisj;k on the set Yk.
Proof. The algorithm PDisj;k for constructing the polynomials appears in the relevant codebox
above.
Since px is a degree-tk polynomial applied to a degree-1 polynomial (in the variables yj), its
degree is at most tk. To see the stated norm bound, note that every monomial of total degree
99Input: a vector x 2 f0;1gd.
Let gk be the polynomial described in Lemma 5.11.
Let ~ px 2 R(
m+tk
tk ) be the expansion of px(y1;:::;yd) = gk
Pd
j=1 yjxj

:
Output: ~ px.
Figure 14: PDisj;k.
i in px comes from the expansion of
Pd
j=1 yjxj
i
, and every coefﬁcient in this expansion is a
non-negative integer less than or equal to ki. In px, each of these terms is multiplied by ci (the
i-th coefﬁcient of gk). Thus the norm of px is at most maxi2f0;1;:::;tkg ki  jcij = kO(
p
k log(1=)) =
dO(
p
k log(1=)). To see that PDisj;k is efﬁcient, note that we can ﬁnd every coefﬁcient of px of total
degree i by expanding
Pd
j=1 yjxj
i
into all of its di terms and multiplying by ci, which can be
done in time poly(dtk) = poly(
 d+tk
tk

), as is required.
To see that PDisj;k -approximates FQDisj;k, observe that for every x;y 2 f0;1gd, fx(y) = 0 )
px(y) = 0; and for every x 2 f0;1gd;y 2 Yk, fx(y) = 1 ) 1   px(y)  1+: This completes
the proof.
Theorem 5.1 in the introduction follows by combining Theorems 5.7 and 5.12.
5.4.2 Releasing Monotone r-of-k Queries
We deﬁne the class of monotone r-of-k queries as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.13 (Monotone r-of-k Queries). Let X = f0;1gd and r;k 2 N such that r  k  d.
The query set Qr;k = fqygy2Ykf0;1gd of monotone r-of-k queries over f0;1gd contains a query
qy for every y 2 Yk =

y 2 f0;1gd j jyj  k
	
. Each query is deﬁned as qy(x1;:::;xd) =
1Pd
j=1 yjxjr. The Qr;k function family FQr;k = ffxgx2f0;1gd contains a function fx(y1;:::;yd) =
1Pd
j=1 yjxjr for every x 2 f0;1gd.
Sherstov [81, Lemma 3.11] gives an explicit construction of polynomials that can be used
to approximate the family FQr;k over Yk with low degree. It can be veriﬁed by inspecting the
construction that the coefﬁcients of the resulting polynomial are not too large.
100Lemma 5.14 ([81]). For every r;k 2 N such that r  k and  > 0, there exists a univariate
polynomial gr;k: R ! R of degree tr;k such that gr;k(x) =
Ptk
i=0 cixi and
1. tr;k = O
p
rk log(k) +
p
k log(1=)log(k)

,
2. for every i 2 f0;1;:::;tkg;jcij  2
e O(
p
kr log(1=)),
3. for every x 2 f0;1;:::;r   1g,    gr;k(x)  , and
4. for every x 2 fr;:::;kg, 1     gr;k(x)  1 + .
Moreover, gr;k can be constructed in time poly(k;r;log(1=)) (e.g. using linear programming).
We can use these polynomials to approximate monotone r-of-k queries.
Lemma 5.15 (Approximating FQr;k on Yk). For every r;k;d 2 N such that r  k  d and every
 > 0, the family Pt of d-variate real polynomials of degree t = e O(
p
krlog(1=)) and norm
T = d
e O(
p
kr log(1=)) efﬁciently and uniformly -approximates the family FQr;k on the set Yk.
Proof. The construction and proof is identical to that of Theorem 5.12 with the polynomials of
Lemma 5.14 in place of the polynomials described in Lemma 5.11.
Theorem 5.2 in the introduction now follows by combining Theorems 5.7 and 5.15. Note that
our result also extends easily to non-monotone r-of-k queries in the same manner as Theorem 5.1.
Remark 5.16. Using the principle of inclusion-exclusion, the answer to a monotone r-of-k query
can be written as a linear combination of the answers to kO(r) monotone k-way disjunctions. Thus,
a sanitizer that is (=kO(r);)-accurate for monotone k-way disjunctions implies a sanitizer that
is (;)-accurate for monotone r-of-k queries. However, combining this implication with Theo-
rem 5.1 yields a sanitizer with running time dO(r
p
k log(k=)), which has a worse dependence on r
than what we achieve in Theorem 5.2.
5.4.3 Releasing Decision Lists
A length-k decision list over m variables is a function which can be written in the form “if `1
then output b1 else  else if `k then output bk else output bk+1,” where each `i is a boolean literal
in fx1;:::;xmg, and each bi is an output bit in f0;1g: Note that decision lists of length-k strictly
101generalize k-way disjunctions and conjunctions. We use DLk;m to denote the set of all length-k
decision lists over m binary input variables.
Deﬁnition 5.17 (Evaluations of Length-k Decision Lists). Let k;m 2 N such that k  m and
X = DLk;m. The query set QDLk;m = fqygy2f0;1gm of evaluations of length-k decision lists
contains a query qy for every y 2 f0;1gm. Each query is deﬁned as qy(x) = x(y) where x 2 DLk;m
is a length-k decision list over m variables. The QDLk;m function family FQDLk;m = ffxgx2DLk;m
contains functions fx(y) = x(y) for every x 2 DLk;m. That is, FQDLk;m = DLk;m.
Weclarifythatinthissetting, therecordsinthedatabasearelength-k decisionlistsoverf0;1gm
and the queries inputs in f0;1gm. Thus jXj = jDLk;mj = mO(k) and jQj = 2m. Alternatively,
X = f0;1gd for d = k(logm + 2) + 1, since a length-k decision list can be described using this
many bits. Klivans and Servedio [58, Claim 5.4] have shown that decision lists of length k can be
uniformly approximated to accuracy  by low-degree polynomials.
Lemma 5.18 ([58]). For every k;m 2 N such that k  m and every  > 0, the family Pt of
m-variate real polynomials of degree e O
p
k log(1=)

and norm T = m
e O(
p
k log(1=)) efﬁciently
and uniformly -approximates the family FQDLk;m = DLk;m on all of f0;1gm.
We obtain Theorem 5.3 of the introduction by combining Theorems 5.7 and 5.18.
102Chapter 6
Faster Algorithms for Marginal Queries on
Small Databases
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, we presented a one-shot sanitizer for the set of k-way marginals that has both run-
ning time and minimum database size dO(
p
k). Although this algorithm achieves the best-known
running time for answering all k-way marginals, the minimum database size required is still sig-
niﬁcantly larger than e (k
p
d), which we know would be sufﬁcient if we were not concerned with
efﬁciency. In addition to the results of Chapter 5, there are several one-shot sanitizers whose run-
ning time is  dk and guarantee small average error for k-way marginals when the database size is
 dk [41, 22, 45, 38]. However, even in the easiest case where we want small average error under
the uniform distribution over all marginals, none of these algorithms matches private multiplicative
weights with respect to the minimum database size (see Table 5.1)
However, recent experimental work of Hardt, Ligett, and McSherry [43] suggests that in some
cases, it may be more important to optimize the minimum database than the running time. In-
deed they show that for some databases of interest, even the 2d-time private multiplicative weights
algorithm is practical. They also demonstrate that more efﬁcient algorithms based on adding in-
dependent noise do not provide good accuracy for these databases. These ﬁndings suggest that a
promising approach to designing practical algorithms is to achieve a minimum database size com-
parable to that of private multiplicative weights (say, poly(d;k)), and seek to optimize the running
103time of the algorithm as much as possible under this constraint. Unfortunately, there is no algo-
rithm we are aware of that has running time 2o(d) and provides a meaningful accuracy guarantee
for k-way marginals on a database of size comparable to O(k
p
d). If we want accurate answers to
all k-way marginals then there is no 2o(d) time algorithm with minimum database size poly(d;k).
In this chapter we give the ﬁrst algorithms for privately answering marginal queries for this
parameter regime. We show how to privately answer marginal queries in time 2o(d) on databases
of size e O(kd:51), which is nearly the smallest a database can be while admitting any differentially
private approximation to marginal queries.13
6.1.1 Our Results and Techniques
More speciﬁcally, we construct differentially private sanitizers (as opposed to one-shot santiz-
ers) for answering k-way marginal queries.
Theorem 6.1. There exist constants C1;C2 > 0 such that for every k;d;n 2 N, k  d, and every
"; > 0, there is an (";)-differentially private sanitizer that on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n,
with n  C2  d:51 logjQjlog(1=)=", runs in time
poly

n;jQj;min
n
exp

d
1 1=C1
p
k

;exp
 
d=log
:99 d
o
and is (:01;:01)-accurate for the set of k-way marginal queries.
Theorem 6.1 easily gives rise to a one-shot sanitizer for k-way marginals. We can obtain
this one-shot sanitizer simply by requesting answers to each of the d(k) distinct k-way marginal
queries from the online sanitizer. In this case we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary6.2. ThereexistconstantsC1;C2 > 0suchthatforeveryk;d;n 2 N, andevery"; > 0,
there is an (";)-differentially private one-shot sanitizer that, on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n,
with n  C2  kd:51 logdlog(1=)=", runs in time
poly

n;

d
 k

;min
n
exp

d
1 1=C
p
k

;exp
 
d=log
:99 d
o
and (:01;:01)-accurate for the set of k-way marginal queries.
13It is information-theoretically impossible for a differentially private algorithm to answer even 1-way marginal
queries with non-trivial accuracy on a database of size o(
p
d=logd) [88, 90]
104Table 2: A simpliﬁed summary of prior work on k-way marginals for k  d.
Paper Running Time Database Size
[26, 15, 30] d(k) O(dk=2)
[16, 32, 35, 43] 2O(d) e O(kd:5)
Chapter 5 dO(
p
k) dO(
p
k)
This chapter 2O(d=log:99 d) kd:5+o(1)
This chapter 2d1 
(1=
p
k) e O(kd:51)
Here
  d
k

:=
Pk
j=0
 d
j

, and the number of k-way marginal queries is polynomial in this
quantity. Note that for k = O(d=logd), the per-query running time of the online sanitizer is the
dominant term.
See Table 2 for a simpliﬁed summary of known one-shot sanitizers with error :01 on every
k-way marginal when k  d, including the results of this chapter. See Table 1 (Chapter 5) for
a more complete summary including one-shot sanitizers with average case error. In Table 2, the
running time statements ignore dependence on the database size and privacy parameters.
We make a few additional remarks about these results:
Remark 1. When k = 
(log
2 d), the minimum database size requirement can be improved to
jDj  Ckd:5+o(1) log(1=)=" (for some universal constant C > 0) without affecting the running
time signiﬁcantly, but we have stated the theorems with a looser bound for simplicity. Here the
o(1) term is a vanishing function of d.
Remark 2. Our algorithm can be modiﬁed so that instead of releasing approximate answers to
each k-way marginal explicitly, it releases a summary of the database of size e O(kd:01) from which
an analyst can compute an approximate answer to any k-way marginal in time e O(kd1:01).
Remark 3. Theorem 6.1 can actually be strengthened to give an online sanitizer for k-way
marginal queries. Intuitively an online sanitizer is just a sanitizer where the input queries are given
one at a time, and the sanitizer must answer each query immediately after it is issued. See [44] for
a formal treatment of online sanitizers.
Recall that a monotone k-way disjunction is speciﬁed by a set S  [d] of size k and asks what
fraction of records in D have at least one of the attributes in S set to 1. Also recall that we view the
105database as a function fD: f0;1gd ! [0;1], in which each input vector s 2 f0;1gd is interpreted
as the indicator vector of a set S  [d], and fD(s) equals the evaluation of the disjunction query
speciﬁed by S on the database D. As in Chapter 5, our algorithm is based on techniques for
approximating the function fD.
The starting point for our algorithm is the online private multiplicative weights algorithm
(PMW) [44], which has running time 2d per query and answers any sequence of arbitrary count-
ing queries provided jDj &
p
dlogjQj. Gupta, Roth, and Ullman [42] introduced the “IDC
framework”—capturing PMW and other algorithms—for designing differentially private sanitizers
and, in particular, showed that such an algorithm can be derived from any (non-privacy preserving)
online learning algorithm.
Informally, an online learning algorithm is one that plays the following game: In each round,
j, the learner receives a (possibly adaptively chosen) input sj, and must produce a “guess” aj as to
the value of fD(sj) for the unknown function fD. After making each guess aj, the learner is given
some information about the value of fD(sj). If the guess aj is “far” from the true value fD(sj),
then we say that the learner has made a “mistake” in round j. Ultimately, for the sanitizer derived
in the IDC framework, the notion of far will correspond to the accuracy, the per query running time
will essentially be equal to the running time of the online learning algorithm, and the minimum
database size required by the private algorithm will be proportional to the maximum number of
mistakes that the learning algorithm makes in this game.
The algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [44], is derived from an online learning algorithm that
runs in time 2d and makes O(d) mistakes. A common approach to obtaining a faster online learning
algorithmthatstillmakesfewmistakesistouseapolynomialapproximation14 tothetargetfunction
fD. Indeed, it is well-known in computational learning theory that if fD can be approximated to
within high accuracy on every input by a d-variate polynomial pD: f0;1gd ! R of degree t
and weight at most W (where the weight is deﬁned to be the sum of the absolute values of the
coefﬁcients), then there is an online learning algorithm that runs in time poly
   d
t

and makes
O(Wd) mistakes. Thus, if t  d, the running time of such an online learning algorithm will be
signiﬁcantly less than 2d and the number of mistakes (and thus the minimum database size of the
14For this informal introduction, we are using the term polynomial a bit loosely. More precisely, we will approx-
imate fD : f0;1gm ! [0;1] by a low-weight linear combination of low-width parity functions over f0;1gm, which
could alternatively be viewed as a polynomial approximation if wrote fD as a function mapping f 1;1gm to [ 1;1]
in the standard fashion.
106resulting private algorithm) will only increase by a factor of W.
In order to obtain a faster online learning algorithm that makes few mistakes, it sufﬁces to
show that for every database, D, there is a low-degree, low-weight polynomial pD such that
jpD(s)   fD(s)j is small for all vectors s 2 f0;1gd corresponding to monotone k-way disjunc-
tion queries. As we implicitly showed in Chapter 5, it is sufﬁcient to construct a low-degree,
low-weight polynomial that can approximate the d-variate OR function on inputs s 2 f0;1gd of
Hamming weight at most k. Indeed, we show that for every k  d, there is a suitable polynomial
of degree d1 
(1=
p
k) and weight d:01. For larger values of k, this upper bound approaches the trivial
upper bound of d. However, we also show that for the hardest case of k = d, there exists a suitable
polynomial of degree d=log
:99 d and weight do(1).
If our construction could be improved to give a polynomial of even smaller degree and weight
poly(d) that approximates the OR function on all inputs of Hamming weight at most k, then it
wouldimmediatelyimplyafasteralgorithmforansweringk-waymarginalswithasimilaraccuracy
guarantee. However, we prove a lower bound showing that it is not possible to signiﬁcantly im-
prove on our construction. We believe this lower bound is of independent approximation-theoretic
interest.
Theorem 6.3. Let ORd : f0;1gd ! f0;1g denote the OR function on d variables, and for every
vector x 2 f0;1gd, let jxj denote
Pd
i=1 xi, the Hamming weight of x. Fix k = o(logd), and let p
be a real d-variate polynomial satisfying jp(x)   ORd(x)j  1=6 for all x 2 f0;1gd with jxj  k.
If the sum of the absolute values of the coefﬁcients of p is bounded by dO(1), then the total degree
of p is at least d1 O(1=
p
k).
As was the case in Chapter 5, our algorithm can be extended to the case where fD is ap-
proximated not by a low-degree polynomial, but rather by a low-weight linear combination of
functions from an arbitrary feature space S. In this case the running time will be proportional to
jSj. Theorem 6.3 shows that we cannot construct a smaller feature space containing a low-weight
approximation to fD by restricting to monomials of lower degree. We leave it as an interesting
open question to determine whether or not there exists a smaller feature space such that every dis-
junction over d variables can be approximated on inputs of low Hamming weight by a low-weight
linear combination of these features. A positive answer to this question would immediately yield a
more efﬁcient algorithm for answering k-way marginals with a similar accuracy guarantee to ours.
1076.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Query Function Families
We recall the notion of a query-function family from Chapter 5.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Q-Function Family). Let Q = fqygy2YQf0;1gm be a set of counting queries on a
data universe X, where each query is indexed by an m-bit string. We deﬁne the index set of Q to
be the set YQ = fy 2 f0;1gm j qy 2 Qg.
We deﬁne the Q-function family FQ = ffx : f0;1gm ! f0;1ggx2X as follows: For every
possible database row x 2 X, the function fQ;x : f0;1gm ! f0;1g is deﬁned as fQ;x(y) = qy(x).
Given a database D 2 X n we deﬁne the function fQ;D : f0;1gm ! [0;1] where fQ;D(q) =
1
n
Pn
i=1 fQ;x(i)(q). When Q is clear from context we will drop the subscript Q and simply write fx,
fD, and F.
For some intuition about this transformation, when the queries are monotone k-way disjunc-
tions on a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, the queries are deﬁned by sets S  [d] , jSj  k. In this case
each query can be represented by the d-bit indicator vector of the set S, with at most k non-zero
entries. Thus we can take m = d and YQ =
n
y 2 f0;1gd j
Pd
j=1 yj  k
o
.
6.2.2 Low-Weight Linear Approximations
As in Section 5.2.3, let S = fs: f0;1gm ! [ 1;1]g be a feature space of efﬁciently (time
poly(m)) computable m-variate functions. For a vector~ c = (cs)s2S 2 RjSj, let g~ c be the function
g~ c(y) =
X
s2S
cs  s(y):
Abusing notation, we will often associate the function g~ c with its coefﬁcient vector ~ c. Notice that
computing g~ c(y) is equivalent to computing h~ c;~ yi, where ~ y 2 [0;1]jSj is the vector (ys)s2S formed
by taking ~ ys = s(y) for every s 2 S. In contrast to Section 5.2.3, we now wish to work with linear
combinations of function in S that have bounded L1-norm (as opposed to L1-norm). To reduce
ambiguity between different norms, we deﬁne the weight of g~ c to be
W(g~ c) = k~ ck1 =
X
s2S
j~ csj:
108We will tend to restrict attention to functions g~ c that have weight exactly W. This restriction is
essentially without loss of generality if we assume that S includes a function that is identically 0.
Then if we are given a function g~ c over S with weight W 0 < W, we can place additional weight of
W   W 0 on the identically 0 function so that g~ c has weight exactly W. We also restrict attention
to functions g~ c such that~ c lies in R
jSj
0. This restriction is also essentially without loss of generality
if we assume that S is closed under negation (s 2 S )  s 2 S). If either of these two restrictions
fails to hold for a given feature space S, then we can obtain a new feature space of size 2jSj + 1
for which they do hold, which will not have a signiﬁcant effect on the statement of our results.
We are interested in cases where the function fQ;x : f0;1gm ! f0;1g can be approximated
well on all the indices in YQ by a linear combination of functions in S with low weight. Formally:
Deﬁnition 6.5 (Uniform Approximation by a Feature Space). Given a family of m-variate func-
tions F = ffx: f0;1gm ! [ 1;1]gx2X and a set Y  f0;1gm, we say that the feature space
S = fs: f0;1gm ! [ 1;1]g uniformly -approximates F on Y with weight W if for every x 2 X,
there exists~ cx 2 R
jSj
0 such that W(~ c) = W and
8y 2 Y; jfx(y)   h~ cx;~ yij  :
6.3 From Low-Weight Approximations to Sanitizers
In this section we show that low-weight polynomial approximations imply data release algo-
rithms that provide approximate answers even on small databases. Informally, if a feature space
S of m-variate functions -approximates F with weight W, for a sufﬁciently small constant ,
then there is a differentially private online algorithm with running time poly(m;jSj) that releases
answers to every sequence of queries Q in Q within error :01 as long as n & W
p
mlogjQj=".
We will prove this result by constructing a new IDC that has a good mistake bound and running
time for families of queries that can be approximated with low-weight over a small feature space.
We then invoke Theorem 2.15 from Section 2.4.3 to obtain our differentially private sanitizer.
6.3.1 From Low-Weight Approximations to IDCs
The new IDC is derived from the standard (non-privacy-preserving) multiplicative weights
algorithm, andisspeciﬁedinFigure15. ForthisIDC,thedatastructureapproximatingthedatabase
109will be a low-weight linear combination of features from a feature space S, which is a coefﬁcient
vector~ c(t) 2 R
jSj
0.
For a given vector ~ c 2 R
jSj
0 of weight W, we deﬁne c = ~ c=W. We observe two things about
c: (1) Given a query y 2 f0;1gm, we can construct a vector ~ y of length jSj in which ~ ys = s(yi)
for every s 2 S, and this vector will satisfy Whc;~ yi = h~ c;~ yi. (2) c now represents a probability
distribution on the jSj coefﬁcients.
UMW
;S;W(~ c(t);y(t);b a(t)):
Input: An approximation~ c(t) over feature space S, a query y(t) 2 Q, and b a(t) 2 R.
If: ~ c(t) = ; then: output~ c(t+1) = (1;:::;1) and halt.
Let c(t) = ~ c(t)=W and let    =4W.
If: b a(t) < Whc(t);~ y(t)i
Let r(t) = ~ y(t)
Else:
Let r(t) =  ~ y(t)
Update: For all s 2 S let
c
(t+1)
s   exp( r
(t)
s )  c
(t)
s
c
(t+1)  
c(t+1)
kc(t+1)k1
Output~ c(t+1) = W  c(t+1).
Figure 15: The Multiplicative Weights Algorithm for Low-Weight Feature Spaces.
We summarize the properties of the multiplicative weights algorithm in the following theorem:
Theorem 6.6. For every  > 0, and every family of counting queries Q if S (=4)-uniformly
approximates F on Y with weight W then UMW (Figure 15) is an iterative database construction
with mistake bound B for Qfor
B =
16W 2 logjSj
2 :
Moreover, U runs in time poly
 
jSj;log(1=);logW

.
Proof. Let D 2 (f0;1gd)n be any database and consider a (UMW;D;Q;;B)-database update
sequence,

(~ c(t);y(t);b a(t))
	
t=1;:::;B. It will be sufﬁcient if we can show that B  16W 2 logjSj=2.
110Speciﬁcally, that after B = 16W 2 logjSj=2 invocations of UMW, the function~ c(B) is such that
8y 2 YQ; jh~ c
(B);~ yi   fD(y)j  :
That is,~ c(B) represents a function that approximates fD.
The assumption of our theorem is that for every x(i) 2 D, there exists ~ cx(i) 2 R
jSj
0, of weight
W, such that
8y 2 YQ; jh~ cx(i);~ yi   fx(i)(y)j 

4
:
Thus, since fD = 1
n
Pn
i=1 fx(i), the function~ cD = 1
n
Pn
i=1~ cx(i) will satisfy
8y 2 YQ; jh~ cD;~ yi   fD(y)j 

4
:
Note that ~ cD 2 R
jSj
0, thus, viewing ~ cD as a vector, and considering its normalized version cD, we
have
8y 2 YQ; jWhcD;~ yi   fD(y)j 

4
:
Given the existence of cD, we will deﬁne a potential function capturing how far c(t) is from cD.
Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
	t := KL(cDjjc
(t)) =
X
s2S
cD;s log

cD;s
c(t)
s

to be the KL divergence between cD and the current approximation c(t). We have the following
fact about KL divergence.
Fact 6.7. For all t: 	t  0, and 	0  logjSj.
We will argue that in each step the potential drops by at least 2=16W 2. Because the potential
begins at logjSj, and must always be non-negative, we know that there can be at most B 
16W 2 logjSj=2 steps before thealgorithm outputs a (vectorrepresentation of) a low-weightlinear
combination over S that approximates fD on YQ.
The following lemma is standard in the analysis of multiplicative-weights-based algorithms.
We include a proof for completeness.
Lemma 6.8 (See e.g. [5]).
	t   	t+1  
 
hc
(t);r
(t)i   hcD;r
(t)i

  
2
111Proof. We can prove the lemma via the following calculation:
	t   	t+1 =
X
s2S
cD;s log

cD;s
c(t)
s

 
X
s2S
cD;s log

cD;s
c(t+1)
s

=
X
s2S
cD;s log

c(t+1)
s
c(t)
s

=
X
s2S
cD;s log
 
exp( r
(t)
s )
P
u2S exp( r
(t)
u )c(t)
u
!
=  hcD;r
(t)i   log
 
X
u2S
exp( r
(t)
u )c
(t)
u
!
  hcD;r
(t)i   log
 
X
u2S
c
(t)
u (1 + (r
(t)
u )
2   r
(t)
u )
!
  hcD;r
(t)i   log
 
X
u2S
c
(t)
u ((r
(t)
u )
2   r
(t)
u )
!
  hcD;r
(t)i  
X
u2S
c
(t)
u ((r
(t)
u )
2   r
(t)
u )
= 
 
hc
(t);r
(t)i   hcD;r
(t)i

  
2
In this calculation, we have used the fact that, by construction, r
(t)
u 2 [0;1] and using the
elementary facts that for x > 0, log(1 + x)  x and e x  1   x + x2.
The rest of the proof now follows easily. By the conditions of an iterative database construction
algorithm, jb a(t)   fD(y(t))j  =2. Hence, for each t such that jWhc(t);~ y(t)i   fD(y(t))j  , we
also have that Whc(t);~ y(t)i > fD(y(t)) if and only if Whc(t);~ y(t)i > b a(t).
In particular, if r(t) = y(t), then Whc(t);~ y(t)i   WhcD;~ y(t)i  =2. Similarly, if r(t) =  y(t),
then WhcD;~ y(t)i   Whc(t);~ y(t)i  . Here we have utilized the fact that j~ cD(y)   fD(y)j  =4.
Therefore, by Lemma 6.8 and the fact that  = =4W:
	t   	t+1 

4W
 
hc
(t);r
(t)i   hcD;r
(t)i

 
2
16W 2 

4W
 
2W

 
2
16W 2 =
2
16W 2
1126.4 Low-Weight Approximations
In the previous section we reduced the problem of designing efﬁcient online algorithms for
marginal queries to designing certain low-weight linear approximations. In this section we show
that such low-weight linear approximations exist using low-degree, low-weight polynomials. In
this and the following section we give upper and lower bounds on the degree of suitable low-weight
polynomials. For technical convenience, and consistency with the literature in approximation the-
ory, the notation used for these sections differs somewhat from what we have used in Chapter 5
and in the previous sections. This section and the next are intended to be self-contained, and in
Theorem 6.10 we clarify the relationship between the two settings.
In this section we are interested in m-variate real polynomials p: f 1;1gm ! R, written as
p(y) =
X
S[m]
cS 
Y
i2S
yi:
We deﬁne the degree of the polynomial to be
deg(p) := maxfjSj : S  [m];cS 6= 0g;
and we deﬁne the weight w(:) and non-constant weight w(:) of the polynomial to be
w(p) :=
X
S[m]
jcSj; w
(p) :=
X
S[m];S6=;
jcSj:
We use
 [m]
t

to denote fS  [m] j jSj  tg and
 m
t

=
  
 [m]
t
   =
Pt
j=0
 m
j

.
The next deﬁnition is similar to Deﬁnition 6.5 but with different notation and specialized to
polynomials.
Deﬁnition 6.9 (Restricted Approximation by Polynomials). Given a function f : Y ! R, where
Y  Rm, and a subset Y 0  Y , we denote the restriction of f to Y 0 by fjY 0. Given an m-variate
real polynomial p, we say that p is a -approximation to the restriction fjY 0, if jf(y)   p(y)j  
8y 2 Y 0. Notice there is no restriction whatsoever placed on p(y) for y 2 Y n Y 0.
Given a family of m-variate functions F = ffx: Y ! Rgx2X, where Y  Rm, a set Y 0  Y
and a family P of m-variate real polynomials, we say that the family P is a -approximation to
FjY 0 if for every x 2 X, there exists px 2 P that is a -approximation to fxjY 0.
113We view the d variate OR function, ORd as mapping inputs from f 1;1gd to f 1;1g, with the
convention that  1 is TRUE and 1 is FALSE. Let Hm;k = fx 2 f 1;1gm :
Pm
i=1(1 xi)=2  kg
denote the set of inputs of Hamming weight at most k. Let Pt;W denote the family of all m-variate
real polynomials of degree t and weight W. For the upper bound, we will show that for certain
small values of t and W, the family Pt;W is a -approximation to the family of all disjunctions
restricted to Hm;k.
The next theorem reconciles the notation and terminology of this section with that of the pre-
vious sections.
Theorem 6.10. Let Q be the set of all monotone k-way disjunctions on f0;1gd and let FQ and YQ
be the corresponding function family and index set. Here, a k-way disjunction qy(x) =
W
i:yi=1 xi
is speciﬁed by its indicator vector y 2 YQ =
n
y 2 f0;1gd j
Pd
j=1 yj  k
o
. Let FQ be the cor-
responding function family. Assume that there is a d-variate polynomial of degree at most t and
weight at most W that -approximates the function ORd on all inputs in Hm;k. Then there exists
a feature space of size at most 2
  d
t

+ 1 that -uniformly approximates the family F on Y with
weight W.
Proof of Theorem 6.10. For any x 2 f0;1gd, let ORd;x(y) =
W
ijxi=1 yi. We note that qy(x) =
ORd;x(y) Suppose that there is a polynomial p such that
8y 2 Hm;k; jp(y)   ORd(y)j  :
Then the polynomial px(y) = p(y
x1
1 ;:::;y
xd
d ) is such that
8y 2 Hm;k; jpx(y)   ORd;x(y)j  :
Further, it is easy to see that (since xi 2 f0;1g), the degree and weight of px are no larger than that
of p. Now observe that the functions fx 2 F are exactly the functions ORd;x, except that fx maps
f0;1gd ! f0;1g (with 1 representing logical TRUE), whereas ORd;x maps f 1;1gd ! f 1;1g
(with  1 representing logical TRUE). Thus, for every monomial
Q
i2S yi, we can instead use the
feature 1
2   1
2
Q
i2S(1   2yi) to obtain an equivalent function mapping f0;1gd ! f0;1g. Thus,
the feature space St =

sS(y) = 1
2   1
2
Q
i2S(1   2yi) j S  [d];jSj  t
	
, will -approximate the
family F on Y with weight at most W. Also note that the size of this feature space is
  d
t

. Finally,
and we will expand the feature set to be closed under negation and contain a constant 0 feature
114to be consistent with the requirement in Deﬁnition 6.5 that the weight of the approximation be
exactly W and that the coefﬁcients be non-negative. This expanded feature space will have size
2
  d
t

+ 1.
With Theorem 6.10 in hand, we can focus on understanding the choices of weight and degree
for which there admits a polynomial approximation to the function ORd.
For our lower bound, we will show that any collection of polynomials with small weight that
is a -approximation to the family of disjunctions restricted to Hm;k should have large degree. We
need the following deﬁnitions in place:
Deﬁnition 6.11 (Approximate Degree). Given a function f : Y ! R, where Y  Rm, the -
approximate degree of f is
deg(f) := minfd : 9 real polynomial p that is a -approximation to f, deg(p) = dg:
Analogously, the (;W)-approximate degree of f is
deg(;W)(f) := minfd : 9polynomial p that is a -approximation to f, deg(p) = d, w(p)  Wg:
It is clear that deg(f) = deg(;1)(f).
We let w(f;t) denote the degree-t non-constant margin weight of f, deﬁned to be:
w
(f;t) := minfw
(p) : deg(p)  t;f(y)p(y)  1 8 y 2 Y g:
The above deﬁnitions extend naturally to the restricted function fjY 0.
Our deﬁnition of non-constant margin weight is closely related to the well-studied notion of
the degree-t polynomial threshold function (PTF) weight of f (see e.g. [83]), which is deﬁned as
minp w(p), where the minimum is taken over all degree-t polynomials p with integer coefﬁcients,
such that f(x) = sign(p(x)) for all x 2 f 1;1gd. Often, when studying PTF weight, the require-
ment that p have integer coefﬁcients is used only to ensure that p has non-trivial margin, i.e. that
jp(x)j  1 for all x 2 f 1;1gd; this is precisely the requirement captured in our deﬁnition of non-
constant margin weight. We choose to work with margin weight because it is a cleaner quantity to
analyze using linear programming duality; PTF weight can also be studied using LP duality, but
the integrality constraints on the coefﬁcients of p introduces an integrality gap that causes some
loss in the analysis (see e.g. Sherstov [83] and Klauck [57]).
115The ORd function is easily seen to have an exact polynomial representation of constant weight
and degree d (e.g. see Fact 6.14 below); however, an approximation with smaller degree may
be achieved at the expense of larger weight. The best known weight-degree tradeoff (implicit in
Servedio et al. [80]), can be stated as follows: there exists a polynomial p of degree t and weight
(dlog(1=)=t)(d(log1=)2=t) that -approximates the ORd function on all Boolean inputs, for every
t larger than
p
dlog(1=). Setting the degree t to be O(d=log
:99 d) yields a polynomial of weight
at most d0:01 that approximates the ORd function over the entire Boolean hypercube to any desired
constant accuracy. On the other hand, Lemma 8 of [80] can be shown to imply that any polynomial
of weight W that 1=3-approximates the ORd function requires degree 
(d=logW), essentially
matching the O(d=log
:99 d) upper bound of Servedio et al. when W = dO(1) in Lemma 6.12.
However, in order to privately release k-way marginals, we have shown that it sufﬁces to con-
struct polynomials that are accurate only on inputs of low Hamming weight. In this section, we
give a construction that achieves signiﬁcantly improved weight degree trade-offs in this setting.
In the next section, we demonstrate the tightness of our construction by proving matching lower
bounds.
We construct our approximations by decomposing the d-variate OR function into an OR of
OR’s, which is the same approach taken by Servedio et al. [80]. Here, the outer OR has fan-in m
and the inner OR has fan-in d=m, where the subsequent analysis will determine the appropriate
choice of m. In order to obtain an approximation that is accurate on all Boolean inputs, Servedio
et al. approximate the outer OR using a transformation of the Chebyshev polynomials of degree
p
m, and compute each of the inner OR’s exactly.
For k  log
2 d, we are able to substantially reduce the degree of the approximating polyno-
mial, relative to the construction of Servedio et al., by leveraging the fact that we are interested in
approximations that are only accurate on inputs of Hamming weight at most k. Speciﬁcally, we
are able to approximate the outer OR function using a polynomial of degree only
p
k rather than
p
m, and argue that the weight of the resulting polynomial is still bounded by a polynomial in d.
We now proceed to prove the main lemmas. For the sake of intuition, we begin with weight-
degree tradeoffs in the simpler setting in which we are concerned with approximating the ORd
functionovertheentireBooleanhypercube. Thefollowinglemma, provedbelowforcompleteness,
is implicit in the work of [80].
Lemma 6.12. For every  > 0 and m 2 [d], there is a real-valued polynomial of degree t =
116O(dlog(1=)=
p
m) and weight W = mO(
p
mlog(1=) that -approximates the ORd function.
Our main contribution in this section is the following lemma that gives an improved polynomial
approximation to the ORd function restricted to inputs of low Hamming weight.
Lemma 6.13. For every  > 0, k < d and integer k < m  d, there is a polynomial of degree
t = O(d
p
k log(1=)=m) and weight W = mO(
p
k log(1=)) that -approximates the ORd function
restricted to inputs of Hamming weight at most k.
For any constant accuracy , one may take m = dO(1=
p
k) in the lemma (here the choice of
constant depends on the constants in Fact 6.15 and the desired accuracy) and obtain a polynomial
of degree d1 
(1=
p
k) and weight d:01.
Our constructions use the following basic facts.
Fact 6.14. The real polynomial pd : f 1;1gd ! R
pd(x) = 2
0
@
X
S[d]
2
 d Y
i2S
xi
1
A   1 = 2
d Y
i=1

1 + xi
2

  1
computes ORd(x) and has weight w(pd)  3.
Fact 6.15. For every k 2 N and  > 0, there exists a univariate real-valued polynomial p =
Ptk
i=0 cixi of degree tk such that
1. tk = O(
p
k log(1=));
2. for every i 2 f1;:::;tkg, jcij  2O(
p
k log(1=)),
3. p(0) = 0, and
4. for every x 2 f1;:::;2kg, jp(x)   1j  =2.
Proof of Lemma 6.12. We can compute ORd(y) as a disjunction of disjunctions by partitioning the
inputs y1;:::;yd into blocks of size d=m and computing:
ORm(ORd=m(y1;:::;yd=m);:::;ORd=m(yd d=m+1;:::;yd)):
117In order to approximately compute ORd(y), we compute the inner disjunctions exactly using the
polynomial pd=m given in Fact 6.14 and approximate the outer disjunction using the polynomial
from Fact 6.15. Let
Z(y) = pd=m(y1;:::;yd=m) +  + pd=m(yd d=m+1;:::;yd):
Setting k = m in Fact 6.15, let qm be the resulting polynomial of degree O(
p
mlog(1=)) and
weight O(m
p
mlog(1=)). Our ﬁnal polynomial is
1   2qm(m   Z(y)):
Note that m   Z(y) takes values in f0;:::;mg and is 0 exactly when all inputs y1;:::;yd are
FALSE. It follows that our ﬁnal polynomial indeed approximates ORd to additive error  on all
Boolean inputs.
We bound the degree and weight of this polynomial in y. By Fact 6.14, the inner disjunc-
tions are computed exactly using degree d=m and weight at most 3. Hence, the total degree is
O(
p
mlog(1=)  d=m). To bound the weight, we observe that the outer polynomial qm() has at
most T = mO(
p
mlog(1=)) terms where each one has degree at most Douter = O(
p
mlog(1=)) co-
efﬁcients of absolute value at most couter = 2O(
p
mlog(1=)). Expanding the polynomials for Z(y),
the weight of each term incurs a multiplicative factor of cinner  3Douter = 3O(
p
mlog1=) so the total
weight is at most cinner  couter  T = mO(
p
mlog1=):
Proof of Lemma 6.13. Again we partition the inputs y1;:::;yd into blocks of size d=m and view
the disjunction as:
ORm(ORd=m(y1;:::;yd=m);:::;ORd=m(yd d=m+1;:::;yd)):
Once again, we compute the inner disjunctions exactly using the polynomial from Fact 6.14. Let
Z(y) = pd=m(y1;:::;yd=m) +  + pd=m(yd d=m+1;:::;yd):
If the input y has Hamming weight at most k, then Z(y) also takes values in fm;:::;m   2kg.
Thus, we may approximate the outer disjunction using a polynomial of degree O(
p
k log(1=))
from Fact 6.15. Our ﬁnal polynomial is:
1   2qk(m   Z):
The bound on degree and weight may be obtained as in the previous lemma.
1186.4.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1
We now conﬁrm that the results presented so far sufﬁce to establish Theorem 6.1 in the intro-
duction.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. First we take m = O
 
(logd=loglogd)2
in Lemma 6.12 and take m =
dO(1=
p
k) in Lemma 6.13. Combining with Theorem 6.10, it follows that for some constant C > 0,
the family of d-variate disjunctions restricted to Hd;k is 0:01-approximated by the family of d-
variate real polynomials of degree t and weight W where
t = min

d
1  1
C
p
k;
d
log
0:995 d

and W = d
0:01:
Consequently, by Theorem 6.6, we have an algorithm that is a B-iterative database construction
where
B = O(d
0:02tlogd) = O

d
0:02 logd  min

d
1  1
C
p
k;
d
log
0:99 d

and the algorithm runs in time T = poly(
  d
t

)
By Theorem 2.15, we have an (";)-differentially private sanitizer that is (0:01;0:01)-accurate
for any set Q of (possibly adaptively chosen) k-way marginal queries provided the size of the
database
n  C 

1
"
log(100jQj)log

1


d
0:01p
logd  min

d
0:5  1
2C
p
k;
d0:5
log
0:48 d

for an appropriate constant C > 0. Further, the algorithm runs in time
poly(n;T) = poly

n;

d
 t

= poly

n;min
n
exp

d
1 1=C
p
k

;exp
 
d=log
:99 d
o
:
Remark1intheintroductionfollowsfromusingaslightlydifferentchoiceofminLemma6.12,
namely m = O(log
2 d=log
3 logd).
To obtain the summary of the database promised in Remark 2, we request an answer to each
of the k-way marginal queries B(1=400) times. Doing so, will ensure that we obtain a maximal
database update sequence, and it was argued in Section 2.4.3 that the polynomial resulting from
any maximal database update sequence accurately answers every k-way marginal query. Finally,
we obtain a compact summary by randomly choosing e O(kd:01) samples from the normalized coef-
ﬁcient vector of this polynomial to obtain a new sparse polynomial. By a straightforward Chernoff
119bound argument, this polynomial will accurately answer every k-way marginal query (see e.g. [19],
for an example of this argument in the setting of polynomial approximations). Our compact sum-
mary is this ﬁnal sparse polynomial.
6.5 Limitations of Low-Weight Approximations
In the previous section we saw that the degree required to approximate the function ORd on
inputs of Hamming weight at most k can be signiﬁcantly smaller than the degree required to do so
on all inputs. In this section, we address the question of whether or not the degree can be improved
further for inputs of bounded Hamming weight. More generally, we address the general problem of
approximating a block-composed function G = F(:::;f(:);:::), where F : f 1;1gk ! f 1;1g,
f : Y ! f 1;1g, Y  Rd=k over inputs restricted to a set Y  Y k using low-weight polynomials.
We give a lower bound on the minimum degree of such polynomials. In our main application, G
will equal ORd, and Y will be the set of all length d Boolean vectors of Hamming weight at most
k.
Our proof technique is inspired by the composition theorem lower bounds shown in [82, The-
orem 3.1], where it is shown that the -approximate degree of the composed function G is at least
the product of the -approximate degree of the outer function and the PTF degree of the inner
function. Our main contribution is a generalization of such a composition theorem along two di-
rections: (1) we show degree lower bounds that take into account the size of the coefﬁcients of
the approximating polynomial, and (2) our lower bounds hold even when we only require the ap-
proximation to be accurate on inputs of low Hamming weight, while prior work only considered
approximations that are accurate on the entire Boolean hypercube.
Our main theorem is stated below. In parsing the statement of the theorem, it may be helpful
to think of G = ORd, Y = Hd;k, the set of all length d Boolean vectors of Hamming weight at
most k, f = ORd=k, F = ORk, Y = f 1;1gd=k, and H = Hd=k;1, the set of all Boolean vectors
of Hamming weight at most 1. This will be the setting of interest in our main application of the
theorem.
Theorem 6.16. Let Y  Rd=k be a ﬁnite set and  > 0. Given f : Y ! f 1;1g and F :
f 1;1gk ! f 1;1g such that deg2(F) = D, let G : Y k ! f 1;1g denote the composed
function deﬁned by G(Y1;:::;Yk) = F(f(Y1);:::;f(Yk)). Let Y  Y k. Suppose there exists
120H  Y such that for every (Y1;:::;Yk) 2 Y k n Y there exists i 2 [k] such that Yi 2 Y n H. Then,
for every t 2 Z+,
deg(;W)(GjY) 
1
2
tD for every W  2
 kw
(fjH;t)
D
2 :
We derive the following corollary from Theorem 6.16. Theorem 6.3 follows immediately from
Corollary 6.17 by considering any k = o(logd).
Corollary 6.17. Let k 2 [d]. Then, there exists a universal constant C > 0 such that
deg(1=6;W)(ORdjHd;k) = 

 
d
p
k

W
  1
C
p
k
2
p
k=C
!
:
Intuition underlying our proof technique. Recall that our upper bound in Section 6.4 worked
as follows. We viewed ORd as an “OR of ORs”, and we approximated the outer OR with a poly-
nomial p of degree degouter chosen to be as small as possible, and composed p with a low-weight
but high-degree polynomial computing each inner OR. We needed to make sure the weight Winner
of the inner polynomials was very low, because the composition step potentially blows the weight
up to roughly W
degouter
inner . As a result, the inner polynomials had to have very high degree, to keep
their weight low.
Intuitively, we construct a dual solution to a certain linear program that captures the intuition
that any low-weight, low-degree polynomial approximation to ORd must look something like our
primal solution, composing a low-degree approximation to an “outer” OR with low-weight approx-
imations to inner ORs. Moreover, our dual solution formalizes the intuition that the composition
step must result in a massive blowup in weight, from Winner to roughly W
degouter
inner .
In more detail, our dual construction works by writing ORd as an OR of ORs, where the outer
OR is over k variables, and each inner ORs is over d=k variables. We obtain our dual solution
by carefully combining a dual witness   to the high approximate degree of the outer OR, with a
dual witness   to the fact that any low-degree polynomial with margin at least 1 for each inner
OR, must have “large” weight, even if the polynomial must satisfy the margin constraint only on
inputs of Hamming weight 0 or 1. This latter condition, that   must witness high non-constant
margin weight even if restricted to inputs of Hamming weight 0 or 1, is essential to ensuring that
our combined dual witness does not place any “mass” on irrelevant inputs, i.e. those of Hamming
weight larger than k.
1216.5.1 Duality Theorems
In the rest of the section, we let S(x) =
Q
i2S xi for any given set S  [d]. The question of
existence of a weight W polynomial with small degree that -approximates a given function can
be expressed as a feasibility problem for a linear program. Now, in order to show the non-existence
of such a polynomial, it is sufﬁcient to show infeasibility of the linear program. By duality, this is
equivalent to demonstrating existence of a solution to the corresponding dual program. We begin
by summarizing the duality theorems that will be useful in exhibiting this witness.
Theorem 6.18 (Duality Theorem for (;W)-approximate degree). Fix   0 and let f : Y !
f 1;1g be given for some ﬁnite set Y  Rd. Then, deg(;W)(f)  t + 1 if and only if there exists
a function 	 : Y ! R such that
1.
P
y2Y j	(y)j = 1,
2.
P
y2Y 	(y)f(y)   W  j
P
y2Y 	(y)S(y)j >  for every S  [d];jSj  t.
Proof. By deﬁnition, deg(;W)(f)  t if and only if 9(S)S[d];jSjt :
X
S[d];jSjt
jSj  W; and
     
f(y)  
X
S[d];jSjt
SS(y)
     
  8 y 2 Y:
By Farkas’ lemma, deg(;W)(f)  t if and only if @ 	 : Y ! R such that
1
W
X
y2Y
(f(y)	(y)   j	(y)j) >
    
X
y2Y
S(y)	(y)
    
8 S  [d];jSj  t:
The dual witness that we construct to prove Theorem 6.16 is obtained by combining a dual
witness for the large non-constant margin weight of the inner function with a dual witness for the
large approximate degree for the outer function. The duality conditions for these are given below.
The proof of the duality condition for the case of -approximate degree is well-known, and we
omit the proof for brevity (see e.g. [83, 92, 20]).
122Theorem 6.19 (Duality Theorem for -approximate degree). Fix   0 and let f : Y ! f 1;1g
be given, where Y  Rd is a ﬁnite set. Then, deg(f)  t + 1 if and only if there exists a function
  : Y ! R such that
1.
P
y2Y j (y)j = 1,
2.
P
y2Y  (y)p(y) = 0 for every polynomial p of degree at most d, and
3.
P
y2Y  (y)f(y) > .
Theorem 6.20 (Duality Theorem for non-constant margin weight). Let Y  Rd be a ﬁnite set, let
f : Y ! f1; 1g be a given function and w > 0. The non-constant margin weight w(f;t)  w if
and only if there exists a distribution  : Y ! [0;1] such that
1.
P
y2Y (y)f(y) = 0
2.
  
P
y2Y (y)f(y)S(y)
    1
w for every S  [d], jSj  t.
Proof. Let S = fS  [d] : jSj  tg, S = S n f;g. By deﬁnition, w(f;t) is expressed by the
following linear program:
min
X
S2S
jSj
f(y)
X
S2S
SS(y)  1 8 y 2 Y:
The above linear program can be restated as follows:
min
X
S2S
S
S + S  0 8 S 2 S;
S   S  0 8 S 2 S;
f(y)
X
S2S
SS(y)  1 8 y 2 Y; and
S  0 8 S 2 S:
123The dual program is expressed below:
max
X
y
(y)
u1(S) + u2(S)  1 8 S 2 S;
X
y2Y
(y)f(y)S(y) + u1(S)   u2(S) = 0 8 S 2 S;
X
y2Y
(y)f(y) = 0;
(y)  0 8 y 2 Y; u1(S);u2(S)  0 8 S 2 S:
By standard manipulations, the above dual program is equivalent to
max
X
y
(y)
j
X
y2Y
(y)S(y)f(y)j  1 8 S 2 S
X
y2Y
(y)f(y) = 0;
(y)  0 8 y 2 Y
Finally, given a distribution 0 satisfying the hypothesis of the theorem, one can obtain a dual
solution  to show that w(f;t)  w with the choice w 1 = maxS2S j
P
y2Y 0(y)S(y)f(y)j,
(y) = w0(y) 8 y 2 Y . In the other direction, if w(f;t)  w, then we have a dual solu-
tion  satisfying the above dual program such that
P
y2Y (y) = w(f;t). By setting 0(y) =
(y)=w(f;t) 8 y 2 Y , we obtain the desired distribution.
6.5.2 Proof of Theorem 6.16
Our approach to exhibiting a dual witness as per Theorem 6.18 is to build a dual witness by
appropriately combining the dual witnesses for the “hardness” of the inner and outer functions.
Our method of combining the dual witnesses is inspired by the technique of [82, Theorem 3.7].
Proof of Theorem 6.16. Let w = w(fjH;t). We will exhibit a dual witness function 	 : Y ! R
corresponding to Theorem 6.18 for the speciﬁed choice of degree and weight. For y 2 Y k, let Yi =
124(y(i 1)(d=k)+1;:::;yid=k). By Theorem 6.20, we know that there exists a distribution  : H ! R
such that
X
y2H
(y)f(y) = 0; (6.1)
 
  
X
y2H
(y)f(y)S(y)
 
  

1
w
8 S 

d
k

;jSj  t (6.2)
We set (y) = 0 for y 2 Y n H.
Since deg2(F) = D, by Theorem 6.19, we know that there exists a function   : f 1;1gk ! R
such that
X
x2f 1;1gk
j (x)j = 1; (6.3)
X
x2f 1;1gk
 (x)p(x) = 0 for every polynomial p of degree at most D, and (6.4)
X
x2f 1;1gk
 (x)F(x) > 2: (6.5)
Consider the function 	 : Y k ! R deﬁned as 	(y) = 2k (f(Y1);:::;f(Yk))
Qk
i=1 (Yi). By
the hypothesis of the theorem, we know that if (Y1;:::;Yk) 2 Y k n Y, then there exists i 2 [k]
such that Yi 2 Y n H and hence (Yi) = 0 and therefore 	(Y1;:::;Yk) = 0.
1.
X
y2Y
j	(y)j =
X
y2Y
2
kj (f(Y1);:::;f(Yk))j
k Y
i=1
(Yi)
= 2
kEy(j (f(Y1);:::;f(Yk))j)
where y   denotes y chosen from the product distribution  : Y k ! [0;1] deﬁned
by (y) =
Q
i2[k] (Yi). Since
P
y2Y (y)f(y) = 0, it follows that if Yi is chosen with
probability (Yi), then f(Yi) is uniformly distributed in f 1;1g. Consequently,
X
y2Y
j	(y)j = 2
kEzUf 1;1gk(j (z1;:::;zk)j) = 1:
The last equality is by using (6.3).
1252. By the same reasoning as above, it follows from (6.5) that
X
y2Y
	(y)G(y) =
X
z2f 1;1gk
 (z)F(z) > 2:
3. Fix a subset S  [d] of size at most tD=2. Let Si = S \ f(i   1)(d=k) + 1;:::;id=kg for
each i 2 [k]. Consequently, S(y) =
Qk
i=1 Si(Yi).
Now using the Fourier coefﬁcients b  (T) of the function  , we can express
 (z1;:::;zk) =
X
T[k]
b  (T)
Y
i2T
zi =
X
T[k];
jTjD
b  (T)
Y
i2T
zi
since b  (T) = 0 if jTj < D by (6.4). Hence,
	(y) = 2
k X
T[k];
jTjD
b  (T)
Y
i2T
f(Yi)(Yi) 
Y
i2[k]nT
(Yi)
Therefore,
P
y2Y 	(y)S(y)
=
X
y2Y
	(y)
Y
i2[k]
Si(Yi)
= 2
k X
y2Y
0
B B
@
X
T[k];
jTjD
b  (T)
Y
i2T
f(Yi)(Yi) 
Y
i2[k]nT
(Yi)
1
C C
A
Y
i2[k]
Si(Yi)
= 2
k X
T[k];
jTjD
b  (T)
X
y2Y
0
@
Y
i2T
f(Yi)(Yi) 
Y
i2[k]nT
(Yi)
Y
i2[k]
Si(Yi)
1
A
= 2
k X
T[k];
jTjD
b  (T)
X
Y1;:::;Yk2H
0
@
Y
i2T
f(Yi)(Yi)Si(Yi) 
Y
i2[k]nT
(Yi)Si(Yi)
1
A:
Rearranging, we have
P
y2Y 	(y)S(y) =
2
k X
T[k];
jTjD
b  (T)
Y
i2T
 
X
Yi2H
f(Yi)(Yi)Si(Yi)
!
Y
i2[k]nT
 
X
Yi2H
(Yi)Si(Yi)
!
: (6.6)
126Now, we will bound each product term in the outer sum by w D=2. We ﬁrst observe that for
every i 2 [k],
X
x2H
(x)Si(x) 
X
x2H
(x) = 1:
If jSij  t, by (6.2)     
X
x2H
f(x)(x)Si(x)
    

1
w
:
If jSij > t, then     
X
x2H
f(x)(x)Si(x)
    

X
x2H
(x) = 1:
Since
Pk
i=1 jSij  tD=2, it follows that jSij  t for more than k   D=2 indices i 2 [k].
Thus, for each T  [k] such that jTj  D, there are at least D=2 indices i 2 T such that
jSij  t. Hence,
    
X
y2Y
	(y)S(y)
    
 2
kw
  D
2
X
T[k];
jTjD
  b  (T)
    2
kw
  D
2 :
Here, the last inequality is because jb  (T)j  2 k from (6.3).
From 1, 2 and 3, we have
X
y2Y
	(y)G(y)   W max
S[d];jSj tD
2
 
  
X
y2Y
	(y)S(y)
 
  
> 
if W  2 kwD=2.
We now derive Corollary 6.17. We need the following theorems on the approximate degree and
the non-constant margin weight of the ORd function.
Theorem 6.21 (Approximate degree of ORd). [72] deg1=3(ORd) = (
p
d).
Lemma 6.22 (Non-constant margin weight of ORd). w(ORdjHd;1;t)  d=t:
Proof. The function
(x) =
(
1=2 if x = (1;:::;1);
1=2d if x 2 Hd;1 n f(1;:::;1)g:
acts as the dual witness in Theorem 6.20.
127Proof of Corollary 6.17. We use Theorem 6.16 in the following setting. Let Y = f 1;1gd=k, the
inner function f : Y ! f 1;1g be ORd=k and the outer function F : f 1;1gk ! f 1;1g be ORk,
Y = Hd;k and H = Hd=k;1. By a simple counting argument, if (Y1;:::;Yk) 2 f 1;1gdnHd;k, then
there exists i 2 [k] such that Yi 2 f 1;1gd=k n Hd=k;1. Further, by Theorem 6.21, we know that
deg1=3(F) = (
p
k) and by Claim 6.22, we know that w(fjH;t)  d=kt. Therefore, by Theorem
6.16, we have that, for every t 2 Z+,
deg1=6;W(ORdjHd;k) = 


t
p
k

for every W 
1
6
2
 k

d
kt
C
p
k
:
We obtain the conclusion by taking t = b(d=k)(6W2k) 1=C
p
kc.
128Chapter 7
New Analyst-Private Algorithms
7.1 Introduction
Consider a tracking network that wants to sell a database of consumer data to several compet-
ing analysts conducting market research. The administrator of the tracking network faces many
opposing constraints when deciding how to provide analysts with this data. The focus of research
on differential privacy has been to resolve the dilemma between providing privacy for the data
subjects (the consumers in this example) and utility for the data analysts. But the administrator
faces another concern—how to provide privacy for the data analysts, namely hiding their queries
from other data analysts. Indeed, the most interesting databases are going to be analyzed by several
competing ﬁrms, who will be unwilling to risk disclosing their proprietary strategies.
To address this concern, Dwork, Naor, and Vadhan [33] introduced the notion of analyst dif-
ferential privacy. First, they demonstrated that this concern is valid by showing that any stateless
sanitizer that answers each query without consideration of the other queries can answer at most
e O(n2) queries with non-trivial accuracy.15 This result essentially rules out sanitizers that answer
a large number of queries while ensuring perfect analyst privacy.16 Fortunately, they were able to
construct a sanitizer that provides a differential-privacy-like guarantee of privacy for the analysts.
15The Laplace mechanism is a stateless sanitizer—it adds independent noise to each answer—and answers e 
(n2)
queries with non-trivial accuracy (Lemma 2.9).
16Onecanconstructasanitizerthatisnotstatelessbutdoesensureperfectanalystprivacy. Howeverwearenotaware
of any construction that answers more than e O(n2) queries, and conjecture that (non-stateless) sanitizers satisfying
perfect analyst privacy can answer at most e O(n2) queries.
129In particular, Dwork et al. [33] design a sanitizer with the guarantee that the marginal distribu-
tion on answers given to each analyst does not depend signiﬁcantly on the set of queries asked
by all the other analysts. This sanitizer answers a set of counting queries Q on f0;1gd with error
poly(d;logjQj)=n1=4, and thus can answer exponentially many queries (i.e. jQj = 2n
(1)) with
non-trivial accuracy.
However, as they note, their sanitizer has several shortcomings. First, it does not promise
differential privacy for the joint distribution on answers given to multiple analysts. Therefore, if
multiple analysts collude, or if a single malicious analyst interacts with the sanitizer under several
identities, then the sanitizer no longer guarantees analyst privacy. Second, their sanitizer achieves
a weaker level of accuracy than sanitizers without guarantees of analyst privacy, such as the private
multiplicative weights mechanism (Lemma 2.16). That is, analyst privacy is achieved at a cost
to accuracy, and it is unknown if this cost is inherent. Finally, their sanitizer can only answer
linear queries, rather than arbitrary low-sensitivity queries. See Lemma 2.9 and the surrounding
material for the deﬁnition of low-sensitivity and results about the Laplace mechanism for arbitrary
low-sensitivity queries. Although we have focused on counting queries in this thesis, algorithms
similar to the private multiplicative weights algorithm are capable of answering an exponential
number of arbitrary low-sensitivity queries with non-trivial accuracy.
In this chapter, we design new analyst-private sanitizers that fully or partially address all of
these issues. First, we consider sanitizers that guarantee one-query-to-many-analyst privacy—for
each analyst a, the joint distribution over answers given to all other analysts a0 6= a is differentially
private with respect to the change of a single query asked by analyst a. This privacy guarantee is
incomparabletotheoneconsideredbyDwork, etal. [33]; itisweaker, inthatweprotecttheprivacy
of only a single query asked by a single analyst (rather than protecting the privacy of all queries
asked by multiple analysts), but stronger, in that it protects the privacy of one query against all
other analysts, even if they collude (rather than protecting against only a single malicious analyst).
Our ﬁrst result is a sanitizer achieving this notion of analyst privacy, that answers counting queries
with error poly(d;logjQj)=
p
n. This dependence on n is optimal up to polylog(n) factors, even
when comparing to sanitizers that only guarantee data privacy.
Our next result is a variant of the ﬁrst sanitizer that achieves one-analyst-to-many-analyst
privacy—the sanitizer preserves the privacy of every query made by a single analyst, even if all
other analysts collude. This sanitizer answers counting queries with error poly(d;logjQj)=n1=3.
130Unfortunately in this setting we don’t know how to achieve error approaching 1=
p
n, or whether
such error is possible under this privacy deﬁnition.
These sanitizers operate in the ofﬂine setting, which is the setting we established in Chapter 2
and have used throughout this thesis. Although we have not discussed the online setting in this
thesis, algorithms such as private multiplicative weights are capable of answering an exponen-
tial number of queries, even if those queries arrive one at a time, and each query must be accu-
rately answered before seeing the remaining queries. Our ﬁnal result is a sanitizer that satisﬁes
one-query-to-many-analyst privacy and answers counting queries with error poly(d;logjQj)=n2=5.
This sanitizer also admits a natural extension to answering arbitrary low-sensitivity queries, and
can answer arbitrary (1=n)-sensitive queries with error poly(d;logjQj)=n1=10. We remark that our
online algorithms are capable of answering a long ﬁxed sequence of queries, but these queries need
not be speciﬁed in advance. Most online sanitizers without analyst privacy are capable of answer-
ing a long adaptively chosen sequence of queries, but we do not know how to achieve this property
under the constraint of analyst privacy.
When answering k counting queries on a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n all of our algorithms run in
time e O(n(2d+k)). Aswe’veshowninTheorem3.1, assumingtheexistenceofone-wayfunctions,
this running time cannot be improved to poly(n;d;k) since these algorithms are sanitizers that
accurately answer n2+o(1) arbitrary counting queries.
7.1.1 Our Techniques
To prove our results, we take a novel view of private query release as a two player zero-sum
game between a data player and a query player. For each element of the data universe x 2 f0;1gd,
the data player has an action ax. Recall that a database can be viewed as a probability distribution
over the data universe, and that a distribution over the data universe can be viewed as a database
consisting of “fractional rows,” or alternatively a database of inﬁnite size, and this interpretation
is equivalent for the purpose of counting queries. Thus a mixed strategy for the data player can be
interpreted as such a database. The goal of the data player is to choose a database that approximates
the input database D well.
Given a set of queries Q, we give the query player two actions for each q 2 Q, aq and a:q.
The query player tries to play queries for which the data player’s approximation to the database
performspoorly. Thetwoactionsforeachqueryallowthequeryplayertopenalizethedataplayer’s
131approximationbothwhentheapproximateanswertoq istoohigh, andwhenitistoolow. Formally,
we deﬁne the cost matrix by
GD;Q(aq;ax) = q(x)   q(D) GD;Q(a:q;ax) = q(D)   q(x):
The query player wishes to maximize the cost, whereas the database player wishes to minimize the
cost. We show that the value of this game is 0, and that for any pair of -approximate equilibrium
strategies, the strategy of the data player corresponds to a synthetic database that answers every
query q 2 Q correctly up to additive error O().
Different privacy constraints for the private query release problem can be mapped into privacy
constraints for solving two-player zero-sum games by deﬁning different notions of adjacency be-
tween two cost matrices G;G0. If we consider the standard problem of privately answering a set of
counting queries Q, then we want to deﬁne G and G0 to be adjacent if they differ by at most 1=n
in every entry, as this is the type of change to G that can arise from changing one row of the input
database.
If we consider one-query-to-many-analyst privacy, then we want to deﬁne G and G0 to be
adjacent if they differ arbitrarily on at most two rows of the game matrix, as this is the type of
change that can arise if we change one of the input queries in Q. Our main result can be viewed
as an algorithm for privately computing an approximate equilibrium of a zero-sum game while
protecting the privacy of a two rows in the cost matrix.
To construct an approximate equilibrium, we use a well-known result: when each of the two
players in a zero-sum game choose their actions using no-regret algorithms, the empirical distri-
bution of play quickly converges to a pair of approximate equilibrium strategies. When we say
that a player uses a no-regret algorithm, we mean she has an algorithm that observes the actions
of the opposing player and chooses her actions to ensure she cannot achieve a signiﬁcantly higher
payoff in hindsight by playing any single action (or, equivalently, by playing a random choice from
a single distribution on actions) at every turn. Thus, to compute an equilibrium of G, we have the
query player and the data player play against each other using no-regret algorithms, and output the
empirical play distribution of the data player as the synthetic database. We can now discuss the
challenges in converting this approach into a differentially private algorithm.
The ﬁrst problem is that the distribution on actions computed by the no-regret algorithm will
not be privacy-preserving on its own, as it necessarily depends on the cost matrix. In previous
approach to privately answering counting queries such as [78, 44, 42, 50], which are also based
132on no-regret algorithms, privacy has been achieved by perturbing the inputs to the no-regret algo-
rithm. Unfortunately, when the inputs contain information about the queries that we now consider
sensitive information, there does not appear to be a natural way to perturb the inputs that maintains
convergence.
To circumvent this problem, we use the additional structure of a particular no-regret algorithm,
the multiplicative weights algorithm. We crucially rely on the fact that sampling actions from the
distributions maintained by the multiplicative weights algorithm is privacy preserving. Intuitively,
privacy will come from the fact that the multiplicative weights algorithm does not adjust the weight
on any action too aggressively, meaning that when we view the weights as deﬁning a distribution
over actions, changing the losses experienced by the algorithm in various ways will have a lim-
ited effect on the distribution over actions. We note that this property is not used in the private
multiplicative weights mechanism of Hardt and Rothblum [44], who use the distribution itself as
a hypothesis. Indeed, without the constraint of query privacy, any no-regret algorithm can be used
in place of multiplicative weights [78, 42], which is not the case in our setting. Dwork, Rothblum,
and Vadhan [35] used the multiplicative weights algorithm in a similar way in their “private boost-
ing algorithm,” however they needed to use a modiﬁed form of multiplicative weights for their
results. Our techniques can be seen a generalization of their approach.
The second problem is that sampling from the multiplicative weights algorithm only guarantees
privacy with respect to a small number of its inputs, which in this case will be the queries chosen
by the query player. If the query player chooses the same action repeatedly, then altering one of
the input queries could change a large number of inputs to the multiplicative weights algorithm.
Intuitively, we must ensure that changing one query from one analyst does not affect the costs
experienced by the data player too dramatically. To this end, we force the query player to play
mixed strategies from the set of smooth distributions, which do not place too much weight on any
single action. It is known that playing any no-regret algorithm, but projecting into the set of smooth
distributions in the appropriate way (via a Bregman projection), will ensure no-regret with respect
to any smooth distribution on actions. For comparison, no-regret is typically deﬁned with respect
to the best single action, which is a not a smooth distribution on actions. This technique of using
smooth distributions was inspired by the work of Barak, Hardt, and Kale [10], and was also used
in the results of Dwork et al. [35] on private boosting.
Onceweconstrainthequeryplayertothesetofsmoothstrategies, weobtainsomethingslightly
133weaker than a pair of approximate equilibrium strategies. However, we do obtain a mixed strategy
for the data player that ensures a cost no worse than the value of the game as long as the query
player does not choose an action from some set of at-most s actions, where 1=s is the maximum
probability the query player was allowed to place on any single strategy. Moving back to our
original goal of answering counting queries, the data player’s mixed strategy corresponds to a
synthetic database that answers all but s queries accurately, and we release this synthetic database
to all analysts. Now, the last step in our algorithm is a cleanup phase, in which we identify and
answer each of the remaining s queries. Since we will chose s to be small, in fact s = O(n), we
will be able to identify all of the remaining queries using the sparse vector technique, and then
answer each one with Laplacian noise of magnitude e O(
p
s=n) = e O(1=
p
n). The result is a nearly
optimal error rate of poly(d;logjQj)=
p
n.
This approach natural extends to the setting of one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy by giving
the query player one action for each analyst. Here, we will design the cost matrix so that the query
player is rewarded for ﬁnding an analyst such that at least one query issued by that analyst is not
answered well. As before, we will compute a synthetic database that answers the queries of most
analysts accurately, and we will have a cleanup phase in which we accurately answer the queries
for the small number of remaining analysts.
Finally, in Section 7.6 we use these techniques to convert the private multiplicative weights
algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [44] into an online algorithm that preserves one-query-to-many-
analyst privacy, and also answers arbitrary low-sensitivity queries. This algorithm does not directly
use the zero-sum game perspective, but does crucially make use of the technique of sampling from
the mixed strategy maintained by the multiplicative weights algorithm.
7.2 Preliminaries
The notation we use in this chapter differs slightly from what we have used in Chapters 3-
6. These changes are made primarily to improve the clarity of the results by maintaining a clear
notational hierarchy. To this end, we will often use X = f0;1gd to denote the data universe. Addi-
tionally, in this algorithm we only consider sanitizers (as opposed to one-shot sanitizers) that take
arbitrary counting queries as input, thus we will use the calligraphic Q to refer to the set of input
queries and (infrequently) use bold Q to refer to the set of allowable queries. For comparison, in
134the previous chapters we typically used capital Q to denote the set of input queries and calligraphic
Q to refer to the set of allowable queries.
7.2.1 Deﬁnitions of Analyst Differential Privacy
To deﬁne analyst privacy, we ﬁrst deﬁne many-analyst sanitizers. Let Q be the set of all
counting queries. We will assume there are m analysts and will use I = [m] to denote the set
of analysts. The input to the sanitizer is a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n and m sets of k queries,
Q1;:::;Qm 2 Qk. The assumption that each set contains exactly k queries is for convenience,
and has no bearing on the results. The sanitizer returns a sequence A1;:::;Am 2 Rk, where each
set Aid is understood to be a sequence of answers to the queries asked by some analyst id 2 I.
Thus, a many-analyst sanitizer has the form M: (f0;1gd)n  (Qk)m ! (Rk)m. For each id 2 I
we write M(D;Q) id to denote (A1;:::;Aid 1;Aid+1;:::;Am), the output given to all analysts
other than id.
Let Q = Q1;:::;Qm and Q = Q0
1;:::;Q0
m. We say that Q and Q0 are analyst-adjacent if
there exists id
 2 I such that for every id 6= id
, Qid = Q0
id. That is, Q and Q0 are analyst adjacent
if they differ only on the queries asked by one analyst. Intuitively, a sanitizer satisﬁes one-analyst-
to-many-analyst privacy if changing all the queries asked by analyst id
 does not signiﬁcantly
affect the output given to all analysts other than id
.
Deﬁnition 7.1. A many-analyst sanitizer M: (f0;1gd)n  (Qk)m ! (Rk)m satisﬁes (";)-one-
analyst-to-many-analyst privacy if for every database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, every two analyst-adjacent
query sequences Q;Q0 that differ only on one set of queries Qid;Q0
id, and every S  (Rk)m 1,
Pr[M(D;Q) id 2 S]  e
"Pr[M(D;Q
0) id 2 S] + :
Let Q = Q1;:::;Qm and Q0 = Q0
1;:::;Q0
m. We say that Q and Q0 are query-adjacent if there
exists id
 2 I such that for every id 6= id
, Qid = Q0
id and jQid4Q0
idj  1. That is, Q;Q0 are
query adjacent if they differ only on a single query asked by some analyst id
. Intuitively, we say
that a sanitizer satisﬁes one-query-to-many-analyst privacy if changing one query asked by analyst
id
 does not signiﬁcantly affect the output given to all analysts other than id
.
Deﬁnition 7.2. A many-analyst sanitizer M: (f0;1gd)n  (Qk)m ! (Rk)m satisﬁes (";)-one-
query-to-many-analyst privacy if for every database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, every two query-adjacent
135query sequences Q;Q0 that differ only on one query asked by analyst id
, and every S  (Rk)m 1,
Pr[M(D;Q) id 2 S]  e
"Pr[M(D;Q
0) id 2 S] + :
7.3 Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
7.3.1 (Non-Private) Multiplicative Weights
Let A: A ! [0;1] be a measure over a set of actions A. We use jAj =
P
a2A A(a) to denote
the density of A. A measure naturally corresponds to a probability distribution e A in which
Pr
h
e A = a
i
= A(a)=jAj
for every a 2 A. Throughout, we will use calligraphic letters (A) to denote a set of actions, lower
caseletters(a)todenotetheactions, capitalletters(A)todenoteameasureoveractions, andcapital
letters with a tilde to denote the corresponding distributions ( e A). We will use the KL-divergence
between two distributions, deﬁned to be
KL( e Ajj e A
0) =
X
a2A
e A(a)log

e A(a)= e A
0(a)

:
Let L: A ! [0;1] be a loss function (losses L). Abusing notation, we can deﬁne L(A) =
E
h
L( e A)
i
: Given an initial measure A1, we can deﬁne the multiplicative weights algorithm in
Figure 16.
For t = 1;2;:::;T:
Sample at  R e At
Receive losses Lt (may depend on A1;a1;:::;At 1;at 1)
Update:
For: each a 2 A:
Let At+1(a) = e Lt(a)At(a) for every a 2 A
Figure 16: The Multiplicative Weights Algorithm, MW
The following theorem about the multiplicative weights update is well-known.
136Theorem 7.3 (Multiplicative Weights. See e.g. [74]). Let A1 be the uniform measure of density 1,
and let fa1;:::;aTg be the actions obtained by MW with losses fL1;:::;Ltg. Let A = 1a=a,
for some a 2 A, and  2 (0;1]. Then with probability at least 1   ,
E
t R[T]
[Lt(at)]  (1 + ) E
t R[T]
[Lt(A
)] +
KL( e Ajj e A1)
T
+
4log(1=)
p
T
 E
t R[T]
[Lt(A
)] +  +
logjAj
T
+
4log(1=)
p
T
:
We need to work with a variant of multiplicative weights that only produces measures A of high
density, which will imply that e A does not assign too much probability to any single element of A.
To this end, we will apply (a special case of) the Bregman projection to the measures obtained
from the multiplicative weights update rule.
Deﬁnition 7.4. Let s 2 (0;U]. Given a measure A such that jAj  s, let  sA be the (Bregman)
projection of A into the set of density-s measures, obtained by computing c  1 such that s =
P
a2A minf1;cA(a)g and setting  A(a) = minf1;cM(a)g for every a 2 A. We call s is the
density of measure A.
For t = 1;2;:::;T:
Let A0
t =  sAt, and sample at  R e A0
t
Receive losses Lt (may depend on A1;a1;:::;At 1;at 1)
Update:
For each a 2 A:
Let At+1(a) = e Lt(a)At(a)
Figure 17: The Dense Multiplicative Weights Algorithm, DMWs;
Given an initial measure A1 such that jA1j  s, we can deﬁne the dense multiplicative weights
algorithm in Figure 17. Note that we update the unprojected measure At, but sample at using the
projected measure  sAt. Observe that the update step can only decrease the density, so we will
have jAtj  s for every t. Like before, given a sequence of losses fL1;:::;LTg and an initial
measure A1 of density s, we can consider the sequence fA1;:::;ATg where At+1 is given by the
projected multiplicative weights update applied to At;Lt. The following theorem is known.
137Theorem 7.5. Let A1 be the uniform measure of density 1 and let fa1;:::;aTg be the sequence of
measures obtained by DMWs; with losses fL1;:::;LTg. Let A = 1a2S for some set S  A
of size s, and  2 (0;1]. Then with probability 1   ,
E
t R[T]
[Lt( At)]  (1 + ) E
t R[T]
[Lt(A
)] +
KL( e Ajj e A1)
T
+
4log(1=)
p
T
 E
t R[T]
[Lt(A
)] +  +
logjAj
T
+
4log(1=)
p
T
:
7.3.2 Regret Minimization and Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
Let G: AR  AC ! [0;1] be the cost-matrix for a two-player zero-sum game between two
players, (R)ow and (C)olumn, who take actions r 2 AR and c 2 AC and receive losses G(r;c)
and  G(r;c), respectively. Let (AR);(AC) be the set of measures over actions in AR and AC,
respectively. The well-known minimax theorem states that
v := min
R2(AR)
max
C2(AC)
G(R;C) = max
C2(AC)
min
R2(AR)
G(R;C):
We deﬁne this quantity v to be the value of the game.
Freund and Schapire [39] showed that if two sequences of actions fr1;:::;rTg;fc1;:::;cTg
are “no-regret with respect to one another”, then e r = 1
T
PT
t=1 rt and e c = 1
T
PT
t=1 ct form an
approximate equilibrium strategy pair. More formally, if
max
c2AC
E
t [G(rt;c)]     E
t [G(rt;ct)]  min
r2AR
E
t [G(r;ct)] + ;
then
v   2  G(e r;e c)  v + 2:
Thus, if Row chooses actions using the multiplicative weights update rule with losses Lt(rt) =
G(rt;ct) and Column chooses actions using the multiplicative weights rule with losses Lt(rt) =
 G(rt;ct), then each player’s distribution on actions converges to a minimax strategy. That is, if
we play until both players have regret at most :
max
c G(e r;c)  v + 2 v   2  min
r G(r;e c):
For query privacy in our view of query release as a two player game, Column must not put
too much weight on any single query. Thus, we need an analogue of this result in the case where
138Column is not choosing actions according to the multiplicative weights update, but rather using
the projected multiplicative weights update. In this case we cannot hope to obtain an approximate
minimax strategy, since Column cannot play any single action with signiﬁcant probability. How-
ever, we can deﬁne an alternative notion of the value of a game where Column is restricted in this
way: let s(AC) be the set of measures over AC of minimum density at least s, and deﬁne
vs := min
R2(AR)
max
C2s(AC)
G(R;C):
Notice that vs  v, and vs can be very different from v.
Theorem 7.6. Let fr1;:::;rTg 2 AR be a sequence of row-player actions, fC1;:::;CTg 2
s(AC) be a sequence of high-density measures over column-player actions, and fc1;:::;cTg 2
AC be a sequence of column-player actions such that cj  R Cj for every t 2 [T]. Further, suppose
that
E
t [G(rt;ct)]  min
R2(AR)
E
t [G(R;ct)] +  and E
t [G(rt;ct)]  max
C2s(AC)
E
t [G(rt;C)]   :
Then,
vs   2  G(e r;e c)  v + 2:
Moreover, e r is an approximate min-max strategy with respect to strategies in s(AC), i.e.,
vs   2  max
C2s(AC)
G(e r;C)  v + 2:
Proof. For the ﬁrst set of inequalities, we handle each part separately. For one direction,
vs = min
R2(AR)
max
C2s(AC)
G(R;C)
 max
C2s(AC)
E
t [G(rt;C)]  E
t [G(rt;ct)] + 
 min
R2(AR)
E
t [G(R;ct)] + 2 = min
R2(AR)
G(R;e c) + 2
 G(e r;e c) + 2:
The other direction is similar, starting with the fact that v = maxc2C minr2R G(r;c).
For the second set of inequalities, we also handle the two cases separately. For the upper bound,
max
C2s(AC)
E
t [G(e r;C)]  E
t [G(rt;ct)] + 
 min
R2(AR)
E
t [G(R;ct)] + 2 = min
R2(AR)
G(R;e c) + 2
 v + 2:
139For the lower bound,
max
C2s(AC)
G(e r;C)  E
t [G(e r;e c)]  vs   2
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 7.7. Let G: AR  AC ! [0;1]. If the row player chooses a sequence of actions
fr1;:::;rTg by running MW with loss functions Lt(r) = G(r;ct) and the column player chooses
a sequence of actions fc1;:::;cTg by running DMWs; with the loss functions Lt(c) =  G(rt;c),
then with probability at least 1   ,
vs   2  max
c2Cs
G(e r;c)  v + 2;
for
 =  +
maxflogjARj;logjACjg
T
+
4log(2=)
p
T
:
7.4 A One-Query-to-Many-Analyst Private Sanitizer
Wespecifyournewsanitizerachievingone-query-to-many-analystprivacyinFigure18. Recall
that we use X = f0;1gd to specify the algorithm.
7.4.1 Accuracy
Theorem 7.8. The algorithm in Figure 18 is (;)-accurate for
 = O
 p
log(2d + 2km)log(1=)log(2km=)
"
p
n
!
:
Proof. Observe that the algorithm computes an approximate equilibrium of the game GD(x;q) =
1+q(D) q(x)
2 . Let v;vs be the value and constrained value of this game, respectively. First, we pin
down the quantities v and vs.
Claim 7.9. For every D, the value and constrained value of GD is 1=2.
Proof of Claim 7.9. It’s clear that the value (and hence constrained value) is at most 1=2, because
min
x max
q
1 + q(D)   q(x)
2
 max
q
1 + q(D)   q(D)
2
=
1
2
:
140Input: Database D 2 X n and m sets of k counting queries Q1;:::;Qm.
Initialize: Let Q =
S
id2[m] Qid [ :Qid, let D0(x) = 1=jXj for every x 2 X, and let
Q0(q) = 1=jQj for every q 2 Q,
T = n  maxflogjXj;logjQjg;  =
"
4
p
T log(1=)
; s = 12T
For: t = 1;:::;T
DataPlayer:
On input a query b qt, for each x 2 X:
Update Dt(x) = Dt 1(x)  exp

 

1+b qt(D) b qt(x)
2

Choose b xt  R e Dt and send b xt to QueryPlayer
(Recall that, Dt is a measure and e Dt the distribution corresponding to that measure.)
QueryPlayer:
On input a data element b xt, for each q 2 Q:
Update Qt+1(q) = Qt(q)  exp

 

1+q(D) q(b xt)
2

Let Pt+1 =  sQt+1
Choose b qt+1  R e Pt+1 and send b qt+1 to DataPlayer
(Recall that, Pt+1 is a measure and e Pt+1 the corresponding distribution.)
End For:
GenerateSynopsis:
Let b D = (b x1;:::;b xT) be a synthetic database.
For a parameter  b D > 0 to be chosen later, run the sparse vector algorithm on the set
of queries F =
n
fq(D) = jq(D)   q(b D) j q 2 Q
o
to obtain 3s queries Qﬁnal  Q.
Run Laplace mechanism MLap()(D;Qﬁnal) to obtain an answer aq for each q 2 Qﬁnal
Output b D to all analysts and, for each q 2 Qﬁnal, output (q;aq) to the appropriate analyst.
Figure 18: A One-Query-to-Many-Analyst Private Sanitizer
141Suppose we choose x such that (1+q(D) q(x))=2 < 1=2 for some q 2 Q. Then, since the query
q0 = 1 q is also in Q, (1+q0(D) q0(x))=2 > 1=2. But then maxq2Q(1+q(D) q(x))=2 > 1=2,
so the value of the game is at least 1=2.
For the constrained value, suppose we choose x such that Eq RQ [(1 + q(D)   q(x))=2] < 1=2
for some s-smooth distribution on queries Q. Then we can ﬂip the output of every query in Q to
get a new distribution Q0 such that Eq RQ0 [(1 + q(D)   q(x))=2] > 1=2. So vs  1=2 as well.
Let b D = 1
T
PT
t=1 xt. By Corollary 7.7,
vs   2  max
Q2s(Q)

1
2
E
q R e Q
h
1 + q(D)   q(b D)
i
 v + 2:
Applying Claim 7.9 and rearranging terms, with probability at least 1   =3,
  
 max
Q2s(Q)

E
q R e Q
h
q(D)   q(b D)
i    = max
Q2s(Q)

E
q R e Q
h
 q(D)   q(b D)

 
i
 4
= 4

 +
maxflogjXj;logjQjg
T
+
4log(2=)
p
T

= O
 p
log(jXj + jQj)log(1=) + log(1=)
"
p
n
!
:=  b D:
The previous statement sufﬁces to show that jq(D)   q(e D)j   b D for all but s queries. Other-
wise, the uniform distribution over the bad queries would be a distribution over queries contained
in s(Q), with expected error larger than  b D.
We can now run the sparse vector algorithm (Lemma 2.11). With probability at least 1   =3,
it will identify every query q with error larger than  b D + SV for
SV = O
 p
slog(1=)log(Q=)
"n
!
:
Since there are at most s such queries, with probability at least 1   =3, the Laplace mechanism
(Lemma 2.11) answers these queries to within error
Lap = O
 p
slog(1=)log(s=)
"n
!
:
Now, observe that in the ﬁnal output, there are two ways that a query can be answered: either by b D,
inwhichcaseitsanswercanhaveerroraslargeas b D+SV, orbytheLaplacemechanism, inwhich
142case its answer can have error as large as Lap. Thus, with probability at least 1 , every query has
error at most maxf b D +SV;Lapg. Substituting our choice of s = 12T = O(nlog(jXj+jQj))
and simplifying, we conclude that the sanitizer is (;)-accurate for
 = O
 p
log(jXj + jQj)log(1=)log(jQj=)
"
p
n
!
:
7.4.2 Data Privacy
Theorem 7.10. The algorithm in Figure 18 satisﬁes (";)-differential privacy for the database.
Before proving the theorem, we will state a useful lemma about the Bregman projection onto
the set of high density measures (Deﬁnition 7.4).
Lemma 7.11 (Projection Preserves Differential Privacy). Let A0;A1: A ! [0;1] be two full-
support measures over a set of actions A and s 2 (0;jAj) be such that jA0j;jA1j  s and
jln(A0(a)=A1(a))j  " for every a 2 A. Let A0
0 =  sA0 and A0
1 =  sA1. Then we have
that jln(A0
0(a)=A0
1(a))j  2" for every a 2 A.
Proof of Lemma 7.11. Recall that to compute A0 =  sA, we ﬁnd a “scaling factor” c > 1 such that
X
a2A
minf1;cA(a)g = s;
and set A0(a) = minf1;cA(a)g. Let c0 and c1 be the scaling factors for A0
0 and A0
1 respectively.
Assume without loss of generality that c0  c1. First, observe that
   ln

minf1;c0A0(a)g
minf1;c0A1(a)g
    
   ln

A0(a)
A1(a)
     ";
for every a 2 A. Second, we observe that c1=c0  e". If this were not the case, then we would
have c1A1(a)  c0A1(a)e"  c0A0(a) for every a 2 A, with strict inequality for at least one a.
But then,
X
a2A
minf1;c1A1(a)g >
X
a2A
minf1;c0A0(a)g = s;
which would contradict the choice of c1. Thus,
   ln

minf1;c0A0(a)g
minf1;c1A1(a)g
    
   ln

minf1;c0A0(a)g
minf1;c0A1(a)g
    +
   ln

c1
c0
     " + " = 2";
for every a 2 A.
143Now we prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 7.10. We focus on analyzing the privacy properties of the synthetic database
b D = (b x1;:::;b xT), the privacy of the ﬁnal stage of the sanitizer will follow from the privacy
analysis of the sparse vector algorithm and the Laplace mechanism. We will actually show the
stronger guarantee that the sequence v = (b x1; b q1;:::;b xT; b qT) is differentially private for the data.
Fix a pair of adjacent databases D0  D1 and let V0;V1 denote the distribution on sequences v
when the sanitizer is run on database D0;D1 respectively. We will show that with probability at
least 1   =3 over v = (b x1; b q1;:::;b xT; b qT)  R V0,
   ln

V0(v)
V1(v)
    
"
3
;
which is no weaker than ("=3;=3)-differential privacy. To do so, we analyze the privacy of each
element of v, b xt or b qt, and apply the composition analysis of Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan [35].
Deﬁne "0 = 2T=n.
Claim 7.12. For every v, and every t 2 [T],
 
 ln

V0(b xt j b x1; b q1;:::;b xt 1; b qt 1)
V1(b xt j b x1; b q1;:::;b xt 1; b qt 1)
 
   "0:
Proofof Claim 7.12. We can prove the statement by the following direct calculation.
   ln

V0(b xt j b x1; b q1;:::;b xt 1; b qt 1)
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Claim 7.13. For every v, and every t 2 [T],
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144Proof of Claim 7.13. The sample b qt is made according to e Pt, which is the distribution correspond-
ing to the projected measure Pt. First we’ll look at the unprojected measure Qt. Observe that, for
any database D and query q,
Qt(q) = exp
 
 (=2)
t 1 X
j=1
1 + q(D)   q(b xj)
!
:
Thus, if Q0(q) is the measure we would have when database D0 is the input, and Q1(q) is the
measure we would have when database D1 is the input, then
  
ln
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for every q 2 Q. Given that Q0 and Q1 satisfy this condition, Lemma 7.11 guarantees that the
projected measures satisfy  
 ln
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P0(q)
P1(q)
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T
n
:
Finally, we note that if the above condition is satisﬁed for every q 2 Q, then the distributions
f P0;f P1 satisfy   
 
ln
 
e P0(q)
e P1(q)
!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2T
n
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because the value of the normalizer also changes by at most a multiplicative factor of eT=n. We
observe that Vb(b qt j b x1; b q1;:::;b xt) = e Pb(b qt) for b 2 f0;1g, which completes the proof of the
claim.
Now, the composition lemma (Theorem 2.3) (for 2T-fold composition) guarantees that with
probability at least 1   =3,

  ln
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which is at most "=3 by our choice of "0. This implies that b D is ("=3;=3)-differentially private.
We can choose the parameters of the sparse vector computation so that the set of queries Qﬁnal
is ("=3;=3)-differentially private, and we can choose the parameters of the Laplace mechanism
so that the answers to the queries in Qﬁnal are ("=3;=3)-differentially private.
1457.4.3 Analyst Privacy
Theorem 7.14. The algorithm in Figure 18 satisﬁes (";)-one-query-to-many-analyst differential
privacy.
Before query privacy, we will state a useful composition lemma. The lemma is a generalization
of the “secrecy of the sample lemma” [51, 35] to the interactive setting. Consider the following
game:
 Fix an (";)-differentially private algorithm A: U ! R and a bit b 2 f0;1g. Let D0 = ;.
 For t = 1;:::;T:
– The(randomized)adversaryB(y1;:::;yt;r)choosestwodistributionsB0
t;B1
t suchthat
SD(B0
t;B1
t)  .
– Choose xt  R Bb
t and let Dt = Dt 1 [ fxtg.
– Choose yt  R A(Dt).
For a ﬁxed algorithm A and adversary B, let V 0 be the distribution on (y1;:::;yT) when b = 0
and V 1 be the distribution on (y1;:::;yT) when b = 1.
Lemma 7.15. If "  1=2 and T  1=12, then with probability at least 1   T   0 over y =
(y1;:::;yT)  R V 0,
   ln
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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p
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We prove this lemma in Section 7.7.
We also need another lemma about the Bregman projection onto the set of high-density mea-
sures (Deﬁnition 7.4)
Lemma 7.16. Let A0: A ! [0;1] and A1: A [ fag ! [0;1] be two full-support measures over
their respective sets of actions and s 2 (0;jAj) be such that 1) jA0j;jA1j  s and 2) A0(a) =
A1(a) for every a 2 A. Let A0
0 =  sA0 and A0
1 =  sA1. Then SD( e A0
0; e A0
1)  1=s.
Proofof Lemma 7.16. Using the form of the projection (Deﬁnition 7.4), it is not hard to see that for
a 6= a, A0
0(a)  A0
1(a). For convenience, we will write A0
0(a) = 0 even though a is technically
146outside of the domain of A0
0. We can now show the following.
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We also have that jA0
0j = jA0
1j = s, so
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Now we can prove one-query-to-many-analyst privacy.
Proof of Theorem 7.14. Fix a database D. Consider two query-adjacent query sets Q0;Q1 and,
without loss of generality assume Q0 be Q1 with an arbitrary query by some analyst id replaced
with q. We write the output to all analysts as v = (b x1;:::;b xT;b1;:::;bjQj;a1;:::;ajQj) where
b D = fb x1;:::;b xTg is the database that is released to all analysts, b1;:::;bjQj is a sequence of bits
that indicates whether or not q(b D) is close to q(D), and a1;:::;ajQj is a sequence of approximate
answers to the queries q(D) (or ?, if q(b D) is already accurate). We write v id for the portion of
v that excludes outputs speciﬁc to analyst id’s queries. Let V0;V1 be the distribution on outputs
when the query set is Q0 and Q1, respectively.
We analyze the three parts of v separately. First we show that b D, which is shared among all
analysts, satisﬁes analyst privacy.
Claim 7.17. With probability at least 1    over the samples b x1;:::;b xT  R V0,

  ln

V0(b x1;:::;b xT)
V1(b x1;:::;b xT)

    "=2:
147Proofof Claim 7.17. To prove the claim, we show how the output b x1;:::;b xT can be viewed as
the output of an instantiation of the algorithm analyzed by Lemma 7.15. For every t 2 [T] and
b q1;:::; b qt 1, we deﬁne the measure Dt over database items to be
Dt(x) = exp
 
 (=2)
t 1 X
j=1
1 + b qj(D)   b qj(x)
!
:
Notice that if we replace a single query b q` with b q0
` and obtain the measure D0
t, then for every x 2 X,
    
ln
 
e Dt(x)
e D0
t(x)
!    
 :
Thus we can view b xt as the output of an -differentially private algorithm AD(b q1;:::; b qt 1), which
ﬁts into the framework of Lemma 7.15. (Here, b xt plays the role of yt and b q1;:::; b qt 1 plays the
role of Dt 1 in the description of the game, while the input database D is part of the description of
A).
Now, in order to apply Lemma 7.15, we need to argue the distribution on samples b qt when the
query set is Q0 is statistically close to the distribution on samples b qt when the query set is Q1. Fix
any t 2 [T] and let Q0;Q1 be the measure Qt over queries maintained by the query player when
the input query set is Q0;Q1, respectively. For q 6= q, we have
Q0(q) = Q1(q) = exp
 
 (=2)
t 1 X
j=1
1 + q(D)   q(b xj)
!
:
Additionally, we set Q0(q) = 0 (for notational convenience), while Q1(q) 2 (0;1]. Thus, if
we let P0 =  sQ0 and P1 =  sQ1, we will have SD(e P0; e P1)  1=s by Lemma 7.16. Since the
statistical distance is 1=s = 1=12T, we can apply Lemma 7.15 to show that with probability at
least 1   ,
   ln

V0(b x1;:::;b xT)
V1(b x1;:::;b xT)
    

p
T log(1=)
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52T
2

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Now that we have shown b D satisﬁes ("=2;)-one-query-to-many-analyst differential privacy,
it remains to show that the remainder of the output satisﬁes perfect one-query-to-many-analyst
privacy. Recall from the proof of Theorem 7.8 that b D will be accurate for all but s queries. That
is, if we let ffqgq2Q consist of the functions fq(D) = jq(D)   q(b D)j, then
jfj j fj(D)  gj  s;
148where  is chosen as in Theorem 7.8. By Lemma 2.11, the sparse vector algorithm will release
bits b1;:::;bjQj (the indicator vector of the subset of queries with large error) such that for every
id 2 I, the distribution on b id is ("=2;0)-differentially private with respect to a change in the
queries corresponding to any analyst id
0 6= id. Finally, for each query qj such that bj = 1, the
output to the owner of that query will include aj = qj(D) + zj where zj is an independent sample
from the Laplace distribution. These outputs do not depend on any other query, and thus are
perfectly one-query-to-many analyst private. This completes the proof of the theorem.
7.5 A One-Analyst-to-Many-Analyst Private Sanitizer
In this section we present an algorithm for answering counting queries that satisﬁes the stronger
notion of one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy. The algorithm is similar to that of Figure 18, but
with two notable modiﬁcations.
First, instead of the “query player,” we will have an “analyst player” who chooses analysts as
actions and is trying to ﬁnd an analyst id 2 [m] for which there is at least one query in Qid with
large error (recall that the queries are given to the algorithm in sets Q1;:::;Qm). That is, the
analyst player attempts to ﬁnd id 2 [m] to maximize maxq2Qid q(D)   q(b D).
Second, we will compute a database b D such that maxq2Qid jq(D)   q(b D)j is small for all but
s analysts in the set [m], rather than having the s mishandled queries. We can still use sparse
vector to ﬁnd these s analysts, however we can’t answer the queries with the Laplace mechanism,
since each of the analysts may ask an exponential number of queries. However, since there are
not too many analysts remaining, we can use s independent copies of the multiplicative weights
mechanism (each run with "0  "=
p
s) to handle each analyst’s queries.
7.5.1 Accuracy
Theorem 7.18. The algorithm in Figure 19 is (;)-accurate for
 = e O
 p
log(2d + m)logk log(m=)log
3=4(1=)
"n1=3
!
:
149Input: Database D 2 X n, and m sets of k linear queries Q1;:::;Qm. For id 2 I = [m], let
Qid = Qid [ :Qid.
Initialize: Let D0(x) = 1=jXj for each x 2 X, let I0(q) = 1=m for each id 2 I,
T = n
2=3 maxflogjXj;mg;  =
"
4
p
T log(1=)
; s = 12T:
DataPlayer:
On input an analyst b idt, for each x 2 X, update:
Dt(x) = Dt 1(x)  exp
 
  max
q2Qb idt

1 + b qt(D)   b qt(x)
2
!
Choose b xt  R e Dt and send b xt to AnalystPlayer
AnalystPlayer:
On input a data element b xt, for each id 2 I, update:
It+1(id) = It(id)  exp

  max
q2Qid

1 + q(D)   q(b xt)
2

Let Pt+1 =  sIt+1
Choose b idt+1  R e Pt+1 and send b idt+1 to DataPlayer
GenerateSynopsis:
Let b D = (b x1;:::;b xT) be a synthetic database.
For a parameter  b D > 0 to be chosen later, run the sparse vector algorithm
on the set of queries F =
n
fid(D) = maxq2Qid jq(D)   q(b D) j id 2 I
o
to
obtain a set of at most 3s analysts Iﬁnal  I.
For each analyst id 2 Iﬁnal, run MMW(D;Qid) with parameters "0 = "
10
p
slog(3s=)
and 0 = 
3s to obtain a set of answers A(id)
Output b D to all analysts and f each id 2 Iﬁnal, output Aid to analyst id.
Figure 19: A One-Analyst-to-Many-Analyst Private Sanitizer
150Proof. Aswediscussedabove, thealgorithmiscomputinganapproximateequilibriumofthegame
GD;Q(x;id) = max
id2[m]
max
q2Qid
1 + q(D)   q(x)
2
:
Let v;vs be the value and constrained value of this game, respectively. First we pin down the
quantities v and vs.
Claim 7.19. For every D;m;Q, the value and constrained value of GD;m;Q is 1=2.
The proof of this claim is omitted, but is nearly identical to that of Claim 7.9.
Let b D = 1
T
PT
t=1 b xt. By Corollary 7.7,
vs   2  max
I2s([m])
E
id Re I
"
max
q2Qid
 
1 + q(D)   q(b D)
2
!#
 v + 2:
Applying Claim 7.19 and rearranging terms, we have that with probability 1   =3,
    max
I2s([m])
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E
id Re I

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q2Qid
q(D)   q(b D)
    = max
I2s([m])

E
id Re I

max
q2Qid

 q(D)   q(b D)

 

 4
= 4

 +
maxflogjXj;logmg
T
+
4log(3=)
p
T

= O
 p
log(jXj + m)log(1=) + log(1=)
"n1=3
!
:=  b D:
The previous statement sufﬁces to show that maxq2Qid jq(D)   q(e D)j   b D for all but s analysts
id 2 I. Otherwise, the uniform distribution over the analysts for which the error bound of  b D does
not hold would be a distribution over analysts, contained in s([m]) with expected error larger
than  b D.
Since there are at most s such analysts we can run the sparse vector algorithm (Lemma 2.11),
and, with probability at least 1 =3, it will identify every analyst id such that the maximum error
over all queries in Qid is larger than  b D + SV for
SV = O
 p
slog(1=)log(m=)
"n
!
:
There are at most s such analysts. Thus, running the private multiplicative weights algorithm
(Lemma 2.16) independently for each of these analysts’ queries—with privacy parameters "0 =
151("=
p
slog(s=)) and 0 = (=s)—will yield answers such that, with probability 1   =3, for
every id 2 I0,
max
q2Qid
jq(D)   aqj  O
 
s1=4 log
1=4 jXj
p
log(sjQidj=)log
3=4(s=)
p
"n
!
 e O
 
n1=6p
log(jXj + m)log(jQidj=)log
3=4(1=)
p
"n
!
 e O
 p
log(jXj + m)log(jQidj=)log
3=4(1=)
n1=3p
"
!
:= MW:
Taking a union bound, observing that the maximum error on any query is maxf b D + SV;MWg,
and simplifying, we get that the sanitizer is (;)-accurate for
 = e O
 p
log(jXj + m)logjQidjlog(m=)log
3=4(1=)
"n1=3
!
:
7.5.2 Data Privacy
Theorem 7.20. The algorithm in Figure 19 satisﬁes (";)-differential privacy for the data.
We omit the proof of this theorem, which follows that of Theorem 7.10 almost identically.
The only difference is that in the ﬁnal step, we need to argue that running s independent copies
of multiplicative weights with privacy parameters "0 = ("=
p
slog(s=)) and 0 = (=s) sat-
isﬁes ("=3;=3)-differential privacy, which follows directly from the composition properties of
differential privacy (Theorem 2.3).
7.5.3 Query Privacy
In this section we prove query privacy for our one analyst to many analyst sanitizer.
Theorem7.21. ThealgorithminFigure19satisﬁes(";)-one-analyst-to-many-analystdifferential
privacy.
Proof. Fix a database D. Consider two analyst-adjacent sets of queries Q0;Q1. Without loss
of generality assume Q0 is just Q1 with all the queries by some analyst id replaced with a new
152set Q0(id). We write the output to all analysts as v = (b x1;:::;b xT;b1;:::;bm;A1;:::;Am) where
b D = b x1;:::;b xT is the database that is released to all analysts, b1;:::;bm is a sequence of bits that
indicates whether or not qj(b D) is close to qj(D) for every q 2 Qid, and A1;:::;Am is a sequence
consisting of the output of the multiplicative weights mechanism for every analyst id 2 I and ?
for every other analyst. Let V0;V1 be the distribution on outputs when the queries are Q0 and Q1,
respectively.
The proof closely follows the proof of one-query-to-many-analyst privacy for Algorithm 3.
Showing that the ﬁnal two parts b;A of the output are query private is essentially the same, so we
will focus on proving that b D satisﬁes one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy.
Claim 7.22. With probability at least 1    over b x1;:::;b xT  R V0,

  ln

V0(b x1;:::;b xT)
V1(b x1;:::;b xT)
     ":
Proofof Claim 7.22. To prove the claim, we show how the output b x1;:::;b xT can be viewed as the
output of an instantiation of the sanitizer analyzed by Lemma 7.15. Notice that for every t 2 [T]
and b id1;:::; b idt 1, we can write the measure Dt over database items as
Dt(x) = exp
 
 (=2)
t 1 X
j=1
max
q2Q
(b idj)
1 + b qj(D)   b qj(x)
!
:
If we replace a single analyst b id` with b id
0
`, and obtain the measure D0
t, then for every x 2 X,
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Thus we can view b xt as the output of an -differentially private algorithm MD(b id1;:::; b idt 1),
which ﬁts into the framework of Lemma 7.15. (Here, b xt plays the role of yt and b id1;:::; b idt 1
plays the role of Dt 1 in the description of the game, while the input database D is part of the
description of A).
As before, we apply Lemma 7.15, to argue that the distribution on analysts b idt when the query
set is Q0 is statistically close to the distribution on analysts b idt when the analyst set is Q1. The ar-
gument does not change signiﬁcantly, thus we can apply Lemma 7.15 to show that with probability
at least 1   ,
   ln
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153As before, the remainder of the output satisﬁes perfect one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
7.6 Another One-Query-to-Many-Analyst Private Sanitizer
So far we have presented two analyst-private sanitizers capable of answering exponentially
many queries. These sanitizers were in the ofﬂine setting, which has been the focus of the thesis.
These sanitizers were also limited in that they were only capable of answering counting queries,
whereas variants of the median mechanism [78] can answer exponentially many arbitrary low-
sensitivity queries while ensuring differential privacy.
In this section, we present a new sanitizer satisfying one-query-to-many-analyst privacy that
addresses these issues. Since we have only introduced notation and terminology for the ofﬂine
setting, we will present and analyze our sanitizer in that setting. However, it will be clear from
the construction that the sanitizer would be just as effective if the queries were speciﬁed online, so
long as the entire sequence of queries is ﬁxed in advance. That is, the sequence need not be known
to the sanitizer ahead of time, but may not be chosen adaptively in response to the answers given
by the sanitizer. In contrast, many non-query-private online sanitizers are capable of answering an
exponentially long sequence of adaptively chosen queries. See [44] for a more formal treatment of
the online setting. Although we will only describe this sanitizer formally in the case of counting
queries, in Section 7.6.4 we will discuss how it can be extended to the case of arbitrary low-
sensitivity queries.
ThenewsanitizerissimilartothemultiplicativeweightsalgorithmofHardtandRothblum[44].
In their algorithm, a “hypothesis” about the true database is maintained throughout the sequence
of queries. In particular, the hypothesis will be a probability distribution over the data universe—
essentially an inﬁnite database. When a query arrives, it is classiﬁed according to whether or
not the current hypothesis accurately answers that query. If it does, then the query is answered
according to the hypothesis. Otherwise, the query is answered with a noisy answer computed from
the true database and the hypothesis is updated using the multiplicative weights update rule.
The main challenge in making that algorithm query-private is to argue that the current hypoth-
esis does not depend too much on the previous queries. We overcome this difﬁculty by “sampling
from the hypothesis” to obtain a ﬁnite database that represents the hypothesis well, but satisﬁes
154query-privacy. We must balance the need to take many samples—so that the database we obtain by
sampling accurately reﬂects the hypothesis database, and the need to limit the impact of any one
query on the sampled database. To handle both these constraints, we introduce batching—instead
of updating every time we ﬁnd a query not well-answered by the hypothesis, we batch together s
queries at a time, and do one update on the average of these queries to limit the inﬂuence of any
single query.
A note on terminology: the execution of the algorithm takes place in several rounds, where
each round processes one query. Rounds where the query is answered using the real database are
called bad rounds; rounds that are not bad are good rounds. We will split the rounds into T epochs
and the distributions Dt and hypotheses Ht correspond to the t-th epoch.
7.6.1 Accuracy
First, we sketch a proof that the online sanitizer answers counting queries accurately. Intu-
itively, there are three ways that our algorithm might give an inaccurate answer, and we treat each
separately. First, in a good round, the answer given by the hypothesis may be a bad approximation
to the true answer. Second, in a bad round, the answer given may have too much noise. We ad-
dress these two cases with straightforward arguments showing that the noise is not too large in any
round.
The third way the algorithm may be inaccurate is if there are more than R bad rounds, and
the algorithm terminates early. We show that this is not the case using a potential argument: after
sufﬁciently many bad rounds, the hypothesis DT and the sample HT will be accurate for all queries
in the stream, and thus there will be no more bad rounds. The potential argument is a natural
extension of the argument in Hardt and Rothblum [44] to handle the additional error coming from
taking samples from Dt to obtain Ht.
Theorem 7.23. The algorithm in Figure 20 is (;)-accurate for
 = O
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:
Proof. First we condition on the event that the magnitude of the noise is sufﬁciently small in every
round. Speciﬁcally,
8i 2 [k]; jzij   log(4k=): (7.1)
155Input: Database D 2 X n, sequence Q = fq1;:::;qkg of counting queries
Initialize: D0(x) = 1=jXj for each x 2 X, H0 = D0, U0 = ;, s0 = s + Lap(2="), t = 0,
r = 0;
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AnswerQueries:
While t < T;r < R;i  k, on input query qi:
Let zi = Lap()
If jqi(D)   qi(Ht)   zij  : Output: qi(Ht)
Else:
Let u = sgn(qi(D)   qi(Ht) + zi)  qi and let Ut = Ut [ fug, r = r + 1
Output: qi(D) + zi
If jUtj > st:
Let (Dt+1;Ht+1) = Update(Dt;Ut)
Let Ut+1 = ;, and let st+1 = s + Lap(2=") and let r = 0.
Advance to query qt+1
Update:
Input: Distribution Dt, update queries Ut = fu1;:::;ustg
For each x 2 X:
Let ut(x) = 1
s
Pst
j=1 uj(x) and update Dt+1(x) = e(=2)ut(x)  Dt(x):
Normalize Dt+1 and let Ht+1 be b n independent samples from Dt+1
Return: (Dt+1;Ht+1)
Figure 20: Analyst-Private Multiplicative Weights for Counting Queries
156A standard analysis of the tails of the Laplace distribution shows that (7.1) holds with probability
at least 1   =4.
Next we show that, conditioned on (7.1), the algorithm answers every query accurately so long
as it has not terminated before answering all k queries.
Claim 7.24. Assume (7.1) holds. Then prior to termination of the algorithm, every query is an-
swered with error at most  +  log(4k=)
Proofof Claim 7.24. First we consider bad rounds. In these rounds qi is answered with qi(D)+zi.
Conditioned on (7.1), all of these queries are answered sufﬁciently accurately.
Now we consider good rounds. In these rounds we answer with qi(Ht), and we will only have
a good round if jqi(D)   qi(Ht)   zij  . Conditioned on (7.1), we can only have a good round
if jqi(D)   qi(Ht)j   +  log(4k=).
Now we must show that the algorithm does not terminate early. Recall that it can terminate
early either because it hits a limit on the number of epochs, or because it hits a limit on the number
of bad rounds. We will use a potential argument to show that there cannot be too many epochs.
The number of bad rounds that is in epoch t is a random variable st, and we will also show that
with high probability, there are not too many bad rounds within the T epochs.
In doing the analysis, it will be useful to establish the property that the values of st are close to
s on average. Let St = st   s, be the value of the noise added to s in the t-th epoch. We want to
condition on the event
jSj 
8
p
T log(4=)
"

T
2
; (7.2)
where the ﬁnal equality holds for large enough T, so long as " and  are not too small as a function
of T. We can easily deduce that event (7.2) holds with probability at least 1   =2 from the
following lemma.
Lemma 7.25 ([42]). Let X1;:::;XT be T independent draws from Lap(2="), and let X =
PT
t=1 Xt. Then,
Pr
"
jXj >
8
p
T log(2=)
"
#
< :
We also want to establish that, in every epoch, Ht is “close” to Dt in the sense that
8i 2 [k]; jqi(Dt)   qi(Ht)j  =4; (7.3)
157where t is the epoch in which the i-th query is asked. Recall that Ht consists of b n random samples
from the distribution Dt. Thus, a standard Chernoff bound will establish that jqi(Dt)   qi(Ht)j 
p
4log(4k=)=b n  =4 with probability at least 1   =4.
We will now demonstrate that, with high probability, the algorithm does not terminate early.
Claim 7.26. Assume (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3) hold. Then the algorithm does not terminate before
answering all k queries.
Proofof Claim 7.26. We will use a potential argument on the sequence of distributions Dt. The
potential function will be
t = KL(DjjDt) :=
X
x2X
D(x)log

D(x)
Dt(x)

:
Elementaryproperties ofthe potentialfunction showthat t  0 and 0 = KL(DjjD0)  logjXj.
The decrease in potential from epoch to epoch can be expressed in terms of the error of the current
distribution on the update query.
Lemma 7.27 (See e.g. [44]).
t 1   t   (ut(D)   ut(Dt 1))   
2:
Since the potential function is bounded between 0 and logjXj, we can get a bound on the num-
ber of epochs by showing that the potential decreases signiﬁcantly between most epochs. Given
the preceding lemma, we simply need to show that the queries u1;u2;::: have large (positive)
error.
Recall that ut = 1
s
P
u2Ut u. Also recall that if u 2 U and u = qi, then the reason qi is in U is
because qi(D)   qi(Ht 1) + zi > . Similarly, if u = :qi, then qi(D)   qi(Ht 1) + zi <  . We
will focus on the ﬁrst case where qi(D)   qi(Ht 1) + zi > , the other case will follow similarly.
We can get a lower bound on u(D)   u(Dt 1) as follows.
u(D)   u(Dt 1) = (u(D)   u(Ht 1) + zi) + (qi(Ht 1)   qi(Dt 1) + zi)
 (u(D)   u(Ht 1) + zi)   jzij   jqi(Ht 1)   qi(Dt 1)j
    jzij   jqi(Ht 1)   qi(Dt 1)j
158We need to show that the right-hand side of the ﬁnal expression is large. By (7.1), we have that
jzij   log(4k=)  =4. By (7.3), we have that jqi(Ht 1)   qi(Dt 1)j  =4. So we have
stablished that for every u 2 Ut,
u(D)   u(Dt 1)     =4   =4 = =2:
We can now express the error on ut in terms of jUtj as
ut(D)   ut(Dt 1) =
1
s
X
u2Ut
u(D)   u(Dt 1) 
jUtj
2s
:
Inturn, wegetanexpressionforthetotaldecreaseinpotentialafterT epochsintermsof
P
tT jUtj,
and can apply (7.2) to lower bound the total decrease in potential.
T   0 

2s
 
X
tT
jUtj
!
  T
2
=

2s
 
X
tT
st
!
  T
2 =
T
2
+

2s
 
X
tT
St
!
  T
2 =
T
4
  T
2:
Now, noting that   8, we have
T   0  2
2T   
2T  
2T:
Thus, conditioning on all the events above, T  logjXj=2  n4=5 logjXj. Thus we have shown
that the algorithm will not terminate by reaching its limit of epochs. Finally, we must show that
the algorithm does not terminate because it reaches its limit of bad rounds. Assuming (7.2), the
number of bad rounds is at most
T X
t=1
st =
T X
t=1
(s + St)  2Ts:
Thus, assuming (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3), the algorithm does not terminate due to reaching its limit
on the number of epochs or bad rounds, and indeed answers all k queries prior to terminating.
By a union bound, the probability that all of (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3) hold is at least 1   . Thus,
combining the two claims proves the theorem.
1597.6.2 Data Privacy
In this section we establish that our sanitizer satisﬁes differential privacy. As discussed in the
introduction, we will rely on the generic blueprint of MIDC—the combination of sparse vector
with an IDC (Section 2.4.3).
Theorem 7.28. The algorithm in Figure 20 satisﬁes (";)-differential privacy.
Proof sketch. We will simply outline how to cast our algorithm as the combination of an IDC with
the sparse vector algorithm. There is some ambiguity caused by our use of the term “update”
within the speciﬁcation of the algorithm. Here, the different periods for the IDC correspond to the
intervals between bad rounds (rather than update rounds). The approximation maintained in each
period is the state (Dt;Ht;Ut;st;r). The updates have two types, if jUtj < st then the update is
simply to add the query u to Ut. If jUtj = st, then the update is to perform a multiplicative weights
computationandresamplethehypothesisHt andresettheotherparameters. Noticethatthenumber
of update rounds, in this sense, is at most B = TR. Thus, we can verify that the parameters for the
surrounding sparse vector algorithm are set appropriately to ensure (";)-differential privacy.
7.6.3 Query Privacy
More interestingly, we show that this sanitizer satisﬁes one-query-to-many-analyst privacy.
Theorem 7.29. The algorithm in Figure 20 is (;)-one-query-to-many-analyst private.
Proof. Fix the input database D and the values of the Laplace noise, z1;:::;zk. We will show that
for every value of the Laplace random variables, the sanitizer satisﬁes analyst privacy. Consider
any two adjacent sequences of queries Q0;Q1. It will be sufﬁcient to restrict to the case where
Q0 = q1;:::;qk and Q1 = q;q1;:::;qk. If the query on which Q0 and Q1 differ is not the ﬁrst
query in the sequence, then the portion of the transcript of the sanitizer that answers the common
preﬁx of queries will reveal no information about whether the query sequence is Q0 or Q1.
We want to argue that the answers to all queries in Q are private, but not that the answer to
q is private (if it is requested). We will represent the answers to the queries in Q by a sequence
f(Ht;it)gt2[T] where Ht is the hypothesis used in the t-th epoch and it is the index of the last query
in that epoch (the one that caused the sanitizer to switch to hypothesis Ht). Observe that for a
ﬁxed database D, Laplace noise, and sequence of queries Q, we can simulate the output of the
160sanitizer for all queries in Q given only this information—once we ﬁx a hypothesis Ht, we can
determine whether any query q will be added to the update set Ut for this epoch. So once we begin
epoch t with hypothesis Ht, we have ﬁxed all the bad rounds, and once we are given it, we have
determined when epoch t ends and epoch t + 1 begins. At this point, we ﬁx the next hypothesis
Ht+1 and continue simulating.
Formally, let V0;V1 be distribution over sequences f(Ht;it)g when the query sequence is
Q0;Q1, respectively. We will show that with probability at least 1   , if f(Ht;it)gt2[T] is drawn
from V0, then    ln

V0(f(Ht;it)g)
V1(f(Ht;it)g)
     ":
Recall that Ut is the set of queries that are used to update the distribution Dt to Dt+1. We will
use Ut =
St
j=0 Ut to denote the set of all queries used to update the distributions D0;:::;Dt.
Notice that if q does not get added to the set U0, then V0 and V1 will be distributed identically.
Therefore, supposeq 2 U0. Firstwemustreasonaboutthejointdistributionoftheﬁrstcomponent
of the output.
Claim 7.30. For all H0;i0,    ln

V0(H0;i0)
V1(H0;i0)
    
"
2
:
Proofof Claim 7.30. Since H0 does not depend on the query sequence, it will be identically dis-
tributed in both cases. Indeed, H0 is simply b n random samples from the uniform distribution over
X. Once H0 is ﬁxed, we can determine whether a query q will cause an update. Fix query qi0 and
assume that it is the s-th update query in the sequence q1;:::;qk and the (s + 1)-st update query
in the sequence q;q1;:::;qk. Then V0(i0jH0) = Pr[s0 = s] and V1(i0jH0) = Pr[s0 = s + 1]. By
the basic properties of the Laplace distribution,
 
 ln

V0(i0jH0)
V1(i0jH0)
 
  
"
2
:
Now we reason about the remaining components (H1;i1);:::;(HT;iT).
161Claim 7.31. For every H0;i0, with probability at least 1    over the choice of the sequence of
components v = (H1;i1;:::;HT;iT)  R (V0 j vt 1), we have

  ln

V0(v j H0;i0)
V1(v j H0;i0)

   
"
2
:
Proofof Claim 7.31. We will show that v is the b nT-fold composition of ("0;0)-differentially pri-
vate algorithms for suitable "0. Fix a preﬁx vt 1 = H0;i0;:::;Ht 1;it 1. Given this preﬁx, we
can determine for any given sequence of queries q1;:::;qit 1 or q;q1;:::;qit 1 which queries are
in the update set. Moreover, if U<t is the set of all update queries from the ﬁrst query sequence,
and U0
<t is the set of all update queries from the second sequence, then U<t4U0
<t = q.
Now consider the distribution of Ht. Each sample in Ht comes from the distribution Dt, which
is either
Dt(x) / exp
 
 

s
X
u2U<t
u
!
or D
0
t(x) / exp
0
@ 

s
X
u2U0
<t
u
1
A
Given this, it is easy to see that for any x we have
   ln

Dt(x)
D0
t(x)
     2=s := "0:
Notice that once it 1 and Ht are ﬁxed, it depends only on the choice of st (the number of bad
rounds to allow before updating the hypothesis), which is independent of the query sequence and
thus incurs no additional privacy loss. Thus the only privacy loss comes from the b n samples in
each of the T epochs, and the algorithm is a b nT-fold adaptive composition of ("0;0) differentially
private algorithms. A standard composition analysis (Theorem 2.3) shows that the components v
are("0;)-DPfor"0 = "0
p
2b nT log(1=)+2"2
0T  "=2. Thiscompletestheproofoftheclaim.
Combining these two claims proves the theorem.
7.6.4 Handling Arbitrary Low-Sensitivity Queries
We can also modify this algorithm to answer arbitrary -sensitive queries, albeit with worse
accuracy bounds. As with our ofﬂine algorithms, we modify the algorithm to run the multiplicative
weights updates over the set of databases X n and adjust the parameters. When we run multiplica-
tive weights over a support of size jXjn (rather than jXj), the number of epochs increases by a
factor of n, which in turn affects the amount of noise we have to add to ensure privacy.
162We will now sketch the argument, ignoring the parameters  and  for simplicity. In order
to get convergence of the multiplicative weights distribution, we need to take T 
nlogjXj
2 and
in order to ensure that Ht approximates Dt sufﬁciently well, we take b n 
q
logk
2 . Recall that to
argue analyst privacy, we viewed the algorithm as being (essentially) the b nT-fold composition of
"0-analyst private algorithms, where "0 = =s. In order to get analyst privacy, we needed

s
.
"
p
b nT

"2
p
nlogjXjlog
1=4 k
=) s &
p
nlogjXjlog
1=4 k
"
:
Once we have set s (as a function of the other parameters) to achieve analyst privacy, we can work
on establishing data privacy. As before, the number of bad rounds will be
R  sT 
n3=2 log
3=2 jXjlog
1=4 k
"3 :
Given this bound on the number of bad rounds, we need to set
 

p
R
"

n3=4 log
3=4 jXjlog
1=8 k
"3=2
to obtain data privacy, and
   logk 
n3=4 log
3=4 jXjlog
9=8 k
"3=2
to ensure that all the update queries truly have large error on the current hypothesis Ht.
The ﬁnal error bound will come from observing that  and  are both lower bounds on the
error. The error is bounded below by  because that is the noise threshold set by the algorithm, and
 must be larger than  or else we cannot argue that multiplicative weights makes progress during
update rounds. Thus setting  =  will approximately minimize the error.
The ﬁnal error bound we obtain (ignoring the parameters  and ) is
O
 
2=5n3=10 log
3=10 jXjlog
9=20 k
"2=5
!
;
which gives a non-trivial error guarantee when   1=n3=4.
1637.7 A Secrecy-of-the-Sample Lemma
In this section we give a formal proof of Lemma reflem:sdtodp. First we restate the lemma.
Consider the following process:
 Fix an (";)-differentially private algorithm A: U ! R and a bit b 2 f0;1g. Let D0 = ;.
 For t = 1;:::T
– The (possibly randomized) adversary B(y1;:::;yt;r) chooses two distributions B0
t;B1
t
such that SD(B0
t;B1
t)  .
– Choose xt  R Bb
t and let Dt = Dt 1 [ fxtg.
– Choose yt  R A(Dt).
For a ﬁxed algorithm A and adversary B, let V 0 be the distribution on (y1;:::;yT) when b = 0
and V 1 be the distribution on (y1;:::;yT) when b = 1.
Lemma 7.32. If "  1=2 and T  1=12, then with probability at least 1   T   0 over y =
(y1;:::;yT)  R V 0,
   ln

V 0(y)
V 1(y)
     "(T)
p
2T log(1=0) + 30"
2(T)T:
Proof. Given distributions B0;B1 such that SD(B0;B1)  , there exist distributions C0;C1;C
such that B0 = C0 + (1   )C and B1 = C1 + (1   )C. An alternative way to sample from
the distribution Bb is to ﬂip a coin c 2 f0;1g with bias , and if the coin comes up 1, sample from
Cb, otherwise sample from C.
Consider a partial transcript (r;y1;:::;yt 1). Fixing the randomness of the adversary will ﬁx
the coins c1;:::;cT, which determine whether or not the adversary samples from Cb
j or Cj for
j 2 [T]. Let w =
PT
j=1 cj. Fixing the randomness of the adversary and y1;:::;yt 1 will also ﬁx
the distributions Cj for j  t and, in rounds for which cj = 0, will ﬁx the samples xj for j  t. If
we let D0
t;D1
t denote the database Dt in the case where b = 0;1, respectively, then we have
jD
0
t   D
1
tj 
t X
j=1
cj 
T X
j=1
cj = w:
164Thus,    ln

V 0
t (ytjr;y1;:::;yt 1)
V 1
t (ytjr;y1;:::;yt 1)
     w";
and
E

ln

V 0
t (ytjr;y1;:::;yt 1)
V 1
t (ytjr;y1;:::;yt 1)

 w"minfe
w"   1;1g;
where the expectation is taken over V 0
t jr;y1;:::;yt 1.
Fix w 2 f0;:::;Tg. Conditioning on any r such that
PT
t=1 ct = w, we can apply Azuma’s
inequality as in [35] to obtain
D
T+0
1 (V
0jwjjV
1jw)  w"
p
2T log(1=0) + w"minfe
w"   1;1gT:
Thus,
D
T+0
1 (V
0jjV
1) 
T X
w=1
Pr[w]

w"
p
2T log(1=0) + w"minfe
w"   1;1gT

=
T X
w=1
Pr[w]w"
p
2T log(1=0) +
T X
w=1
Pr[w]w"minfe
w"   1;1gT: (7.4)
First, we consider the left sum in (7.4).
T X
w=1
Pr[w]w"
p
2T log(1=0)
= "
p
2T log(1=0)
T X
w=1

T
w


w(1   )
T ww
= "
p
2T log(1=0)(T)
T 1 X
w=0

T   1
w


w(1   )
T 1 w (
 T
w

w =
 T 1
w 1

T)
= "
p
2T log(1=0)(T)
165Now, we work on the right sum in (7.4).
T X
w=1
Pr[w](w"minfe
w"   1;1gT)
=
T X
w=1

T
w


w(1   )
T w (w"minfe
w"   1;1gT)
=
 
4"
2T

1=" X
w=1

T
w


w(1   )
T ww + ("T)
T X
w=1="

T
w


w(1   )
T ww
=
 
4"
2T

1=" X
w=1

eT
w
w
w
2 + ("T)
T X
w=1="

eT
w
w
w

 
4"
2T

1=" X
w=1
(eT)
w + ("T)
T X
w=1="
(eT)
w (w2=ww  1 for w 2 N)
 4"
2T(2eT) + 2(eT)
 1=""T  3"
2T (eT  1=4)
 24"
2(T)T + 4"
2(T)T  30"
2(T)T
Combining our bounds for the left and right sums in (7.4) completes the proof.
166Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have made several contributions to understanding the computational complex-
ity of natural privacy-preserving data analysis tasks. We ﬁrst examined the question of how many
arbitrary counting queries can be answered by an efﬁcient sanitizer. In Chapter 3, we answered this
question by showing that, assuming the existence of one-way functions, there is no differentially
private sanitizer that can accurate answer n2+o(1) arbitrary counting queries.
In light of the previous result, it was natural to ask whether or not it is possible to efﬁciently and
privately answer many more than n2 simple counting queries. In particular, we studied the com-
putational complexity of answering marginal queries. In Chapter 4, we showed that computational
complexity is still a major barrier even for marginal queries. Speciﬁcally, we showed that, assum-
ing the existence of one-way functions, there is no efﬁcient, differentially private one-shot sanitizer
that generate private synthetic data preserving even the answers to all 2-way marginals. We also
showed that if synthetic data is not required, then there exist sanitizers for marginal queries that
are faster and require less data than previous approaches. In Chapter 5 we introduced a one-shot
sanitizer for k-way marginals on a database with d attributes that has running time and mini-
mum database size roughly dO(
p
k), which is much less than the number of such queries. Then in
Chapter 6 we considered one-shot sanitizers that have nearly optimal minimum database size. We
showed that when k  d, such a one-shot sanitizer for k-way marginals exists with running time
2o(d), improving on the 2d running time required by the private multiplicative weights algorithm
with only a slight decrease in utility.
Despite these results, there is still a signiﬁcant gap in our knowledge between private-data-
167analysis tasks for which we have efﬁcient algorithms and tasks that we know are intractable. One
important open problem is to design faster algorithms for answering k-way marginal queries. Ar-
guably, the “holy grail” would be a one-shot sanitizer that is :01-accurate for all k-way marginal
queries with running time poly(d;k;n) and minimum database size poly(d;k). We would like to
call attention to one appealing step towards this goal that may be open to attack: ﬁnd a differen-
tially private one-shot sanitizer that is :01-accurate for all k-way marginal queries and has running
time poly(dk;n) and minimum database size poly(d;k).
Another signiﬁcant open question is whether we can prove hardness results (that do not rely on
synthetic data) for simple families of counting queries. Currently, the simplest family for which
we know answering n2+o(1) counting queries is hard consists of depth-6 circuits of size poly(d;n),
which is a family of size  2n. Dwork et al. [32] showed that, under certain cryptographic
assumptions there is a family of size roughly 2
p
n queries for which private and accurate one-shot
sanitization is hard. An unsatisfying feature of these results is that the size of the query families in
question depends on n. Most natural families of counting queries, such as marginals, have size that
is independent of n, and depends only on d. Given our current state of knowledge, it is possible that
foreveryfamilyofqueriesofsize2poly(d), thereexistsanefﬁcientone-shotsanitizerthatguarantees
accuracy on databases of size poly(d). However, we conjecture that such a statement is false. Thus,
a major open problem is to ﬁnd a (possibly not natural) family of counting queries of size 2poly(d)
for which there is no private, efﬁcient, and accurate one-shot sanitizer. Dwork et al. [32] showed
that such a result would imply the existence of a certain weak form of traitor-tracing scheme
with “constant-size ciphertexts” (length that depends only on the security parameter), which is
a notorious open problem. However, recent advances in cryptography, in particular functional
encryption, suggest that this open problem may be close to a resolution, which could in turn lead
to new hardness-of-sanitization results.
In addition to studying the complexity of natural tasks in private data analysis, in Chapter 7
we designed new sanitizers that ensure differential privacy for both the data subjects and for the
data analysts. In particular, we focused on sanitizers that guarantee privacy for the analyst even
if all other analysts collude, and constructed sanitizers that answer exponentially many queries
while ensuring the privacy of a single query asked by one analyst (one-query-to-many-analyst
privacy) or all of the queries asked by one analyst (one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy). In the
former case, we were able to answer many arbitrary counting queries while achieving accuracy
168e O(1=
p
n), which is the optimal dependence on n up to polylogarithmic factors. Although our
analyst-private sanitizers achieved better accuracy than was previously known, they still do not
match the accuracy achieved by differentially private sanitizers without a guarantee of analyst
privacy. Thus, the main open question raised by the results of Chapter 7 is whether or not there
is any gap between sanitizers satisfying some notion of analyst differential privacy and those that
merely satisfy differential privacy for the data subjects.
Our belief is that the study of each of these open problems will lead to progress towards resolv-
ing the dilemma of privacy-preserving data analysis.
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